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Abstract
Within the context of the town of Liverpool between the years 1815 and 1860, the entire range 
of collective violence is considered, from brawls outside public houses to political protest. The 
forces available for the suppression arid prevention of riot are also investigated. Particular 
attention is paid to the police, both to the miscellaneous organisations of variable efficiency 
available up to 1835, and to the new force established in 1836.
A simple method of categorizing riotous incidents according to their apparent motive is 
proposed. This is based on contemporary assumptions as revealed in Press reports; it is argued 
that these would be shared by those who determined the way collective violence was 
controlled. Using these categories, comparisons are made between the measures of prevention, 
dispersal, and punishment applied to incidents of different types. Where the nature of the 
available information permits translation into numeric terms, statistical tests are used. The 
findings for the years 1815 to 1835 are then compared with those for the years 1836 to 1860.
It is shown that before 1836 the severity of measures of control varied according to the category 
to which an mcident belonged. After 1836, with the single exception of political protest, much 
more uniformity of handling is found. This finding can then be related to theories of the causes 
of riotous disorder implicit in local and contemporary records in a way which relates to the 
work of historians of crime of other types.
Abstract
Riot and its Control in Liverpool, 1815-1860
Chapter One: Introduction
The object of this study is to propose an alternative approach to the problems of collective 
violence. By at first ignoring the question of motive, and exarnining the entire range, from 
public house brawl to attempted revolution, a scheme of classification can perhaps be 
developed which, while it cannot reflect the inaccessible beliefs and aspirations of the 
participants, makes use of such information as is available in a sufficient number of cases. This 
scheme can then be used to investigate collective violence within a limited area and time, with 
the hope that there will be some questions which can thereby be approached more effectively. 
In particular, it may help in assessing the motives of those using the law and the forces of law 
enforcement against collective violence, and to estimate the relative importance of the 
protection of individual citizens on the one hand and the maintenance of the existing 
distribution of power on the other.
The study of riot is in itself nothing new. In 1964, George Rude wrote that "no historical 
phenomenon has been so thoroughly neglected by historians as the crowd".* This is no longer 
true. Before that date there had been the work of Beloff on disorder in the seventeenth century, 
Darvall on the Luddites, Mather on the Chartists, and Hobsbawm on the machine-breakers 
and other pre-political protest movements (or movements in which he found elements of 
protest).^ Since then, as the boundaries between history and the social sciences have grown
* G. Rude, The Crowd in History 1730-1848, London,1981, p. 3
2 M. Beloff, Public Order and Popular Disturbances, 1660-1714, London, 1938; F. O. Darvall, 
Popular Disturbances and Public O rder in Regency England, London, 1969 (1934); F. C. M ather, 
Public O rder in the Age o f the Chartists, M anchester, 1959; E. J. Hobsbawm , Primitive Rebels,
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more permeable, more attention has been paid to the crowd, and, in particular, the crowd as 
involved in riot or disorder. Rudé's choice of this neutral word was necessary to avoid the 
assumption that "the mob" was a permanent phenomenon, continuing to exist even between 
riots in some area of mean streets like London's St. Giles'. Perhaps now that he has shown that 
rioters were drawn from a much wider area of society the word can be used again to describe 
a crowd when engaged in a riot.
The eighteenth century has been a productive field for historians of riot. The typical form has 
usually been taken to be the bread riot, and it has been argued that trade disputes are closely 
related, either because both can be seen as "class protests" or, more simply, because early trade 
disputes were often mainly concerned with the adequacy of wages in relation to bread prices. 
Works like Thompson's on the "moral economy" of the crowd and Stevenson's study of 
English riots^ have described a system of interactions between the law, as invoked by local JPs, 
and popular protest, characterised by restrained and ritualised violence and seizure of goods. 
It has been shown that such riots were frequently successful. Thompson's influential paper 
on the legitimisation of disorder by shared community values has played a part in 
concentrating attention on the protest-based motivation of riot. It is probable that many rioters 
believed themselves justified in using violence, yet in some cases the belief was less tenable than 
in others; assaulting a constable who was attempting to stop a fight, for example. By collecting 
information mainly from major protest-based riots, the existence of riot motivated by the 
self-interest of smaller and less reputable groups of people can be obscured. The same narrow 
focus applies to John Bohstedf* who has placed this system of protest in its context as typical 
of small urban communities. He has shown how disruption of these communities by
M anchester, 1978; E. J. Hobsbawm , "The M achine Breakers" in Past and Present, 1, Feb 1952, pp. 
57-70.
2 E. P. Thom pson "The M oral Economy o f the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century" in Past and 
Present 50, February 1971, pp .76-136; J. Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in England, 1700-1870, 
London, 1979.
^ J. Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics in England and Wales, 1790-1810, Cambridge, Mass.,
and London, 1983.
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urbanisation and capitalist industrialisation destroyed the political relationships upon which 
riots of this kind relied, and how the destruction of this "viable politics of riot" was crucial to 
the development of new political movements.
Although many features of eighteenth century riot persist into the nineteenth century, it is 
these new political movements, characterised by labour historians^ as looking forwards to 
radical changes in society rather backwards to tradition, which have attracted most attention. 
Yet it is questionable whether the pattern which Bohstedt discerned in Manchester was 
necessarily to be found in all areas of rapid urbanisation.
Bohstedt himself states that Manchester was an extreme case, "at one end of the social 
spectrum", and that other forms of class alienation existed elsewhere.® The Liverpool case, 
however, caimot be easily fitted into a linear "spectrum". Riot no longer served as a viable 
political mechanism, although it continued to be a well-known phenomenon. This loss had 
not led to class politics developing in the pattern which Bohstedt discerned in Manchester. 
Perhaps Bohstedt's theory, powerful though it is, requires some enrichment before it can 
account for the full range of ways of undergoing urbanisation.
Liverpool, too, grew fast during the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Although 
smaller than Manchester, Liverpool was of the same order of size, being one of the largest 
towns in Britain. Urbanisation proceeded similarly in the two towns, but industrialisation did 
not. The Liverpool economy was, and remained, principally commercial. From this different 
economic background developed very different social relationships, and these relationships 
were reflected in a very different pattern of riots. Between 1815 and 1860, a later and (at least 
in the sense of size) a more "urban" period than Bohstedt's, riotous behaviour in Liverpool 
seems to have consisted to a great extent of fighting between groups of working men. The use
 ^ G . Rude The Crowd in History ..., and Ideology and Protest, London, 1980; E. P. Thom pson, The 
M aking o f the English W orking Class, London, 1962; E. J. H obsbaw m , Primitive Rebels, 
M anchester, 1978.
® Bohstedt, Riots and Community P o litics  p. 223
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of riot to constrain the actions of more powerful groups was rare in comparison with its use 
between Catholics and Protestants, between Tory working men and Radicals, or between 
strikers and strike-breakers.
Bohstedt derives his concept of class from E. P. Thompson, whose words he slightly adapts:
Class happens when as a result o f experience a group o f people com e to feel and to articulate
their com m on interests as opposed to those o f other groups o f people’
The experience of Liverpool shows that phenomena other than class can develop out of shared 
experience. It may be that the difference arose out of the tendency of prosperous workers to 
take a short-term rather than a long-term view of their prospects for either improvement in 
their individual lot or, in bad times, for maintenance of their small privileges. It may be that 
the much greater variety in types of employment divided the workforce and thus made it less 
capable of developing a united consciousness than the workforce of a city such as Manchester. 
However it arose, there was Httle sign, either in peaceful or in violent activity, that workers here 
felt themselves to be united in opposition to the exploitation of their employers. The 
shipwrights, the ehte of the town's workforce, came instead to identify their interests as 
opposed to those of competing workmen from other towns, but linked to those of Liverpool's 
merchants. Many of the Protestant workers came to see the Catholic Irish immigrants as their 
opponents. Many of the Irish inhabitants looked to a rectification of the relations between 
Ireland and England for the amendment of their condition. Many if not most of the town's 
native workers appear to have inclined towards the view that they and their employers were 
jointly engaged in promoting the fortunes of their town and trade. Perhaps Manchester, with 
a narrower range of industry, could be seen as moving towards the possession of a united 
working class during the first half of the nineteenth century; in Liverpool, the phrase "working 
classes" can still be used to describe the fragmented groupings of workers. The community 
as a single entity could arguably be said to have been replaced, not by a population divided 
according to class interests, but by a complex structure of groups of individuals linked by ties 
of acquaintanceship, trade, sect, and neighbourhood.
’ J. Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics , p. 69
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The boundaries of some groups were drawn more clearly than others. The freemen of the 
town, sole holders of the parliamentary franchise before 1832, were perhaps the most neatly 
defined group. It can be claimed that most freemen felt more strongly than other townsmen 
that they belonged to the town of Liverpool, and indeed that Liverpool belonged to them, as 
collective owners (at least in name) of the town's estates. Other groups expressed their identity 
in other ways. Men employed in the trades of the port, for example, proclaimed their unity (at 
some periods) by marching together in procession. For others, the defining factor was 
nationality; the Irish were the most prominent such body, but there were also Welsh and 
Scottish immigrants who celebrated their identity on national saints' days. Sectarian divisions 
often corresponded to national ones, but the relationship was not exact.
Riotous crowds could often be identified as being drawn from one or another of these 
overlapping groups. The degree of to which groups accepted violent means of self-expression 
or protest varied. Men in port-related trades, for example, generally used more violent 
measures in trade disputes than those employed in the town.
As the nineteenth century progressed, the development of policing combined with the rapid 
expansion of the press to increase the recording of minor incidents, including attacks on the 
police, so that more riots and affrays could be identified. This helps the study of crowd 
violence, while at the same time it confuses estimates of frequency.
Many historians have concentrated on periods of severe rioting such as the Swing riots or the 
Luddite or Chartist years.* Stevenson's is the most comprehensive of the surveys of riot.^ His 
wide coverage is achieved at a cost, which includes the need to group riots together into 
epidemics without the possibility of examining the credentials of each incident for membership 
of its group. This method of handling also means that less attention is paid to small riots
* E. J. Hobsbaw m  and G. Rude, Captain Swing, Harm ondsw orth, 1973; F. O. Darvall, Popular 
D isturbance and Public Order in Regency England, London, 1969; F . C. M ather, Public O rder in 
the Age o f the Chartists, M anchester, 1959.
5 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances...,
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unrelated to epidemics. While the nature of major outbreaks has been thoroughly examined, 
and the degree of protest or rebellion inherent in each has been much discussed, less is known 
about smaller incidents. When statistics of commitals are quoted, they include riots of differing 
natures, in proportions which are not known. Stevenson is clearly aware of this problem, and 
at times he stresses the difficulty; for example:
there are two very different questions involved ... one which involves the threat o f revolution and
one which refers to a ... degree of m ore general disturbance.!")
It is not always clear, however, which riots are to be counted Under which heading. It has been 
necessary to make use of secondary sources, where classification has sometimes had to be 
adopted from the original.** Stevenson's main concern is with protest; the result is that, while 
it is scarcely possible to doubt that there was a considerable reduction in the level of 
protest-related collective violence in England after about 1848, he does not enter into the 
question whether this reduction extended to other kinds of collective violence, such as 
public-house affrays.
Perhaps only a local survey can explore fully the entire range of collective violence. One such 
is David Philips' study of disorder in the Black Country, but here the selection of cases has 
been left to the authorities, since cases are included either because the Riot Act proclamation 
was read or because charges of rioting were brought.*^ This excludes cases of collective violence 
not treated as riot by ma^strates or police.
In most studies, stress has been on the causes and forms of riot, and less attention has been 
given to control. Darvall and Mather ^ve good accounts of the mechanism of the law in their 
periods. Critchley's The Conquest of Violence is flawed by an insufficiently critical approach;
*° Stevenson, Popular Disturbances   p .319.
*1 E.g. pp.306-307,
*2 D. Philips "Riots and Public O rder in the Black Country, 1835- 1860" in Stevenson and Quinault,
Popular Protest and Public Disorder, London, 1974.
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the very title betrays his unjustified optimism. Stevenson has given an account of methods of 
control before 1829, but in a short paper dealing with the whole of England which necessarily 
concentrates on well-defined protests.*^
After 1829, histories of the police often deal only incidentally with operations against riot. The 
debate as to the importance of riot as a reason for the foundation of the new police forces 
apart, the group of criminal offences which can be classified as riotous (small when compared 
with the entire range of crime) is not often handled separately. Even when "disorder" is set 
apart, it links riot with offences such as drunkenness, street gambling, and prostitution, to 
which it is only tenuously related. Exceptions include Storch on hostility to the new police, 
and Emsley, who shows that riot control before and after 1829 exhibits considerable 
continuity.*"*
The interaction between police, magistrates, local government, and Home Office has similarly 
been only partly analysed. Philips' study of the changes in the mechanism of law and order 
concentrates on first begirmings, and therefore on London.*® Keller examines the dialogue 
between police, crowds, government and law in the context of London, where a special 
relationship between Home Secretary and police applied, and also selects riots and public 
meetings which were productive of legal change.*® It has been argued that heavy reliance on 
official sources for such studies can produce an artificial coherence between incidents widely
*3 Darvall, Popular D isturbance ...; M ather, Public Order...; T . A. Critchley, T he Conquest o f Violence, 
London, 1970; J. Stevenson "Social Control and the Prevention o f Riots in England, 1798-1829" in 
A. P. Donajgrodzki (ed). Social Control in Nineteenth Century Britain, London, 1977.
*"* R. D. Storch "The Plague of the Blue Locusts" in International Journal o f Social History 20, pp. 
61-90, and "The Policeman as Domestic Missionary" in Journal o f Social History, Sum m er 1976, 
pp. 481-509; C. Emsley, Policing and its Context, London, 1983, pp. 68-71.
*5 D. Philips "A New Engine o f Power and Authority" in V. A. Gatrell et al (eds). Crime and the Law, 
London, 1980.
*® L. Keller, Public O rder in Victorian London, Unpublished PhD  thesis, Cam bridge, 1976.
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separated geographically, and arising out of differing local conditions.*^ This approach is also 
likely to lead to a bias towards types of disturbance seen as dangerous by the government of 
the day, with a consequent neglect of minor or apohtical incidents. This in turn can support 
an assumption that riot and protest are identical. For example, a recent pohce historian uses 
figures for a number of crimes, including riot, to calculate "Protest Offences".** This blurring 
of the distinction between protest and casual violence is particularly misleading when the 
incidence of riot is correlated against some other variable, as for example in the Tfilys' The 
Rebellious Century, where the relationship between protest and urbanisation is explored.*’ 
Riot is thus regarded as an index of social protest. Even when the incidents concerned form a 
recognisable group having (at least in part) common motivation, this takes a good deal for 
granted. Where statistics of riot are used merely as numbers of arrests or sentences, the 
assumption that collective violence demonstrates the existence of undercurrents of rebellion 
or of dissent is unjustified. The equation of riot with protest arose partly from legal definitions; 
disturbances which were not directed against constituted authority or towards changing existing 
conditions were often treated less seriously (unless very dangerous to life or property) and thus 
became less visible. Even though the law distinguished between riot having an object "of a 
public nature" and affray where the motivation was purely private, it would scarcely be safe to 
assume that this distinction which was significant to a contemporary magistrate would now 
be helpful to a modem historian. Riot as a felony originated in a statute of Edward III which 
stretched the meaning of "levying war on the king" to cover warlike mobs whose intention was 
to diminish the power of the crown by enforcing some alteration to the law. This became 
treason, as opposed to "mere riot" which was only a misdemeanour. This sometimes difficult
*’ Introduction to J. Stevenson and R. Quinault, (eds). Popular Protest and Public Disorder, London, 
1979.
** S. H. Palm er, Police and Protest in England and Ireland, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 550-1.
*’ Charles, Louise and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century, London, 1975.
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distinction was further confused by the 1714 Riot Act which created a new felony out of the 
continuing assembly of a crowd after due wammg.^° ,
If legal definitions are disregarded, it becomes necessary to redefine the limits of the behaviour 
to be investigated. The legal definitions of riot are inappHcable, as the purpose of this study 
is partly to discover how legal definitions were applied, and the widest possible definition wHl 
be adopted. Five criteria can be considered essential to a definition of riot. There must be a 
certain minimum number of participants, who must show some degree of cooperation with 
each other; there must be at least a threat of illegality, normally violence; the incident must 
happen in a place which is open to the public, and those acting must have some common 
motive . . —
Each of these criteria offers scope for variation, but three can be specified fairly clearly. The 
number of people can set as three, or twelve, or some other arbitrary number. Ten has been 
chosen as large enough to exclude two types of relationship; close kinship, and partnership. 
Mutual assistance among small numbers of persons in family quarrels, or in enterprises such 
as robberies carried out by gangs, is essentially different in kind from that found among larger 
groups. At the same time this figure is small enough to include most cases where collective 
violence was spontaneous.
The illegal action is either itself of a violent nature, or accompanied by either real or anticipated 
violence; legal definitions usually include a phrase such as "in a tumultuous manner". This 
violence can be defined either in terms of the fears aroused in a legal fiction, the reasonable 
man, or in terms of wounds and damage. Here both actual and anticipated violence must be 
considered. The public nature of the site is not usually in doubt. The allied questions of 
cooperation and motive are more difficult. Cooperation can probably be assumed in most 
cases where the other criteria are fulfilled. It would be harder to explain, perhaps, how a crowd 
could chance to act illegally and together without cooperation. In a large crowd there may be 
many motives, perhaps as many as there are members, but they may presumably be taken to 
cooperate at least minimally in continuing to form a disorderly crowd. Motive presents more
20 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, London, n.d., Vol.VIII, pp. 328 -32.
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problems. Normally there is Httle direct evidence of this, and what there is comes frequently 
from records created during the legal process, or at any rate written by those whose interests 
were at odds with those of the rioters. For legal purposes too the distinction between a private 
motive and one of a pubhc nature can be crucial in deciding whether an incident is riot or 
affray. The object here is to include both without distinction. To avoid question-beg^ng and 
pedantry, the word "riot" will be used, as in colloquial Enghsh, for both.
While there is a clear difference between a drunken brawl outside a pubhc house and, for 
example, the Chartist-inspired crowd activities of 1842, there were many gradations between 
the two. What of the resistance to pohce interrupting a brawl? What about sectarian or loyahst 
demonstrations which became violent? What about fighting as entertainment? It is important 
to remember that disorder, even of the most violent type, need not protest against anything. 
If two men fighting by fixed rules can be sport, then it must at least be borne in mind that 
twenty or two hundred men fighting by their own rules may be no more motivated by protest. 
Recent studies of crowds at footbah matches have shown violence to be largely expressive 
rather than instrumental.^* There are obvious dangers in applying the results of modem studies 
to earher periods, but the similarity of footbah violence to, for example, some aspects of 
riotous behaviour at elections, is very striking. It is also important to reahse that there may 
be a strong element of protest even where the "sporting" aspect is most visible. In dealing with 
riots where no immediate motive is apparent it is essential not to assume that either must 
necessarily be the explanation.
It is desirable to divide incidents of coUective violence according to motivation, to separate 
protest from casual violence. This would make it possible to ask a number of important 
questions. It is impossible to achieve this where there is no direct knowledge of the state of 
mind of participants, unfortunately. Yet ah is not lost. The authorities' interpretation of the 
rioters' motivation is much more accessible, and it is this rather than the 'tme' motivation 
which would influence measures of control and punishment. It would be possible, for example, 
to ask whether the severity of handling of riotous incidents related to the severity of the
2* SSRC/Sports Council, Public Disorder and Sporting Events, London, 1979; P. M arsh, E. Rosser, 
& R. H arré, The Rules o f D isorder, London, 1978.
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mcident in terms of danger to life or property, or whether some types were more harshly 
repressed than others. Were some types of riot tolerated? It is generally accepted that there 
was a reduction in collective violence after about 1850. Was this a reduction in those specific 
types of riots which the authorities were anxious to repress, or a general decrease in violence? 
How far did it reflect changes in the rioters? Did different kinds of people join in different kinds 
of riot?
The sources used for this thesis include both local and national official papers; the Home Office 
papers provide much information about riots which were thought serious enough to involve 
the central authorities, and occasionally, by chance, about minor riots. Of local official papers, 
the minutes of the Corporation, the "Town Books", give mainly negative information of the 
lack of official interest in riots. The minutes of the Commissioners of the Watch, Scavengers 
and Lamps and the later Watch Committee are more useful both directly, in reports of riots, 
and indirectly, in items such as the replacement of damaged clothing. Other official sources 
used are the Quarter Sessions and Assize records. The former exist for 1835 onwards, almost 
complete although damaged, yet are of less assistance than might be expected, because so many 
rioters were tried summarily (the police court records do not survive); and also because charges 
such as common assault or causing grievous bodily harm may relate to riot, yet (unless there 
is evidence from elsewhere) the accused cannot be identified as rioters. The Assize courts were 
less commonly involved; only the most "serious" (in contemporary terms) of offenders were 
tried there. It will be seen that this was more common with some types of riot than with others.
For the many riots which escape the net of official records, the newspapers are the principal 
recourse. At the start of the period there were three weekly newspapers which have survived 
almost intact: the Radical Mercury the Ultra-Tory Courier, and the predominantly commercial 
and a-political Gore's General Advertiser. The number increased from the mid 1820s with the 
addition of the Whig Albion the Toiy Saturday's Advertiser, and the Radical Chronicle. By 
the mid 1830s, a weekly paper was published every day of the week, with three on Saturdays. 
With the gradual reduction of the taxes on newspapers in the 1840s a number of papers began 
to publish two or three times per week. Abolition of the last penny of tax in 1855 was followed
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by the publication of the first daily, the Liverpool Daily Post.^ There was thus a steady 
increase in the volume of locally-printed news. This was not always the same as an increase 
in local news. Periods such as the Crimean War found papers giving more space to events of 
national importance, while at other times the pressure of advertising reduced the space 
available, for example during the railway boom of 1847-8.
Within the available space the proportion given to riot was very variable. Most reports 
originated from the police court. Before 1835, this was only sporadically reported; after that 
date, about half the newspapers carried regular police court news, ranging from one-third of a 
column to half a page. The proportion of riot cases was never high, and varied both from one 
newspaper to another and from year to year for the same paper. This variation was quite 
independent of events, and fortunately there was almost always at least one newspaper at any 
one time which reported a reasonable number of incidents. Only serious incidents involving 
thousands of participants and taking place in the town centre were guaranteed a report. For 
smaller incidents, no pattern emerges to suggest any coherent policy of reporting. A 
newspaper's political bent did not correlate with the choice of news items in any systematic 
fashion, although it did of course often colour the report, particularly its estimates of severity. 
The Liverpool Journal and the Liverpool Daily Post, being edited by an ex-Head Constable, 
interested themselves in police matters; otherwise, the treatment of major incidents was 
reasonably consistent across the period, and across the range of papers; the selection of minor 
incidents was uniformly chancy.
The problem of classification must now be considered. Debate has centred on the element of 
protest, and the subject of protest has been a favourite means of classifying riots — 
bread-prices, recruitment, taxation, parliamentary reform, and so on. This classification has 
sometimes been used partly because such groups of riots have tended to occur as epidemics 
and have formed neat topics for papers or chapters.^^ There is, however, a similarity between 
some of these groupings — recruitment and taxation, for example — and a definable difference
22 F or the reduction in taxation, see A rthur Aspinall, Politics and the P re ss ,, Brighton , 1949, p p l6-23.
23 See, for example, D. Richter, Riotous Victorians, Ohio, 1981, passim.
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between others. For example, riots concerning parliamentary reform, being concerned with an 
alteration in the distribution of power, have a quasi-revolutionary aspect which is not 
necessarily to be found in protests about the way in which political power is used (or abused) 
by its current holders, such as recruiting riots. It is clearly necessary to transcend such 
accidental distinctions of causation as whether a protest concerns toll-gates or selection of 
militiamen. .
Classifications have also been proposed which delve deep into theories of crowd behaviour for 
their basis. These cannot be considered as useful to the historian since it is rare to find data 
available about historical riots to enable a complex analysis such as that proposed by 
Smelser. '^* The sources are necessarily coloured by the prejudices and patterns of thought of 
the period. Instead of attempting to burrow beneath this to reconstitute (with very little 
evidence) the underlying motivation, it is proposed to adopt the basic framework of 
inteipretation from the contemporary sources. The kind of assumption about the origin of 
riots which would have influenced the authorities in controlling disorder may thus be taken 
into account. The next step, then, is to derive a small number of categories seen as meaningful 
by the local authorities of the period. There must not be too many; to divide incidents too 
finely is as little help as to leave them undivided.
The local press has been taken to offer the best guidance here. At the start of the period, a 
newspaper cost perhaps a quarter of a workman's daily wage. Undoubtedly they were read by 
some workingmen yet in general they were written to accord with the views of their more 
characteristic readers, the wealthier townsmen, and particularly the merchants upon whom 
their advertising revenue depended. It was from this group above all that magistrates and town 
councillors came. By 1860, newspaper reading was less exclusive, but so was access to local 
power. Newspapers took more account of small tradesmen, but so did the authorities since 
these men now elected the town council.
Although newspapers differed in political allegiance, their treatment of the topic of collective 
violence was on the whole similar. Tory and Radical newspapers often differed in their
24 N. J. Smelser, Theory o f Collective Behaviour, London, 1962, pp. 67-130.
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allocation of blame (for electoral disorder, for example) whüe revealing shared assumptions 
regarding the relative importance of different types of incident. This was demonstrated by the 
amount of space given to each, the nature of the information given, and the vocabulary used. 
Even for political protest meetings, the more radical of newspapers demonstrated, by their 
anxiety to show the peacefulness of meetings of their own supporters, that they were at least 
conscious of the same expectations as their competitors.^ When describing events in other 
towns, there was even more common ground. The Reform Act riots were universally deplored 
as the work of extremists;^® when William Cobbett visited Liverpool and delegates arrived from 
other Lancashire towns to meet him, the local Radical press accounted for the scuffles which 
took place by saying that local men had been trying to remove troublemakers from the square 
in which the meeting took place.^  ^Among the Tory press the ideas of protest and disorder were 
clearly linked to such an extent that it was not necessary to give any other explanation for such 
precautions as might have been taken than that such a meeting was expected. Speeches at 
meetings to oppose the com laws were described as "calculated to inflame the passions of the 
multitude"^* despite the local multitude's lack of inclination even to attend such meetings; at 
the time of Parliamentary Reform the "inflammatory" nature of placards displayed about the 
town was a cause of Tory concem .^^ This connection between political innovation and fears 
of angry crowds is not remarkable; it is brought forward only to show that political protest 
was one category of disorder, real or threatened, which was recognised in Liverpool then — as 
it has been in most places at most times.
25 E.g. Liverpool M ercury, 3 Sep 1819, 1 Oct 1819, 14 Oct 1831 
25 Liverpool M ercury, 4 Nov 1831 
22 Liverpool M ercury, 3 Dec 1819
28 Saturday's Advertiser^ 18 Nov 1826
29 Liverpool Courier, 16 May 1832
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The treatment of elections is in strong contrast. If collective violence was expected and feared 
at protest meetings, at elections it was expected but largely accepted. Untü the 1830s, it was 
so normal as to be scarcely newsworthy. In 1816, when a number of rioters were tried at the 
assizes, the only record in the press to electoral disorder is the Mercury's brief reference, an 
erroneous claim that they were not local men.^° Later in the period, when election riots were 
seen as more important, it was stül deemed sufficient to state that supporters of opposing 
parties were involved; no further explanation of fighting was required.^'
In contemporary terms, sectarian disorders were very similarly regarded. The party was at least 
as significant as the sect, and fears of violence resulted from the display of political banners as 
well as of religious sym bolsA lthough at the start of the period this phenomenon was new, 
and there were hopes that it would prove tr ans i to ry i t  became well-known during the 1840s. 
As with elections, the press reveals striking contrasts in the allocation of blame, but clearly 
fighting surprised nobody when the two sides came together.
These were not the only groups of residents of whom this could be said. In a sense, sectarian 
battles were a special case of a class of disorder which can be designated private battle. Even 
apart from sectarian loyalties, riotous behaviour was expected of Irish immigrants. As one 
newspaper put it, in describing a battle between two factions which were named as "Irish" and 
"Comiaught Rangers", both sides were "natives of the sod, to have trodden which in youth 
seems to communicate a certain eccentricity to the character somewhat unfriendly to 
p e a c e . . E v e n  the Mercury, more friendly towards the Irish than most, felt that the cause of 
one such incident had been adequately stated as; "It appears that two Irish factions, the
30 Liverpool M ercury, 14 Jun 1816; PRO PL26.79 Indictments, Lancaster Summer Assizes, 1816.
31 E.g. Saturday's Advertiser, 17 Jun 1826; Liverpool Courier, 7 Jul 1841
32 E.g. Saturday's Advertiser, 21 Feb 1829; Liverpool Times, 22 M ar 1842
33 Liverpool M ercury, 30 Jul 1819
34 Saturday's Advertiser, 23 Sep 1826
Chapter One: Introduction 19
Leinster and the Ulster, came into contact."^ Similar behaviour was also expected of navvies 
and schoolboys.^® In all such cases, press coverage is erratic.
In other styles of riot, the press stressed the reason for the use of violence rather than the 
identity of the rioters. The cause given can range from protest at the dismissal of an actress^’ 
to lack of food,^ ® and the reason stated can of course be inaccurate, or (as in the latter case) 
be stated only so that the grievance can be dismissed as unfounded. This group has been 
termed direct action riots.
Two types of grievance, however, have been separated from this group because their special 
character was (and stül is) clearly recognisable. The first of these is trade disputes. Here the 
threat of violence was almost always described in terms of intimidation of workmen not on 
strike and considerable space was devoted to reporting ma^strates' remarks condemning the 
strikers for interfering with a fellow-worker's right to work.^ ® Invariably, the press was hostüe 
to the strikers.
The other special case of direct action was the anti police riot. This most frequently consisted 
of resistance to arrest or to the dispersal of crowds, or attempts to rescue those arrested. Such 
battles were given little news-space unless they became very severe. One was reported because 
a magistrate became personally involved"*® whüe in another case, a series of riots were reported
35 Liverpool M ercury, 7 M ar 1834
35 E.g. Saturday's Advertiser, 23 Sep 1826; 11 Jul 1829; 14 Aug 1830
32 G ore's G eneral Advertiser, 16th Dec. 1824
38 Liverpool M ercury, 20 Feb 1855; 27 Feb 1855
39 E.g. G ore 's G eneral Advertiser, 29 Jan 1824; Saturday's Advertiser, 9 Jun 1827; G ore's General
Advertiser, 12 Sep 1833
4® Saturday's Advertiser, 24 Dec 1830
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only when a constable was so injured that his life was in danger."** In reporting these riots, 
journalists assumed that police would frequently meet such incidents. In comparison with 
trade disputes, there is a noticeable absence of moralising comment; such riots were made by 
the incorrigibly corrupted who, unHke decent working men, would not be open to reason.
The last category of the eight is an unfortunate necessity. There are many cases where nothing 
is known of the origin of a disturbance. This category, riots of unknown origin, is Hkely to 
overlap with most of the other categories, and particularly with anti-police riots. (Incidents 
will only be classed for statistical purposes as "anti-police" if there is evidence that the riot 
began after the police arrived.) Incidents may fall within this group for one of two reasons. It 
may chance that no information about an incident has escaped destruction; this becomes less 
probable if there are a good number of surviving records relating to the area and period 
concerned. On the other hand, it may be that the incident was of a type which aroused little 
contemporary interest; perhaps an outbreak of fighting in a street where this was "only to be 
expected" by the newspaper-buying public. An affray arising out of a private quarrel is likely 
to fall into this category, but it cannot be assumed that all riots in this category are private.
These eight categories, simplistic as they are, are proposed as a step towards a more detailed 
approach to riot. It would be desirable to be able to reflect much more sophisticated 
distinctions; the absence of contemporary evidence makes this impossible. The questions 
which we can hope to answer now must be strictly limited by the questions which seemed 
sigmficant to the writers of the source-documents; relevant facts wül have gone unrecorded if 
they did not relate to questions implicit in the writer's mind. Yet although categories are 
derived from the assumptions of the local press, it is not always necessary that their 
categorisation wül be accepted. The riots of 1836 to 1844 which arose from political meetings 
are one case. There is evidence to show that these incidents had much in common with other 
incidents which have been classed as sectarian, and that this influenced the police and the 
courts even if the press chose to regard political protest as the cause.
41 Liverpool Mercury, 19 Nov 1833
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It is tempting to try to arrange the categories here derived in a linear fashion according to their 
political sophistication. Clearly, political protest could come at one extreme; it would 
probably be safe enough to put private battles at the other. There are more difficulties in 
between. Trade disputes are concerned with economic rather than political power; these are 
more tricky to place. And what of election riots? If they tried to exert force in any way, it was 
to influence the choice between members of the ruling class; there was not generally an 
intention otherwise to alter the distribution of power. Nor was this motive always paramount; 
there were also holiday aspects to election riots. Sectarian riots have sometimes much in 
common with election riots; the equation between sect and party has at times been almost 
complete.
Regrettably, a linear relationship is not to be expected. Instead, a rough grouping according 
to political impact is possible. Political protest stands alone, as intending radically to alter the 
distribution of political power. Next can be grouped trade disputes, anti-police riots, and direct 
action riots. AU these attempt, in one way or another, temporarily to usurp, or to prevent a 
free exercise of, authority. Election and sectarian riots form a third group, being concerned 
rather with the expression of party or sectarian loyalties and sense of identity than with any 
attempt to produce specific changes. Non-sectarian private battles perhaps expressed other 
types of loyalties, unconnected with politics, and therefore remain alone.
Certain trends emerge when the reporting of incidents of different types is compared. The 
activities of crowds at political protest meetings were always given considerable attention by 
reporters who would be present primarily to report the speeches; elections were of course 
simUarly reported, but here crowd violence was often discounted as "only to be expected", at 
least before about 1830. Sectarian riots were reported very differently by different papers, but 
the major incidents occurred normaUy on July 12th, and for most of the period even a peaceful 
12th was worthy of report. Trade disputes were also fairly comprehensively reported, 
considerable detail of trials being ^ven. In aU these types of incident, it was usual at least after 
1835 to find the same incident reported in several newspapers.
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In contrast, reports of direct action riots, private battles, and anti-police riots were more often 
reported only in one paper, unless they were extremely large. They often owed their news-space 
to factors such as humour, often that of Irish witnesses reported in "quaint" dialect, such as:
I niver offended M ary Mallowney in me life, plase yer worships, bu t she shtruck m e tree times 
and offended me very bad e n t i r e ly .42
Other cases appeared by being recounted as part of the history of a further incident. One 
Irishwoman, for example, gave evidence of two incidents involving up to fifty people, 
otherwise unrecorded, during the prosecution of a police constable for assault."*^
Clearly the number of unrecorded cases, whilst of course not measurable, is very much higher 
in these types of incident than in elections, political or sectarian riots, or trade disputes. It 
would therefore be wrong to base any argument on the relative frequency of different types. 
However, comparisons of the nature and handling of different types do not rely on their being 
countable; all that is required is that there should be a sufficient number of incidents of each 
type among the data, and the the mechanism by which these incidents have been selected for 
survival should not be such as to suggest that the sample would be significantly biased.
It seems fair to suppose that the ratio of reported incidents compared with unreported incidents 
might remain fairly constant for any one type. For example, nearly every case of riotous 
political protest could be expected to be recorded, whereas the proportion for anti-police riots 
may well have been something like 2%. This cannot be proved, however; and at times when 
news-space was short, "less interesting" types would be excluded more freely than "more 
interesting" cases. There are also likely to have been long-term variations. The main argument 
therefore wiU not rely even on regularity in the proportion of cases recorded within each type; 
the only assumption is that those recorded form a representative sample of their type.
42 Liverpool Chronicle, 24th September 1839.
43 Liverpool Courier, 24th April 1839.
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For each type of riot, consideration wül be given to frequency, severity, and typical form. The 
nature of the groups taking part must also be considered. The main consideration, however, 
is control. This can be seen as consisting of prevention, policing; and punishment.
Prevention of riot at its most general level can operate at a great distance from actual 
disturbances. It is possible to see education, religious teaching, poor-relief and other charitable 
efforts as having a role in the avoidance of protest-based disturbances. Even if it is accepted, 
however, that these measures were intended to preserve order, they would operate in so general 
a manner as to be of no help to a comparative study.
Some types of riots occurred without warning, of course, and therefore could only be handled 
using emergency methods. Unless the incident lasted for some hours, private battles and direct 
action riots were usuaUy dealt with by the police who chanced to be at hand, without the 
intervention of ma^strates. The normal police also bore the brunt of anti-police riots.
Some types of riot gave more warning. Elections, political meetings, and sectarian processions 
were aU advertised in advance. Preparations for expected riots could be of several kinds, 
including the relocation of police, the enrollment of special constables, patrols by troops 
already in the town, and reinforcement by troops from elsewhere. Among those incidents 
where preparation was possible, comparison of levels of precautions can be informative.
Once a riot was a reality, the measures taken were largely determined by its scale, location, and 
duration, and the avaüabüity of police or troops. Evidence may perhaps show whether the 
choice between dispersal and arrest was related to the type of riot. However, lack of arrests can 
be due to the short duration of an incident and its distance from the nearest police. Only if this 
is taken into account can numbers of prosecutions be taken to show intention to deter further 
such offences.
The final stage in the progression was punishment based on the verdict of the court. The 
sentence ^ven was determined by the choice of charge, the type of trial, and the discretion of 
the judge or magistrate. There was considerable scope for variation in all these factors. The 
relationship between charge and sentence was partiaUy laid down by law, when a range of 
possible sentences was prescribed; in practice this did not constrain judges or magstrates very
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greatly. Only murder was likely to be punished by death; manslaughter similarly gave a much 
higher maximum sentence than was possible for riots which did not result in death; other 
differences were less hard and fast. The penalty for riot, either as a felony or as a 
misdemeanour, could be much higher if the accused were sent for trial at the assizes than if 
they were tried at the police court. This decision lay with the magistrates; the choice between 
felony and misdemeanour was also theirs, although this depended on whether the riot act 
proclamation was read at the time of the riot rather than being decided at the time of the trial. 
In trade disputes in particular there were higher penalties available, for example for 
intimidation; there was, however, no compulsion for magistrates to use such a charge rather 
than, say, assault. It is probably fair to assume, for purposes of comparison, that the length 
of sentence for all offences other than killing was within the control of magistrates.
To facilitate comparisons, as much information as possible has been translated into numeric 
codes. Their meaning is given in an appendix. In many cases, these codes are arbitrary labels; 
some hide an assumption or a potential loss of accuracy, and must be justified. They are of 
different types.
The sentences for riots can be converted into a number by taking the length in days, regardless 
of whether the option of a fine was offered, and taking a month to consist of 30 days. The 
resulting figure is proportional to the variable it measures; a sentence of 14 days is twice as long 
as a sentence of 7 days. Most codes do not share this property; for example, the size of an 
incident (the number of people involved) is never accurately known. The numbers 1 to 5 are 
used, in ascending order of size; each corresponds to a range of values. An incident of size 4 
is larger than one of size 2, but it is not twice as large. Although approximate figures are given 
in the appendix to indicate the number of people involved in a riot of each type, it is not 
claimed that they can usually be accurately known. The codes 1 to 5 are best regarded as 
meaning "trivial", "small", "moderately large". Targe" and "exceptionally large", all within the 
local context. If riots of a very much greater size were to be handled, there is no reason why 
extra codes should not be used. The codes for "duration", "severity", "prevention" and 
"policing" can similarly be regarded as showing increasing values. In all cases, the range of 
codes used reflects the variation actually found in the current study. As with "size", it would 
be possible to extend the range to cover greater variation.
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The definition of degrees of severity was to some extent handicapped by the small attention 
paid by the sources to reporting injuries. No precise count of damage or wounds is possible; 
instead, the general style of reporting must be taken into account in forming an estimate; if 
no information is available, no entry is made, but quite a brief report can indicate whether it 
is probable that many injuries were caused. If a report mentions jostling or verbal abuse alone, 
it is probably reasonable to assume that no worse violence took place, unless the reporter could 
have some reason to minimise the damage done. Damage to property is a useful criterion, as 
claims for damages are often very detailed.
AU the codes so far mentioned can at least be arranged in order of size; others do not even have 
this property. An assault charge, for example, is coded as 3, and incitement as 7, but this does 
not imply that incitement is "larger" than assault. Such codes are merely labels.
The choice of statistical tests must take these differences into account if the result is to be 
meaningful, and is therefore restricted to tests of the type described by statisticians as 
'non-parametric'. The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance can be used to test for any 
significant relationship between the type of riot and the length of sentence. Correlations are 
also calculated between sentences on the one hand and size and severity of riots on the other. 
Size and severity are estimated (where evidence permits) on a scale of 1 to 5, in increasing 
order. In this way, an estimate can be made of the relative importance of injuiy as opposed 
to motive in the the sentencing process. These numerical tests can then be combined with 
more traditional methods to produce a comparative overview of the control of different types 
of coUective violence. The first section deals with the years up to 1835. Early in 1836, the new 
poUce force for the borough started its operations. The second section wUl consider the 
methods used thereafter. The geographical area to be covered is the area of jurisdiction of the 
mayors of Liverpool from 1836 onwards; this coincided with the Liverpool police district.
Before 1836, the mayor's area of control was smaUer, as was the town itself.
\
The method of analysis described here has been developed during an investigation of coUective 
violence in Liverpool. It is hoped that its use wiU serve to demonstrate its potential as a tool 
for use in other such studies, and that it wUl also provide local answers to a number of
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questions about the pattern of riotous behaviour and its control. Perhaps similar studies 
elsewhere may then suggest informative contrasts and comparisons.
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Chapter Two: Liverpool, 1815 to 1835
Liverpool was a merchants' town; its prosperity depended upon their trade, its function was 
to act as the main port of Lancashire."*  ^ It grew in the eighteenth century from a minor creek 
attached to the port of Chester to a major port as the result of the slave trade; surviving 
abohtion, it continued to grow, and by the census of 1861 the population neared half a million.
The main import was cotton; the volume of this trade tripled in the years 1820 to 1850."*® From 
1815 to 1860, trade suffered only brief setbacks, and the tonnage of ships annually using the 
port rose from under a miUion in 1815 to over five million by I860."*®
There was little manufacturing industry in the town or its immediate area, and what existed 
was very diverse; ironfounding, soapmaking, engineering, sugar-boiUng, and watchmaking. The 
majority of the working population, however, worked either in port-based trades, or in the 
provision of goods and services to the town and its surroundings. There were also large 
numbers of seamen based in Liverpool, beside larger numbers of foreign seamen passing 
through the town. Unskilled work was mainly casual; dock-portering provided at least
44 Sources for the economy of Liverpool; S. M arriner, The Economic and Social Development o f 
Merseyside, L ondon,1982; B. L. Anderson and P. J. M. Stoney (eds). Com merce, Industry and 
Transport, Studies in Economic Change on Merseyside, Liverpool,1983; J. R. H arris (ed), Liverpool 
and Merseyside, New Y ork, 1969; C. Aspin, Lancashire, the First Industrial Society, Preston, 1969.
45 D. M. Williams, 'Liverpool M erchants and the Cotton T ra d e ' in Harris (ed), L iverpoo l.........
45 D. Caradog Jones (ed). The Social Survey o f Merseyside, Liverpool, 1934, p. 24.
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sporadic work for very large numbers; this and the building trade attracted large numbers of 
immigrants to the town.
Underemployment was always a problem; dock porters' pay, for example, was throughout the 
period something like 2s6d per day, but often for two or less days per week. Wages for skilled 
workers could be up to 6s per day, and they were less prone to underemployment; there were, 
however, periods when unemployment affected both, not only during trade depressions, but 
also during prolonged bad weather, which could stop the work of the port for weeks together 
in winter.
In 1815, patterns of employment and methods of production had altered little over the 
previous century. Industrialisation brought growth rather than change to Liverpool. Between 
1815 and 1860 there were more changes. Iron ships powered by steam became common, 
although this had less impact on shipbuilding than the expansion of the docks, which by 1860 
had almost displaced shipyards from the town's waterfront to Birkenhead and Widnes. The 
use of steam power produced other changes; in sawmills, it reduced work for sawyers, and 
steam cranes produced changes in methods of stevedorage. In other trades, such as ropemaking 
and tailoring, skilled male workers were increasingly replaced by unskilled or female labour. 
Yet many trades experienced little or no alteration during these years, and others declined only 
gently. Such changes as occurred were dispersed both in time and across the range of trades, 
and produced gradual and localised results.
The diversity of nineteenth-century urban life is increasingly being recognised by social and 
economic historians, and just as the economic history of a town in the woollen districts of 
Yorkshire differs from that of Manchester, so is the economic history of Liverpool very 
different from that of industrial towns generally. The eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
brought urbanisation but not industrialisation to Liverpool. They brought problems of 
poverty, bad living conditions, and ill health. They did not, however, produce any large body 
of workers whose skills had been suddenly superseded by machinery, nor did they replace 
traditional small-scale workshops with factories. The skilled workforce was still divided into 
small groups which had been working in the same ways for many years. A crisis in one trade
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might have no impact on others. There were thus few factors to encourage feelings of common 
interest among workers.
Liverpool was governed until 1836 by the Common Council, which had 41 members; 
vacancies were filled by nomination by the remaining members; this self-perpetuation 
produced a very close-knit oligarchy. Members were freemen, which reduced possible 
candidates to a very small number. Of 160,000 inhabitants in the early 1830s, only about 5,000 
were freemen. Sales of the freedom were stopped in 1777,"*’ to preserve the revenue from the 
town dues, which freemen did not pay. It had since then been granted only to sons or 
apprentices of freemen. This favoured the skilled working class, and the great majority of 
freemen came from this social stratum."*® The choice of new Council members was made from 
among the few hundred freemen having sufficient wealth and status, and was usually influenced 
by family connection. In 1832, 37 members were said to be related to current or former 
councillors. They were, without exception, Anglicans, and, with few exceptions, Tories."*’ 
Radical sympathies, however, were not an absolute barrier to higher office. The three chief 
officers were the mayor and two bmliffs; on at least two occasions the mayor was an advocate 
of reform; in 1823-4 all three were Reformers.
The mayor was elected annually, on October 18th, by the whole body of freemen. Mayoral 
elections were often accompanied by much bribery and drinking and a good deal of rough 
humour.®® The phrase "conunon hall" was often heard at these elections.®* This was a meeting 
of all freemen, on whose authority the common council based its claim to power, but which
42 Picton, M emorials o f Liverpool, London, 1852, V ol.l, p.218.
48 Munie. Corp. Report, pp. 2704-5.
49 Munie. Corp. Report, p.2730.
5® Liverpool M ereury, 22 Oet 1819, 12 Qet 1821; G ore's G eneral Advertiser, 25 Oet 1827; Liverpool 
Courier, 21 Oet 1829; Liverpool M ereury, 10 Nov 1816.
51 E.g. Liverpool Mereury, 24 Sep 1824; Liverpool Albion, 19 Oet 1829.
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it never allowed to meet. Some candidates came close to offering to call a common hall; none 
actually did so.
The mayor was, ex officio, a JP. He presided at the quarter sessions, aided by the recorder, 
who was appointed by the corporation. Ex-mayors (aldermen), who usually numbered twelve 
or thirteen, acted as magistrates of petty sessions in the town and at the dock police office.®^  
Juries for the quarter sessions were appointed from freemen who were also "merchants or 
considerable tradespeople"; the foreman of the Grand Jury was often a common councillor.®® 
Trials for offences within the town were removed from the control of the corporation only 
when they were sent to the assizes, which for most of this period were held in Lancaster. 
Corporation responsibility for law-enforcement was handled by a sub-committee consisting 
of the mayor and magistrates.
In principle, the dock estate was controlled by a separate body, the dock trustees; however, the 
majority of them had to be council members,®"* and there were very strong links between the 
two bodies.
The council did not have a monopoly of power; vestry ratepayers voted, in proportion to their 
payments, to elect the select vestry, which controlled poor-relief, and most of the 
commissioners of the watch, scavengers, and lamps, who controlled policing at night and the 
lighting and cleansing of the streets. These bodies provided some opportunity for political 
activity to many wealthy men debarred from the council. A minority of the dock trustees were 
also elected from dock-rate payers who were not councillors. Yet the power of these men was 
small in comparison with that of the council.
The combination of dock trustees and common council had control of the spending of very 
large sums of money, and the employment of many men. The corporation income, from the
®2 Munie. Corp. Report, pp. 2698-2700.
53 Munie. Corp. Report, p. 2714.
54 M unie. Corp. Report, p. 2706.
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corporate estate, and from a local tax on goods entering the town by sea, came to some 
£108,000 p.a.®® They made free use of patronage. Appointments often went to family members; 
in 1834, two-thirds of the clergy were related to present or former councillors, and the recorder 
was the brother of an ex-alderman.®® Lesser appointments were also used; in 1829 the 
superintendent of the town constables complained that men were appointed, regardless of 
suitability, on the recommendation of friends of the corporation.®’ The common council 
cannot, however, be regarded as unduly corrupt according to the standards of the time. Some 
of their servants made good profits — the town surveyor was said to have received £175,000 
as commission on the building of the custom house,®® in the 1830s — but there is no suggestion 
that the profit of the councillors went beyond lavish public dinners. Many improvements were 
made: dock-budding, street-widening, public buildings. Yet a petition in 1826 for parks and 
baths for the working classes was rapidly rejected without reason given.®’ Other such requests 
met a similar fate. Although the council worked well for their town, they saw that town as a 
machine of commerce.
The maintenance of order did not rank particularly high among their responsibilities. Of the 
full-time police, only the town constables were directly under the control of the mayor. In 1815 
they consisted of a superintendent, seven head constables, each with two assistants, and a 
keeper and three constables at the main bridewell.®® These numbers remained unchanged until
55 Town Books, Vol.16, p .546, 25 Jul 1835.
55 Munie. Corp. Report, p. 2730; ibid, p.2699.
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1826, when the total rose to 43; by 1835, it was 53.®* The constables did not patrol the streets, 
and were often difficult to find as their duties in connection with the courts and the execution 
of warrants occupied much of their time. In 1825, riotous ropemakers paraded for hours 
throughout the town before the constables caught up with them.®® In 1829, a Grand Jury 
presentment complained of serious delays in emergencies, and suggested that a police officer 
be stationed at each of the lock-up houses, of which there were at least two, and probably 
three.®® This suggestion seems not to have been acted upon. In 1831, no police were available 
at the police office for over an hour to go to a riot.®"* It was only in 1834 that three police 
stations were established, to be manned during the daytime.®®
Even when police could be found, their efficiency was not remarkable. Improvements were 
attempted in 1829, when the Mayor agreed to dismiss "all officers who appear totally unfit for 
their situation." Their superintendent thought there were many such, blaming it on the exercise 
of Council patronage, and recommended that "In future before any appointment takes place 
... some enquiry and examination as to the qualification and ableness of the candidate for office 
be made."®® It is not clear how effective this was. In 1831, a new superintendent, a Mr. Parlour, 
was appointed; he had been superintendent of the nightly watch for eleven months.®’ Formerly 
an inspector in the Metropolitan Police, Parlour had introduced several organisational changes 
in the watch, and may have done the same for the constables. Even so, on the establishment
®* Town Books, Vol. 15, p .564, 5 A pr 1826; Munie. Corp. Report, p. 2715.
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of the new police force in 1836, it was stated that "a vicious system" had prevailed arnong the 
town constables, and that "upwards of one thousand pounds per annum" had been received 
from publicans wishing to avoid prosecution. The watch committee had grave reservations 
about appointing such men to the new force, and although at least half of them were eventually 
re-employed, many were restricted to duties in the offices and the courts which provided less 
scope for bribery.®®
The Mayor and magistrates could also appoint special constables. It is not clear how they were 
selected, but the fact that they were paid®’ suggests that they were largely of working class 
origin. They were enrolled in advance for occasions such as elections, and when disorder was 
severe could be appointed or reinforced at very short notice.
The dock police were not controlled by the mayor but by the dock trustees; however, of 21 
trustees, 13 were members of the common council.’® This police force was estabhshed in 1811: 
by 1824, it consisted of one superintendent and 31 watchmen "who act as constables in the 
docks during the day but are obliged to be also on duty during the night."’* As the docks 
expanded, so did this force, and in 1833 there were 138 privates, 12 serjeants, 4 inspectors and 
a superintendent.’® Less is known of their efficiency than of that of the constables. In 1833, 
following the example of the Nightly Watch, a Metropolitan Police officer was appointed as
58 LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/1, p .l2 , 28 Jan  1836; ibid, p. 24, 24 Feb 1836; ibid, p. 133, 20 Aug 1836.
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superintendent.’® He brought two Metropolitan inspectors with him.’"* Soon afterwards, the 
first uniforms were issued; this may be a sign of more basic changes.’® AU three local forces 
had now had the benefit of chief officers with Metropolitan PoUce experience.
Much more is known of the nightly watch; the minute books of the commissioners of the 
watch, scavengers and lamps survive from 1824 on. The commissioners consisted in theory 
of all aldermen — they numbered about 13 — with eighteen others elected by the vestry.’® In 
practice, the aldermen rarely attended meetings, and active committee members were usuaUy 
men debarred from any other part in local government by lack of family connection, by not 
being freemen, or by religious or political persuasion. Most were moderate Tories; a few were 
Whigs or Reformers. Political bent and lack of conflicting public duties combined to produce 
more energetic management than the council could provide.
The watch patroUed each night, with extra patrols during the earlier part of the long winter 
evenings. In 1815, 83 men were employed;”  by 1830, the force consisted of eight captains and 
about 120 men.’® In 1834, ten additional watchmen were taken on.”  A list of "extramen" was 
maintained at least from 1824 as reserves and remfbrcements. Vacancies were fiUed from their 
number. In 1835, several extramen were appointed as fuU-time employees; reasons for this
23 Liverpool Courier, 20 M ar 1833.
24 Liverpool M ercury, 12 A pr 1833.
25 Liverpool M ercury, 20 Sep 1833.
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decision included "fires, riots, and walks left unexpectedly vacant", and to provide a 
probationary appointment for new watchmen.®®
For much of this period, the efficiency of the watch was unimpressive. In 1815, a petition to 
the Mayor claimed that they must watch by night and sweep by day, and were fined so often 
that men died of starvation.®* The commissioners offered a reward of fifty pounds for the 
conviction of the author for libel, and indignantly denied that fines were excessive.®® A resident 
describes in his memoirs®® the feebleness of the "Old Charleys", employed to be kept off the 
parish, but says that they were replaced later by men "who looked as if they would stand no 
nonsense, and could do a little fighting at a pinch."
If there was any profound change, it was brought about by a sequence of campaigns. In 1826, 
a sub-committee investigating the Watchmen found 20 to be "aged and infirm"; the rest could 
be "effective" if discipline were stricter. They recommended an age limit on appointment of 
40.®"* Two years later, 73 were found "effective", and 12 infirm from age or disease; this included 
those injured on duty.®® In 1830, a superintendent, Mr. Parlour, was appointed, recommended 
by Richard Mayne of the Metropolitan Police. He brought with him the Metropolitan PoUce 
rule book.®® Although he moved to the town constables only eleven months later, for a higher 
salary. Parlour introduced many alterations in equipment and routine, based on the
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Metropolitan model. These included the provision of a standard truncheon in place of sticks 
of varying sizes provided by the men themselves. New men must be 35 or less, literate, and 5'  
6 "  or taller. Sweeping duties were much reduced.®’
Parlour was succeeded by another metropolitan policeman, John Shipp. Although he was a 
remarkable man — he had twice risen from the ranks to hold an army commission — he served 
the commissioners unremarkably from August 1831 to May 1833, when he became governor 
of the workhouse.®® The third superintendent, Michael James Whitty, was an Irish journalist 
with no previous police experience. Despite this, he was to be the first Head Constable of the 
new Liverpool police from its foundation in 1836 until 1844. During his time with the Watch, 
he also became head of the fire police, the firemen being watchmen paid extra for work at fires.
Standards of discipline are difficult to evaluate. Drunkenness was the most frequent problem, 
disciplinary actions being needed in most weeks. A decision that men found drunk should be 
dismissed was passed in 1830, but rescinded the following year.®’ The turnover of men was fast, 
contributing further to the drink problem as the custom of paying "footings" was impossible 
to stamp out.’® There is no indication whether the word "drunk" meant intoxicated so as to 
impair efficiency, or merely "having taken drink"; many of the commissioners were supporters 
of the temperance movement.
Assaults by the watch on members of the public were recorded two or three times a year; the 
circumstances were given in detail only if indecency was in question. The usual punishment
82 Min. Com. W atch, 7 Sep 1830 and 10 Sep 1830.
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for any assault was dismissal.’* There were also more bizarre offences; in 1835, a watchman 
was discharged for keeping fowls in his watchbox and killing them with his truncheon.’®
It was unusual for the watch to be used against daytime riots, and they seem never to have 
been used at pubHc meetings or elections. Indeed, during celebrations of the Queen's acquittal 
in 1820, they marched in the procession rather than policed it.’® The men could not easily be 
called out when off duty, and could not be used both day and night. There may also have been 
a lack of cooperation between commissioners and council. It is notable that in listing police 
strength for the Home Office in 1824 the Mayor omitted the watch.’"* During their hours of 
duty, however, the watch routinely dealt with many riotous affrays; they patrolled in strength 
in areas hke VauxhaU Road on Saturday nights and on the night of St. Patrick's day when 
drunken riots were expected. Injuries to watchmen were frequent, and the commissioners often 
prosecuted rioters at the expense of the parish.
There were frequent clashes between these three police forces, often resulting from members 
of one arresting members of another.’® Relations between their superiors were little better; in 
1823, the dock trustees refused the watch the use of their lock-up; in the next year, the 
commissioners asked their clerk to report obstruction of rate collection by the magistrates, and 
in 1826 the commissioners clashed with one of the aldermen over an alleged assault by a
Min. Com. W atch, 24 N ov 1826, 20 Dec 1827, 27 Feb 1835.
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watchman.’® In 1834, conflict between commissioners and council became acute when the 
Council applied for an act of parliament for a new day police force.
A daytime patrol was by then generally admitted to be necessary. Tentative experiments had 
been made, at the instigation of the commissioners, in 1828; ten men were appointed to patrol 
the main streets, their duties being to remove vagrants, clear obstructions, and assist the public 
in cases of felony.”  This experiment had had little result, the number of "streetkeepers", as they 
were called, being reduced to zero over the next three years.
In 1834, the common council again raised the question of day police, and drafted a bill to 
empower them to appoint such a force.This became known as the Parson-Police Bill, since the 
parish was to pay two thirds of police costs in return for being relieved of the cost of 
supporting the clergy. The commissioners objected most strongly to this bill, which had been 
approved by the vestry at a time when the great majority of ratepayers could not vote; the rate 
having recently been laid, they were technically in arrears.’® They petitioned parliament against 
the bill, and this roused the Mayor and Aldeimen to use their right to sit as commissioners to 
engineer the removal of many of the elected members on grounds such as non-residence.”
Before producing any result, this squalid business was overtaken by municipal corporation 
reform. It is probable that the main concern of the corporation was the maintenance of the 
clergy, threatened by proposed changes in legislation, but the terms of the bill throw some light 
on the common council's ideas on policing.*®® The preamble makes no specific mention of riot 
or disorder, merely of "offences against persons and property". The strength of the force is not
’5 Min. Com. W atch, 26 Dec 1823, 13 Aug 1824, 24 Nov 1826.
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stated; in view of the reluctance of the council to increase the number of town constables, it 
is unlikely that they envisaged a large force. They were to be controlled by the mayor, the last 
mayor, and the two churchwardens, only. These men were to have powers to arm the police, 
the type of arms not being specified. The police were to be empowered to arrest anyone "whom 
they shall have cause to suspect of any evü design", or anyone out at night without good 
reason. Most of these provisions seem better fitted to prevent robbery than riot. Even the use 
of arms may have been intended for use in remote areas; after the foundation of the new police 
in 1836, cutlasses were first issued to patrols in isolated areas where robberies from the person 
were most to be expected.*®* Probably the mayor and magistrates were more satisfied with the 
resources available against riot than with those available against other crimes.
The general trend over this period is thus toward increasingly numerous and effective police. 
In 1815 there were probably about 140 police of all kinds, with troops available only after 
considerable delay. By 1835, this figure had risen to 336, with troops also permanently 
stationed in the town. Riot was never quoted to justify increases to the police forces; theft 
loomed much larger in the consciousness of the authorities. Nevertheless, the commissioners 
for municipal corporations reported that "this force has been found perfectly adequate to the
preservation of the peace of the town the inhabitants consider themselves a very well
protected community".*®® Probably there were inhabitants in the poorer areas of town who 
would not agree, yet on the whole this is a fair assessment; Liverpool was likely to be as well 
policed as any town outside London.
For Liverpool, as for most provincial towns. Home Office involvement in questions of law and 
order was small. Although the prevention of riot fell within the area of responsibility of the 
Home Secretary, he was only necessarily involved if the civü power required the assistance of 
military force. Where the civil power alone was used, the Home Office was unlikely to be 
concerned unless local magistrates lacked the skill, confidence, or resources to act effectively.
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This was partly because the scale of riots was usually small, their nature not very threatening; 
and partly because the mayors of these years were able to cope without assistance.
Until January 1822, the Home Secretary was Lord Sidmouth, whose contact with Liverpool 
consisted largely of expressions of his confidence in the current mayor.'”^  This trust was also 
displayed when a visitor to Liverpool wrote to warn of the seditious activities of the Club of 
Independent Freemen; the reply was curt and dismissive.*°  ^ Later Home Secretaries did not 
express their confidence so explicitly, but it can be deduced from their equal lack of 
intervention.
The loyalty of the Common Council was expressed not only in addresses to the Crown 
containing extravagant condemnation of sedition*'^ and by judicious gifts of the freedom of 
Liverpool,^'’® but also in practical assistance in matters of national security. A considerable 
proportion of the correspondence between the Home Office and the Mayors concerned public 
order in Ireland. The Mayor or Town Clerk might be asked about seditious Irish meetings or 
the export of arms.^°’ Although Irish immigrants were seen as a fertile source of lesser riots,
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as will be seen later, the local authorities showed no fear before 1835 of politically motivated 
disorder from this source. Replies were generally reassuring and steps were taken to prevent 
the export of arms. °^* Home Office concern was also expressed on some occasions when a 
national event led to fears of riot, such as the celebration in support of the Queen in 1820 or 
the reform crisis of 1831. On such occasions, the mayor was not the only source of 
information; in 1820, a Major Drake, ''on the staff at Liverpool", reported via the 
Commander-in-Chief for the North, General Byng, on the use of "dangerous" (seditious) 
languagei°® and in 1831 a report was received, via the Post Master General, from the 
postmaster of Liverpool.^*® The Home Secretary thus had ways of watching the local 
authorities which did not differ greatly from those found over the previous half-century.^"
During this period problems which concerned the Home Office were not usually the cause of 
riots in Liverpool, and the riots which occurred were almost entirely dealt with by the local 
authorities. The obvious exception is the handful of incidents which required the use of troops. 
In these cases, the approval of the Home Secretary was needed. In practice, this approval might 
be assumed, if troops were available. If they had to be brought from a distance, prior approval 
was sought, either directly"^ or via the senior military officer present.^^  ^ Particular cases wül 
be examined later; in general, the troops were used, as if they were an extension of the town's 
police forces, at the discretion of the mayor.
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Out of 79 recorded incidents, only 9 involved troops. The remainder were handled by the civil 
power. The local volunteer cavalry, the Liverpool Light Horse, were used only once, for an 
illegal meeting of protest about Peterloo."'^ More usually, regular troops were used. For much 
of the period, the military presence in the town was small or non-existent, with a maximum 
of three troops of cavalry, or one troop of cavalry and two companies of infantry, being 
brought from Manchester or Chester as needed."^ These troops withdrew as soon as the 
immediate danger had passed; the council had decided not to provide barracks."® In 1831, 
accommodation was provided in a former lunatic asylum,"’ and a permanent military presence 
was maintained thereafter.
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Chapter Three: Riots, 1815 to 1835
The year 1815 was in many ways, of course, a watershed; but it is not claimed that there was 
any major significance for it in Liverpool's riotous behaviour. Riots had been frequent during 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; memoirs of the period describe the almost 
routine riotous resistance to pressgangs."^ Most elections were attended by serious disorder, 
1807 being particularly notable; and once the nomination of a candidate was prevented by 
violent means."^ There were also serious sectarian attacks, on a Catholic chapel and the houses 
of Catholics, as early as 1746, ’^® whilst the town's most serious riots to date had been during 
the sadors' strike of 1775 when the Town Hall was bombarded by cannon.^^  ^ The mob was 
frequently loyalist, in 1794 surrounding the Town HaU and breaking windows to demand that 
the Council should produce a Loyal Address to the King.*’^
For the years between 1815 and 1835, 79 incidents have been discovered which justify 
inclusion, actual violence (sometimes minimal) occurring at 74 of them. Details are given in 
abbreviated form in Appendix 2.They range from small brawls of unknown origin to riots
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which convulsed large parts of the town for over 24 hours. One sectarian riot, one anti-police 
riot, and one trade dispute shared this distinction, but the type which above all affected the 
whole town during this period was election disorder.
Election Riots
In Liverpool, the franchise extended to the freemen; that is, sons of freemen, or men who had 
served an apprenticeship of 7 years to a freeman, who paid a fee of two pounds (or had it paid 
for them by candidates). Of the 5,271 men who were freemen by 1830, over 3,000 were 
artisans.12^ Many were members of trade societies which at election time formed a forum for 
canvassing, when voters and non-voters alike enjoyed the hospitality of the candidates. The 
franchise was to such clubs almost a joint possession.
The political parties active from 1815 until about 1827 were three in number. The "Ins" were 
the town council party, making free use of the patronage of the Corporation. Their candidate 
was General Isaac Gascoyne, a man more famous for his blunders than his political acumen. 
The "Outs" were gentlemen excluded from influence with the Corporation, most of them being 
merchants first and politicians second. A mixture of moderate Tories and Whigs, they required 
a candidate of ability and influence to protect the town and its trade at Westminster, and 
supported first Canning and later Huskisson. They had wealth, which enabled them to practice 
effective bribery. The third party was the hapless Radicals; short of both money and influence, 
long on conscience, they were unable to offer direct incentives. Their main organisational body 
was for a time the Concentric Club, which existed from 1812 to 1823, and whose members 
even after that date continued to be recognisable as a political body.^ '^* Although rarely able 
to prevent the election of two Tories, they could at times command a fair amount of popular
123 R eport o f the Proceedings before the Select Committee o f the House of Commons appointed to try 
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support. During the early part of the period, this was orchestrated by a local auctioneer known 
as "General" Green, whose "army" of some hundreds of freemen took an active part in the 
selection of candidates, visiting them en masse accompanied by large numbers of 
non-voters.*^ However, they lost even this support in 1827 when the question of parliamentary 
reform took on a new urgency. In Liverpool this was the beginning of a six-year campaign by 
middle-class Radicals to use evidence of the corruption of the poorer freemen to obtain a local 
act of parliament to disfranchise them in order to to transfer their votes to the allegedly more 
independent middle classes. This alienated poorer freemen to such an extent that the 
Conservatives could still make electoral capital from it in the 1850s.^ ®^ A further factor in the 
Radicals' lack of support was their lack of the common touch. Earnest talk about the 
brotherhood of man was often of less use than the generous if temporary conviviality of the 
Tories. They also included few merchants; this meant not only a lack of direct employer 
influence, it more crucially robbed them of a claim to a joint interest with the artisans in the 
commercial prosperity of the town. In a town whose prosperity was built up out of the slave 
trade, their earlier, and continuing, agitation against slavery cannot have endeared them to 
many. Together these factors explain why the poorer freemen gave their support in the main 
to the Tories.
Elections in the early part of the century were convivial. Music, ribbons, banners, all helped 
the festive air, but drink was the most powerful influence. Voters were received only in groups 
of ten ("tallies"), which were formed in public houses and held there until required. Bribery in 
cash was usual; in some years the sum was only that lost in wages by taking time off to vote, 
in other years it was much more.^^’
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Nine elections led to fears of disorder during this period; the size of crowds in itself justified 
precautions. The extent of violent disturbance at parliamentary and mayoral elections is 
particularly hard to estimate because it was so much expected as to be considered normal. In 
1826, one paper reports "A very few acts of outrage only, and not of an aggravated character," 
while in 1820 the only indications of trouble are the payment for special constables and an 
oblique reference ia the words "...if the town is in disorder...
Such disturbances as are described include large noisy gangs parading through the town, 
sometimes breaking windows where party emblems were displayed, or carrying effigies of 
unpopular local personalities.*^^ Party insults sometimes led to fighting, and candidates 
appearing in public were showered with hisses and invective, and occasionally with heavier 
o b jec ts .T h is  was all fairly normal for the times; earlier Liverpool elections had been, and 
later ones were to be, very much more riotous. In 1768, a party of men armed with 
blubber-knives had prevented the nomination of a third candidate, and ensured that no 
election was held.*2i
It is not surprising that elections were disorderly. Drink would account for a good deal; the 
evidence at enquiries into electoral bribery shows that accusations of treating were not merely 
party propaganda.*^^ The hohday atmosphere of processions, of bands of music accompanying 
voters to the poll in their "tallies" of ten, the fact that on this day the gentleman canvasser
128 Saturday's Advertiser, 17 Jun 1826; Town Books, Vol. 15, p. 90, 5 A pr 1820; Liverpool Mercury, 
14 M ar 1820.
129 Liverpool M ercury, 28 Jun 1816; Liverpool Journal, 22 Oct 1831; Saturday's Advertiser, 17 Jun 
1826; Liverpool Journal, 10 Jan 1835; Liverpool Albion, 9 M ay 1831, 24 Oct 1831.
130 Liverpool M ercury, 14 Jun 1816; G ore's G eneral Advertiser, 5 M ay 1831; Liverpool Courier, 12 
Dec 1832; G ore's General Advertiser, 27 Oct 1831.
131 Picton, M emorials o f Liverpool, London, 1875, Vol. 1, p. 206.
132 Bribery R eport (1831), passim.
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addressed the artisan as man to man, all would contribute to a loosening of restraint. Electoral 
squibs were produced by all parties in a vein of cheerful scurrility:
Old cockfighting Sefton declares he will stand
Back'd by Rushton, Tom Green, and the Jacobin band..."^
This atmosphere of misrule was probably more important in producing disorder than any 
desire to influence the outcome of the election, and much more serious violence would have 
been necessary to do so.
The formation of partisan groups was probably assisted by the participation of those societies 
which had freemen among their members. Their involvement in elections was considerable; 
candidates approached many of the artisan voters by way of their clubs, trade-based or 
convivial, and both types of association marched in procession at the "chairing" of the 
victorious candidates. Such groups could reduce as well as increase disorder; the relative 
orderliness of the elections of these years may owe something to the fact that voters were not 
anonymous among the mass. Among individuals, coloured ribbons given by the candidates 
served to announce party allegiance. Fights may have started with these favours being tom off, 
as happened elsewhere.*^^
Few measures were used to reduce disorder at Liverpool elections. Special constables were 
routinely enrolled, being posted at the hustings and outside the candidates' lodgings. Further 
specials were added later if disturbances took place.*^ In 1816, the dock police were used. A 
number of rioters were committed to the assizes for trial. On this occasion, sentences were
*33 LRO: The Squib Book, being a collection of the addresses, songs, squibs, and other papers issued
during the contested election a t Liverpool, in June 1818, Liverpool, 1818, p. 5.
134 p p  1826-7 (394) IV.1114; Report from the Select Committee on Electoral Polls for Cities and
Boroughs, Minutes o f Evidence, pp. 3, 17, 19, 26.
*35 Gore's General Advertiser, 25 Nov 1830; Liverpool Mercury, 9 Jan 1835.
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severe, seven men being imprisoned for eighteen months.*^® This probably reflects current fears 
aroused by working-class Radicalism in Manchester and other areas rather than any influence 
acting purely in Liverpool. Apart from this occasion, few arrests are recorded, and no 
sentences. Electoral rioters would usually be tried summarily, and maximum sentences would 
therefore be lower than those which could be passed at Sessions or Assizes.
Two organisational changes were made before 1835 with the intention of preventing disorder. 
The first was the use of booths, with voters divided alphabetically, which meant the end of 
tallies. They were first used in 1831, at the insistence of supporters of reform.*^’ The second 
was the end of the chairing of victorious candidates. The chairing was cancelled in 1832, again 
at the instigation of the reform party, after an election where sectarian war-cries had been 
important. Although there had been more noise than violence, it was said that the threat of 
disorder was too great; no chairing was held after that date. The Reformers' tolerance of 
disorder seems to have been rather lower than that of Tories; where the common council was 
in control, tradition seems to have been more important than order. This need not imply that 
they used or encouraged violence; there is no evidence to support such an idea. It only means 
that, where a moderate degree of disorder was traditional, they (unhke the reformers) made 
no great effort to prevent it.
Political Protest
More than any other occasion, political meetings led to unjustified fears of disorder. 
Precautions were taken on five occasions, at only one of which was there even the smallest 
violence. There was also one politically-motivated window-breaking which occurred without 
warning.
Radicalism was on the whole a phenomenon of the middle classes in Liverpool. The sympathy 
between a large proportion of the town's artisans and the dominant Tory merchants which
*36 Liverpool M ercury, 14 Jun 1816; Town Books, Vol. 14, p. 613, 5 Feb 1817; PRO PL26.79, 
Lancaster Assizes, Indictments, Summer 1816.
*37 Liverpool M ercury, 6 May 1831.
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was notable at parliamentary elections is also relevant to political protest. Until about 1827, 
Radical sympathies among the town's artisans were not uncommon. The Concentric Club 
maintained friendly relations with the artisans who followed "General" Green, and trade 
societies drank toasts at their annual diimers such as those of the Operative Printers to Sir 
Francis Burdett and "Orator" Flunt.*^  ^ More typical, though, was the town's anticlimactic 
response to a visit from Cobbett.*^® The disfranchisement question in the later 1820s served to 
reduce even the small degree of popular political protest activity previously shown. For these 
reasons, parliamentary reform never aroused the working classes of Liverpool to the extent that 
it did elsewhere.
Even while the Six Acts were in force, the mayor of a corporate town could permit public 
meetings, and the mayors of Liverpool frequently did so. There seems to have been no fear that 
disturbances would develop merely because people gathered together. The frequent processions 
of trade and friendly societies were not interfered with, and neither they nor public meetings 
having mayoral permission seem to have required any large police presence. There is no 
evidence that special constables were appointed.
Meetings within the town were generally organised by gentlemen, and no requisition to the 
mayor seems to have been made without the support of men of reasonably high standing in 
the town. When working men met, the venue was Mosslake Fields, outside the town 
boundary. Several meetings took place there over the question of the disfranchisement of the 
poorer freemen, but none led to disturbance sufficient to call for any action.
The mayor probably consulted the town magistrates when deciding. If he approved, he called 
the meeting, which might take place indoors or out. Reasons for such meetings range from the 
expression of condolence at the death of Princess Charlotte to protests against the com
*38 Liverpool Mercury, 5th July 1820.
*39 Liverpool Courier, 17th May 1826.
Chapter Three: Riots, 1815 to 1835 51
laws.*'”’ When permission was refused, as it was whenever parliamentary reform was involved, 
there was no attempt to prevent the meeting. In the handful of cases when the meeting still 
went ahead, there were no arrests of persons attending.
The only disturbance at any public meeting other than elections was when Wüliam Cobbett 
visited Liverpool and held a meeting attended by Liverpool reformers, their opponents, and 
delegates from elsewhere in Lancashire. The disorder was mainly shouting and jostling. The 
Liverpool Mercury reported that the majority overcame trouble-makers and "shouldered them 
out of the square."*'** The Mayor had decided not to intervene unless there was actual breach 
of the peace.*'*’
Despite this trivial measure of actual violence, however, the mere idea of political protest could 
produce quite disproportionate measures of prevention. While it was unusual for any 
extraordinary precautions to be taken or for the mayor to consult the Home Office, this did 
happen at times when there had been serious rioting at similar meetings elsewhere in the 
country. In August 1819, a meeting was held to protest about the events at Peterloo. The 
Mayor had been advised by the Home Office to observe the meeting with a view to providing 
legal evidence of seditious speeches; there was implicit approval of the decision not to stop the 
meeting, which was held without mayoral permission. The yeomanry, the Liverpool Light 
Horse, stood by (in heavy rain), and the Mayor was able to report that all had passed off 
quietly.*'*’ In 1820, when local reformers wanted to celebrate the Queen's acquittal, the Mayor 
used the threat of troops to negotiate a compromise whereby a procession was held (peacefully.
*40 Liverpool M ercury, 5 Dec 1817, 3 A pr 1825.
*41 Liverpool M ercury, 3 Dec 1819.
*42 Billinge's Advertiser, 29 Nov 1819.
*43 H 041 .4  fo 267, H obhouse to M ayor, 28 Aug 1819; G ore 's G eneral Advertiser, 2 Sep 1819; H 041.5
fo l, Hobhouse to M ayor, 1 Sep 1819, acknowledging that information.
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as it turned out) and an illumination was replaced by a firework display in Mosslake Fields.*'*'* 
The peace of the procession is remarkable in view of attempts by ultra-loyalists to "introduce 
into the procession carriages containing their frail female friends".*'*® And in 1831, after 
dangerous riots in Bristol over parliamentary reform, the Mayor asked for troops to be sent 
to Liverpool, even though a recent reform meeting attended by a crowd estimated at ten 
thousand had been peaceful.*'*®
Trade disputes
Liverpool men were not so sympathetic to the middle classes that they refrained from disputes 
with their employers. Thirteen riotous incidents were recorded during these years, and 
precautions were taken on one further occasion. Many trade associations existed. The 
shipwrights, described below, were undoubtedly the strongest. Each had its own style; as Clive 
Behagg argues, beside its official rules each of these societies had unwritten rules determining 
its attitude to the use of violence.*'*’ Some specialised in the use of violent methods by 
individuals; the shipsawyers, vulnerable to competition because of their relative lack of skill 
and powerless because their apprenticeship was too short to entitle them to qualify as freemen, 
were particularly noted for extreme violence exercised by individuals or small groups. One 
murder, some serious assaults, and several acts of arson were committed in this way.*'*^  These 
acts may, of course, have resulted from collective decisions; the difficulty of getting evidence.
*44 HO40.15 f o l35, D rake to Byng, 13 N ov 1820; Billinge's Advertiser, 21 Nov 1820.
*46 Liverpool Mercury, 24 Nov 182Û.
*46 H 052.13 fo274. M ayor to Lord M elbourne, 2 Nov 1831; HO40.29/2 fo303, W. Banning, Postm aster 
in Liverpool, to Sir. F. Freeling, 12 Oct 1831.
*47 Clive Behagg "Secrecy, Ritual and Folk Violence; The Opacity o f the W orkplace in the First H alf 
o f the Nineteenth Century" in R  D Storch (ed). Popular Culture and Custom in Nineteenth Century 
England, London, 1982, pp. 154-179.
*48 Gore's General Advertiser, 12 Feb 1824; Liverpool Mercury, 14 Sep 1821 and 28 Jun 1833;
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despite offers of rewards or pardons and the use of Bow Street officers, could reflect equally 
general solidarity or individual secrecy.*'*® Other trade associations tended towards collective 
violence. The most serious riots were among the shipwrights, but ropemakers, shoemakers, 
ironfounders, and builders used similar methods during these years.*®°
Violence was only one method of protecting the interests of workers, and must be seen in 
context. In many, probably most, cases, wage rates were agreed peacefully.*®* Petitions were 
often used, and trade societies sometimes bought advertising space to publicise their 
complaints.*®’ In one case, the powerful Shipwright's Club prosecuted their employers under 
the Combination Acts, but without success.*®’ Strikes, which resulted most often from the 
reduction of wages, did not necessarily involve violence, nor was violence always collective.
Violent acts which are known to have been collective were usually directed against blacklegs; 
"black sheep" as they were then called. At least once they were offered money before being
Liverpool M ercury, 27 Feb 1824 and 19 M ar 1824; Town Books, Vol. 15, p. 419, 3 M ar 1824; 
Liverpool Courier, 24 Dec 1834.
*49 H 043 .46  fo41, Phillipps to M ayor, 26 Dec 1824; HO40.33/1.154, M ayor to Goulbourne, 14 Feb 
1835.
*60 Shipwrights: Liverpool M ercury, 29 M ar 1822; G ore's General Advertiser, 19 A pr 1827 and 7 Jun 
1827; Liverpool Albion, 21 May 1827. Shipsawyers: G ore's G eneral Advertiser, 29 Jan  1824 
Ropem akers: Liverpool M ercury, 21 M ar 1823; Shoemakers: Liverpool Journal, 11 Jul 1835 
Ironfounders: Liverpool Mercury, 13 Jan 1835; Builders: Liverpool Courier, 13 Nov 1826
Saturday's Advertiser, 12 Sep 1833.
*61 E.g. Liverpool M ercury, 2 A pr 1824; agreement was usually no news.
*62 Liverpool M ercury, 12 May 1826, 10 Feb 1815 and 16 Feb 1827; Saturday's Advertiser, 18 Feb
1826.
*63 Liverpool M ercury, 3 M ay 1816.
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offered violence.*®'* In some riots, often the smallest, considerable injuries were inflicted.*®® In 
larger riots, violence often amounted only to rough handling. In some, the ceremony was that 
of "rough music", using shame to enforce conformity to group norms, as when ropemakers 
carried two men around the town in a cart, their coats inside-out and placards around their 
necks,*®® or when shipwrights burned the effigy of an apprentice who had obeyed a magistrate's 
instruction to do work traditionally done by journeymen.*®’ In other cases a show of strength 
was a threat of future violence.*®^
Only two attacks on employers are reported; in 1818, a master shipwright is said to have been 
beaten by strikers during an incident during which blacklegs and their tools were thrown from 
the ship on which they were working,*®® and in 1835, ropemakers stoned their employer's 
junior partners; the fact that they were performing journeymen's work at the time may have 
encourage the strikers to treat them as if they were fellow-workers. *®°
In all cases, the object was not to coerce employers directly, but to make strikes effective by 
preventing the use of blackleg labour. Such tactics seem to have had much success, particularly 
among trades where a seven-year apprenticeship was served, and the supply of skilled men was 
limited. These were also the trades with the highest proportion of freemen.
*54 Liverpool Journal, 11 Jul 1835.
*55 1825 (417.437) IV 499.565, Report o f Minutes o f Evidence from  the Select Committee on Artisans 
and M achinery (1824), (C. on A. and M.), p. 184; G ore 's G eneral Advertiser, 29 Jan  1824.
*56 G ore's General Advertiser, 17 Nov 1825.
*57 Liverpool Courier, 18 A pr 1827.
*58 E.g. Billinge's Advertiser, 22 May 1827; Liverpool Courier, 13 N ov 1826.
*59 C. on A. and M.,p. 198.
*50 Liverpool Mercury, 2 Oct 1835.
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For most of this period, the Shipwrights' Club was the most powerful trade organisation in 
Liverpool. Founded in 1810, it succeeded in existing under the Combination Acts because of 
its real but partial function as a benefit society, its readiness to use force, and its organisation, 
and because its members were employed by master shipwrights but paid by merchants or 
shipowners, so that the masters' control was limited. It was able to enforce high wages, 
manning levels, and proportions of apprentices to journeymen.*®* Its membership numbered 
about 900; almost half were freemen, and at election times it received supposedly charitable 
donations from supporters of the common council's candidate. An annual procession on the 
anniversary of the restoration of Charles II, shared with other trades but known as Shipwrights' 
Day, was followed by a dinner of the club.*®’ These dinners and the frequent meetings at 
election times*®’ strengthened the links formed in working together. As journeymen were 
employed by the day, and moved freely between yards, each would have been acquainted with 
many others. These close links must have been one of the factors which made it possible to 
mobilise up to 400 men from the trade.*®'*
No other club had such power or prestige, but several functioned similarly. Some had links 
with national unions in the same trade,*®® but links between trades seem not to have been 
formed until 1833-34, when most if not all of the budding trades joined a general trades union, 
probably the Operative Budders' Union.*®®
*61 C. on A. and M ., pp .183-248, 350-355.
*62 E.g. Liverpool M ercury, 2 Jun 1820 and 1 Jun 1827.
*63 E.g. Liverpool Journal, 13 Nov 1830.
*64 G ore 's General Advertiser, 7 Jun 1827.
*65 Ropem akers: Liverpool M ercury, 25 Jul 1823; Sawyers: HO40.18 fo239, accounts o f Sawyers'
Union, April 1825; Hatters: HO40.32/4 fo220, accounts o f H atters' Union, 16 Jun 1829;
*66 Liverpool Courier, 14 Aug 1833; Liverpool Journal, 22 Jun 1833; R. W. Postgate, The Builders' 
History, London, n.d., Ch.III, pp. 55-76.
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As the nature of trade associations developed, so did methods of control. The police available 
to the mayor were entirely insufficient against such numbers, as was shown in the case of the 
ropers' "carting" when it took more than an hour to find constables. For some years, little 
action was taken against the most formidable bodies, the shipwrights and shipsawyers.*®’ The 
official reason was that legal action could be taken only while a riot was in progress, or if 
evidence of identification was available. It was suggested that the Mayor looked "rather to the 
poUbook than to the statute book" in acting against the shipwrights,*®  ^ but this scarcely 
explains the similar lack of action against the shipsawyers. They served only two years' 
apprenticeship, whereas seven years was required to qualify as a freeman. The answer is more 
likely that given by the town clerk: "They are a great body of men for a magistrate to put his 
shoulder against."*®®
A strike combined with the buming-down of a sawimll in 1824 produced the first sign of 
severity. Both master shipwrights and master sawyers petitioned the Mayor to apply for 
military assistance; he did so at once, and it was immediately granted.*’* Troops were used only 
for the protection of sawrmlls on this occasion. In 1827, a further series of riots was caused 
by a joint campaign by merchants, shipowners, and master shipwrights to destroy the 
Shipwrights' Club. Troops were again requested, and granted, following the first attacks on 
blacklegs.*’* This time, they were used with considerable effect to protect the blacklegs at work; 
direct confrontation between strikers and troops appears to have been rninimal, the troops 
providing a show of force to support police or special constables. The club was eventually
*57 C. on A. and M., pp. 184, 187, 195.
*58 Liverpool Mercury, 29 M ar 1822.
*59 C. on A. and M., p .195.
*75 HO40.18 fo53-58. Petitions of m aster sawyers, master shipwrights, and M ayor to Peel, 22 M ar 1824; 
H 0 4 3 .32 fo257, Dawson to M ayor, 24 M ar 1824.
*7* H 041.7  fo232, Hobhouse to M ayor, 16 A pr 1827; HO40.22/1 fo80, Eckersley to H obhouse, 20 A pr
1827.
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replaced by a benefit society run by the masters.*’’ Troops were used similarly during a building 
strike involving a nation-wide general union in 1833.*”  In all these cases, requests for troops 
were granted without hesitation. The maintenance of public order in the case of trade disputes 
seems to have been given equally high priority by both local and national government at this 
time.
The importance given to the prevention of intimidation in strikes in some cases extended to 
the sentences passed by courts, which were occasionally although not usually long; long or 
short, they were usually accompanied by a sermon from the bench about the "true" interests 
of the working man.*’* In the case of the ropemakers' highly ceremonial treatment of blacklegs 
it seems to have been thought necessary to show that even such relatively non-violent 
behaviour would not be tolerated; the prisoners were committed to the assizes "in order that 
they might hear the law of the land propounded to them by the highest authority"*’® The use 
of troops, and the sentences given, show that trade disputes were surprisingly severely treated 
in these years. It is clearly not their violence which caused this to be so; sentences almost as 
high as those given for violence were passed on apprentices who gave way to intimidation and 
stopped work.*’® A similar concern with the mere possibility of interference with trade is shown 
by the fact that some of the local churches refused communion to known members of general 
trades unions.*”  It was the attempt of workmen to exert economic control at all, rather than 
the use of violent means of doing so, which produced so disproportionate a reaction.
*72 Liverpool Courier, 2 May 1827; Liverpool Albion, 16 Jul 1827.
*73 HO40.31/1 fo35, Bouverie to Phillipps, 30 Jun 1833.
*74 G ore 's G eneral Advertiser, 29 Jan 1824 and 12 Sep 1833.
*75 G ore 's G eneral Advertiser, 23 M ar 1826.
*76 E.g. Liverpool Courier, 18 A pr 1827; G ore's General Advertiser, 17 Nov 1825.
*77 Liverpool Courier, 4 Sep 1833; PP  1836 (40) XXXIV.427, Report on the State o f the Irish Poor in 
G reat Britain, (Poor Inquiry (Ireland)), Appendix G , p. 18.
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Direct Action
Violence was also used in other cases of grievance or anger. "Direct Action" riots were fairly 
frequent, but usually rather small. Of 14 cases, nine happened during the cholera epidemic of 
1832.*” They arose out of fears of "burking" — that doctors would dissect the bodies of cholera 
victims, and perhaps even murder them in order to do so. The Burke and Hare murders were 
comparatively recent, and the 1832 Anatomy Act had made dissection a widespread source of 
fear among the poor, some of whom found it hard to believe that doctors could have any 
concern for their welfare. Such riots occurred in several towns during this epidemic, fears of 
murder by medical men being discernible in several cases.*’® In Liverpool, doctors and the 
constables protecting them were assaulted, and the "palanquin" used to take patients to the 
temporary cholera hospital was destroyed. Those involved included men, women and boys, 
and were described as "chiefly composed of low Irish". This may have been prejudice; two 
men described as "comparatively respectable" and one "Englishman" are listed among the six 
people known to have been arrested. It is supported, however, by the evidence of the town's 
first medical officer of health. Dr. Duncan.*^® The press alleged that the motive was to justify 
a wake.*^ * It is also possible that Roman Catholic beliefs concerning the disposal of corpses 
could have been involved; cremation was not accepted by that church until more than a 
century later, the burial of the entire body being important. Perhaps, too, the close-knit social 
groups within the Irish community made collective action more likely.
The cholera riots were taken very seriously by both press and authorities; patients were moved 
when near death, and risks of infection were increased when patients remained in overcrowded
*’8 Liverpool Journal, 2 Jun 1832; Liverpool Times, 5 Jun 1832; Liverpool Courier, 6, 13, 20, 27 Jun 
1832.
*’® M. J. Durey, The Return of the Plague: British Society and the Cholera, 1831-2, Dublin, 1979, pp. 
158-9, 183-4; Ruth Richardson, D eath, Dissection and the Destitute, London, 1987, pp. 223-230.
*80 Poor Inquiry (Ireland), Appendix G , p l8 .
*81 Liverpool Courier, 13 Jun 1832.
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homes. Some doctors refused to visit patients in areas where riots had occurred,*®’ but most 
persisted; they were provided with escorts of constables. An address by Catholic priests was 
perhaps one of the most useful measures.*®’ There were also a number of exemplary trials. In 
most cases no arrests were made; only six people were arrested. At least five were sent to the 
quarter sessions, bail being allowed in only one case. Magstrates declared that they would 
"visit such offences with the utmost severity",*®* and persisted in sending the one prisoner who 
was granted bail for trial in spite of his "comparative respectability", his apology, and his 
employer's evidence.
In the other cases in this most miscellaneous category the nature of the links between 
participants was also varied. On one occasion, a chance-assembled crowd took violent action 
to rescue a child from a drunken mother; there were three riots in the town's theatre, two being 
protests against the dismissal of an actress. There was also an attack on a temperance 
meeting.*®® These incidents gave no opportunity for special policing, and were treated by 
magistrates on their "merits". The highest sentence was three months imprisonment, 
apparently because of damage to theatre property, whereas in the child rescue the mother was 
arrested, not the rioters.
Sectarian Conflict
The sectarian riot was to become a notably Liverpool event. As Frank Neal has written, in the 
preface to his comprehensive account of Liverpool sectarian violence.
182 Liverpool Courier, 20 Jun 1832.
183 Poor Inquiry (Ireland) ... p. 18.
*84 Liverpool Courier, 13 Jun 1832.
*85 Liverpool M ercury, 7 Jun 1822; G ore's General Advertiser, 16 Dec 1824, 27 Jan 1825; Saturday's 
Advertiser, 26 Aug 1826; Liverpool M ercury, 9 Oct 1835.
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Anyone born and raised in working-class Liverpool in pre-slum clearance days could not fail 
to be aw are o f religious differences within that society.*86
In the nineteenth century, however, the difference was seen as primarily one of "party". 
Conservatives were Protestant; Radicals supported Catholicism and non-conformity. This 
division seems to date from the 1820s; the Tories had for many years claimed for themselves 
a monopoly of true religion. During the years when they labelled their opponents "Jacobin", 
they made much use of accusations of lack of religion. The question of Catholic emancipation, 
coinciding with the arrival of growing numbers of Catholic Irish, led to the replacement of 
"irréligion" by "popery". The granting of increased rights to Catholics in 1829 was followed by 
the establishment of a number of Protestant organisations; the Liverpool Protestant 
Association, the Society for the Education of the Native Irish, the Protestant Reformation 
Society all existed by 1835. Their meetings heard ancient slanders such as tales of priests 
murdering babies in order to cast out the devil, and allegations that the Catholic laity were kept 
in ignorance of the existence the second commandment.*®’ The Liberal press equated this 
extreme protestantism with Conservatism,*®® and the principles of the Tradesmen's 
Conservative Society, which concentrated on the need for the Established Church as the chief 
protection of the state, gives support to this idea. Nor was Unitarianism any more acceptable; 
Thomley, the Liberal candidate in 1832, met much opposition on the grounds of his beliefs, 
which were said by one correspondent of the Liverpool Albion to deny Christ's divinity, and 
thus render him unfit to represent the town.*®®
186 F rank Neal, Sectarian Violence: the Liverpool Experience, 1819 to 1914, M anchester, 1988, p. ix.
*87 Liverpool Courier, 28 M ar 1827, account o f meeting o f the Society for the Education of the Native 
Irish.
*88 E.g. Liverpool Journal, 31 Oct 1835; Liverpool Times, 27 Oct 1835.
*89 Liverpool Albion, 10 Dec 1832.
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Although much worse violence was to come after 1835, there were five incidents between 1815 
and that year which arose because of the Loyal Orange Order.
The major occasion for Orange pageantry, the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne, July 
12th, was first celebrated in Liverpool in 1819, and produced the town's first Orange riot.*®** 
About 100 Orangemen from Liverpool and from other parts of Lancashire marched through 
the main streets of the town carrying banners bearing protestant devices, many of which were 
deeply provocative to Catholics. At the bottom of Dale Street, in the heart of the town, they 
were attacked by a crowd said (probably correctly) to be made up of Irishmen. Stones were 
thrown, and several marchers were injured. Eleven of the attackers were arrested, and troops 
called out to prevent a recurrence of fighting.*®*
The 'ringleader' was imprisoned for six months, the others for three. A similar march in the 
following year met a similar fate, eight arrests being made.*®’ The Mayor attempted to exclude 
Manchester Orangemen and to test the legality of Orange processions by indicting the order 
at the quarter sessions; the precise charge used is not recorded. The Grand Jury threw out the 
bill against the order; the prosecution against those who attacked its members was dropped. 
The inference is that these events were connected.
No further procession was held in Liverpool until the 1840s, although an incident in 1823 
showed that Orange lodges still met, and that town constables were members. A constable 
was attacked by a small group of men as he left an indoor celebration of the 12th July. He ran 
for help, finding several other constables so soon that it is fikely that they had been attending 
the same meeting. Five men were imprisoned for six months for the attack.*®’
*95 G ore 's General Advertiser, 22 Jul 1819, 29 Jul 1819; Billinge's Advertiser, 19 Jul 1819, 26 Jul 1819. 
*9* Billinge's Advertiser, 19 Jul 1819.
*92 Liverpool M ercury, 15 Jul 1820; Billinge's Advertiser, 18 Jul 1820, 25 Jul 1820.
*93 G ore 's General Advertiser, 17 Jul 1823, 31 Jul 1823.
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A secondary date in the Orange calendar was November 5th, anniversary both of the downfall 
of the papist Fawkes and of the arrival in England of William of Orange. Surprisingly, it 
produced no recorded sectarian problems, although there was concern about the use of 
gunpowder in fireworks which led to precautions being taken.*®*
The relative quietness of the local Orangemen was not brought about by local preventive 
measures alone. In 1821, the order was forced both to move its headquarters from Manchester 
to London,*®® and to change the form of its oaths to comply with the law. In Ireland, too, the 
order was at a.low ebb.*®®
Liverpool seems to have had few Orangemen before the 1830s. The 1819 procession consisted 
of only about 100 men, not all of them from Liverpool. Occupations of some members are 
known; most were small tradesmen or skilled workers.*®’ Local reformers supported the rioters 
imprisoned then, arranging a heroes' welcome on their release.*®® This arose from an 
identification of Orangeism and Toryism which had some justification nationally — such 
upper-class support as the order had was from Ultra-Tories — but which in view of the actions 
of the Mayor seems to have scarcely been justified locally as yet. There is no evidence at this 
date of any sympathy towards the order among leading Tories. Senior states that English
*®* Billinge's Advertiser, 10 Nov 1829; Saturday's Advertiser, 12 Nov 1831; Liverpool Courier, 11 Nov 
1835.
*95 p p  1835 (603) X V II.l, R eport o f Select Committee on Orange Lodges in G reat Britain and the 
Colonies, App. II, p. 3.
*®® H. Senior, Orangeism in Ireland and Britain, 1795-1836, London, 1966, pp. 175 and 199.
*®’ Billinge's Advertiser, 26 Jul 1819.
*®® Picton, Memorials .., pp. 354-5.
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members at this time were mainly Irish immigrants, and almost entirely working-class,*®® and 
this is supported by the evidence of the Head Constable M. J. Whitty:
There are sometimes battles between the Orangem en and the Ribbonm en these silly people
retaining here, where there is no sympathy for either, the absurd enmities which disgraced and 
degraded them at home.^oo
The Ribbonmen mentioned here were members of Catholic societies which were in some ways 
equivalent to Orange lodges. Local clubs were linked by a tenuous central organisation whose 
main function was the coordination of passwords. They were not terrorist organisations, 
although the name was often misused to describe Irish agrarian secret societies which used 
terrorist tactics. Ribbon societies were more usually urban, and sometimes acted as trade 
societies.’*** Their main purpose was opposition to Orangemen, often exhibited in battles which 
took place almost by appointment. Broeker mentions an information centre in Northern 
Ireland where lists of fairs were maintained where such battles were expected.’*’ The existence 
of Ribbon societies in Liverpool at this period is suggested by a letter of the Manchester Grand 
Lodge of the Orange Order’*’ and confirmed by the evidence of an informer, among Dublin 
Castle records, which refers to a schism between Liverpool Ribbonmen from Leinster and 
those from Ulster in 1822.’*** It is possible that opposition to the 1819 march may have been
*99 Senior, Orangeism  , pp. 152,154,158,176;
200 Poor Inquiry (Ireland)..., p. 20.
25* G . Broeker, Rural Disorder and Police Reform in Ireland, 1812-1836, London, 1970, pp. 1-13; Lynn 
Hollen Lees, Exiles o f Erin: Irish M igrants in Victorian London, M anchester, 1979, pp. 213-4, 223-4.
252 Broeker, Rural D isorder   p .15.
253 HO 40.11 fo206, M. A. W oodburne to Lord Sidmouth, 14 M ar 1820.
254 PRO  CO904.8.8, M 'G loin to D rum m ond, 4 Jan  1840.
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organised by such a society, particularly as the evidence that one man gave the order for the 
attack to start is rather more circumstantial than most alleged identifications of iing-leaders.’°®
The remaining two incidents came at a time when anti-Catholic feeling was becoming much 
more general among the town's Protestants, although in neither case was there any Orange 
activity. One was small; charged with having raised a mob to attack an alleged Orangeman in 
the street, a defendant claimed in court that he had been too drunk to know whether he had 
done so. He was fined 20s.’°® The other was the largest riot of the years 1815-1835, and is 
classed as sectarian only because unfounded expectations of an Orange march caused large 
numbers of people to gather in the main thoroughfares of the Irish areas of town.’*” During 
the day, no action was taken to disperse the crowds, but about 10 p.m. a localised disturbance 
led to the watchmen making an arrest. This produced a rescue attempt which rapidly became 
a mass attack, by a crowd armed with sticks and axes, on the bridewell. The outer door was 
broken down, and those besieged inside rang a bell designed as a fire-alarm. Help soon arrived, 
the first being Whitty, superintendent of both fire police and watch. The first watchmen to 
arrive came as fire police, carrying axes; others soon followed, and this force had done much 
to disperse the crowd by the time that the Mayor arrived, with 200 troops, 100 of the dock 
police, and a number of town constables. It is not known whether the Riot Act proclamation 
was read; the troops were used only as a show of force. The'bulk of these forces patrolled 
during the following day as disorder stdl seemed likely, and 500 special constables were sworn 
in to prevent the rescue of the 51 men arrested. 43 of these were satisfactorily identified, 
receiving sentences ranging from one to six months.’*® The sentences reflected the fact that 
most had been in custody for three months before trial.
255 Billinge's Advertiser, 27 Jul 1819.
356 Liverpool Mercury, 7 Aug 1835.
’**’ Liverpool Courier, 15 Jul 1835; G ore's General Advertiser, 16 Jul 1835; Liverpool M ercury, 17 Jul 
1835.
258 Liverpool Courier, 4 Oct 1835.
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This incident clearly shows the problem of classifying riots according to cause. Although it 
could also be considered as an anti-police riot, it has been included here mainly because it was 
the expectation of a sectarian battle which drew the crowd together, and which kept them 
together for much of the second day. During this day, the various police bodies made great 
efforts to persuade the crowd that no Orange march would be permitted. No purely anti-police 
riot attracted a crowd of comparable size.
In these early sectarian disturbances, the bonds linking the individuals on the Protestant side 
are clear. They belonged to the Loyal Orange Order, membership of which was at least a clear 
statement of hostility to the ideas of Catholicism, and in practice was usually evidence of 
hostility to individual Catholics. The Catholic side, however, was probably not entirely 
composed of Ribbonmen; the numbers involved in the 1835 incident”*® suggest that a large 
proportion of the Catholic population took to the streets. As yet, the Orange faction was not 
so important a part of Liverpool society as Irish Catholic immigrants were, but sectarian riots 
were clearly taken very seriously, in contrast to other battles which took place among the 
poorer sections of the community. One reason for this is probably that they were likely to 
happen in the centre of town; another, which applies to the 1830s but probably not to the 
earlier incidents, is the number who had allegiance to one or other side. Later years show these 
fears were not groundless.
Private Battles
Ten incidents have been found where violence seems to have been directed neither against 
those in authority nor towards the direct achievement of any objective, but to have sprung 
from the shared sense of identity of those who formed one or both sides. Children, navvies, 
and some Irish immigrants were among groups participating. •
209 Liverpool Mercury, 17 Jul 1835, 24 Jul 1835.
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Four cases of gang-fighting among children were found.^‘° The participants were described 
twice as "gangs of schoolboys", once as "opposing bands of boys", and once as "boys and girls". 
In this last case, the gangs were drawn from two neighbouring streets; in the other three, there 
is no hint of the basis on which sides were formed. They are included on the fragile evidence 
of the word "gang", combined with the tendency of the wilder games of children to involve 
taking sides which, even if they only last as long as the game, develop a certain temporary 
reality. Their battles consisted mainly of stone-throwing, and seem to have occurred, in three 
out of four cases, on several successive days before any action was taken. The fourth case came 
to the notice of the poHce when the riot escalated to involve the parents of the children. At 
least two boys were arrested, but appear to have been discharged. Perhaps the fact of arrest 
was thought a sufficient deterrent.
The one case involving navvies is scarcely more securely classified. They were regarded as a 
lawless and outcast group who formed their own unconventional style of life and rejected, as 
well as being rejected by, all that was respectable. The incident took place during the building 
of the North Docks, while large numbers of navvies hved temporarily in the town. It was said 
to have been unprovoked, promiscuously directed against all passers-by, and to have ended 
before the Watch could arrive. The supposed brutality of the navvies was much discussed in 
the press, and it was said that the Mayor had taken steps to prevent such outrages; 
unfortunately, these steps were not described.^*^
In the case of the Irish, private battles were fully expected. The more adventurous Victorian 
tourist might even attend an Irish fair in the hope of seeing a faction fight, as they were 
described. This showed an exaggerated degree of expectation of fighting, but there was some 
justification for it. Broeker describes how fights were used in rural Ireland to settle local feuds
Saturday's Adverüser, 23 Sep 1926; Liverpool Journal, 22 Nov 1834 and 7 Feb 1835; Liverpool 
Courier, 20 May 1835.
211 Saturday's Advertiser, 11 Jul 1829 and 14 Aug 1830.
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over problems like the occupancy o f  l a n d , 212 and shows that they were generally tolerated by 
magistrates. When Irish law was in the hands of the English there were reasons for such 
methods of settling quarrels, and emigrants carried the tradition with them. Lees describes 
similar incidents among the London Irish at about the same p e rio d .2 1 2  Although these battles 
appeared fearsome, it was often remarked that surprisingly few serious injuries were inflicted; 
this might reflect the existence of an unwritten code of rules. Ribbon societies were provided 
with passwords specifically for use when a fight threatened; one such password was "provoke 
me not. Sir", the countersign "I hope you will not ^ ve me reason" identified a member of the 
same organisation.^^”* Contemporary estimates of the criminal activity of Irish immigrants were 
often inflated by prejudice; nevertheless they do seem to have been disproportionately 
frequently involved in assaults and affrays. Finnegan's study of the Irish cornmunity in 
York i^  ^ found that these crimes, together with drunkenness, led to the Irish contribution to 
total crime being higher than that of other sections of the city's population. '
The tradition of fighting pitched battles seems to have travelled with the Irish. Witnesses for 
the Parhamentary enquiry into the state of the Irish poor remarked on the tendency for 
allegiance to their region of origin to lead to fighting among immigrants.^*® In at least one case, 
a fight described as being between factions from Ulster and from Leinster is said to have been 
adjourned from Liverpool to Cheshire, presumably to avoid poHce interference.2*'^  This only 
becomes eligible for inclusion because some of the returning combatants continued the battle
212 G. Broeker, op. cit., pp .15 16.
213 L. Hollen Lees, Exiles o f Erin: Irish Migrants in Victorian London, M anchester, 1979, pp. 167, 
213-4.
214 PRO  CO 904.7.77-92, Statement o f John Kelly, 6 Dec 1839.
21  ^ F. Finnegan, Poverty and Prejudice, Cork, 1982, pp .132-154.
216 Poor Inquiry (Ireland)..., pp.20, 27.
217 G ore 's G eneral Adverüser, 5 M ar 1834.
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in Liverpool, which led to seventeen arrests, and sentences of from one to nine months 
imprisonment, A large number of both watchmen and constables were involved; several were 
hurt.
Four other cases of faction fighting have been identified before 1835; one took place on St. 
Patrick's Day 1826, and the fact that those involved were armed suggests that this was not 
spontaneous. Another began as a fight between two Irish groups, poHce being brought in 
apparently only when it spread to include passers-by. There were many arrests on both 
occasions.
The information available about these private battles is usually shght. Those involving navvies 
aroused considerable concern, those involving children were often ignored. The treatment of 
Irish fights fell mid-way; the watch or other pohce made some attempt to stop them, but the 
only measure to against their recurrence was the use of strengthened patrols on Saturday 
nights, described below.
Rescues and Anti-Police Riots
Fourteen incidents can be placed in this category. Only two are reported as unprovoked 
assaults;,2*  ^ this suggests that there was little generalised resentment of poHcing at this time. 
The rest were resistance to police actions. Two of these cases also involved resistance to Excise 
officers, one happened when the Watch helped a publican to clear his premises,^*® and another 
(which happened outside the town boundary, in Toxteth Park) when a JP, assisted by two of 
his gardeners and the one local constable, attempted to stop a prizefight, and aU four were 
attacked by the audience of 600-700 m en.^ A further three happened when the Watch 
attempted to stop fights between individuals.
218 Min Com W atch, 28 May 1824; Liverpool Courier, 23 Jan  1826.
219 G ore's General Advertiser, 26 Jan 1826.
220 Saturday's Advertiser, 24 Dec 1830 and 1 Jan 1831.
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The remaining cases were attempts to rescue prisoners. Two occurred on the same day, and 
were related; a prisoner, arrested for being in possession of rope, called to passers-by for aid, 
appealing to them as "fellow Irishmen"; an affray developed between dock pohce and a crowd 
described as Irish. A few hours later, while excitement was stiU high, the watch attempted to 
arrest two women, and a further rescue attempt cohected a much larger crowd, estimated at 
some thousands. It was rendered unusually formidable by the chance presence of Irish recruits 
en route for South America to fight as mercenaries.^^* This mischance was balanced by the 
fortuitous presence of Enghsh troops just disembarked from Ireland,^ who were used to 
disperse the crowd and prevent recurrence. '
The size of this riot and the use of troops made Home Office involvement inevitable; other 
cases in this category were much smaller. A further three rescues involved prisoners from two 
battling Irish groups, the seizure of an fihcit still, and an assault on a customs official.223
It is noticeable that, where the original reason for arrest or intervention is known, it was often 
for an offence against the law rather than against an individual victim — drinking after hours, 
revenue offences, prizefighting,or "disorderly behaviour". Frequently, also, these offences 
might be expected to be sanctioned by the community as defence of traditionally legitimate 
pastimes. From about 1829, the commissioners of the watch began a campaign against 
breaches of Hcensing regulations by publicans. Watchmen were instructed to report pubHcans 
to the Committee, who would interview offenders, and prosecute in some cases. This may have 
increased the incidence of attacks on watchmen, or have reduced their popularity. Records of 
such attacks before 1835 are too sparse to give numerical support to that idea, however, and
221 Billinge's Advertiser, 28 Jun and 2 Aug 1819.
222 H 041 .4  fo l57 , H obhouse to M ayor, 26 Jun 1819.
223 G ore 's G eneral Advertiser, 25 Jan  1816; Saturday's Adverüser, 23 Sep 1826; Liverpool M ercury, 
23 Aug 1833.
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the fact that offences were reported rather than immediately dealt with would reduce the 
chance of crowd reaction.^”*
Two facts in connection with the formation of anti-poHce crowds suggest that Irish immigrants 
were particularly active in this type of riot. The first is that the prisoner in the dock pohce 
rescue was said to have used his Irish nationahty specifically in his appeal to the crowd. The 
second was the use (by those resisting the clearance of a bar) of a shriU whistle, said to be the 
signal of an Irish organisation called the Rosannah Gang.^ The existence of such a gang 
would be in keeping with what is known of of societies such as Ribbon clubs, part of whose 
function was to provide mutual support in mass quarrels. In other cases, Httle is known of how 
these crowds were formed, but Irish names and streets known to have a high proportion of 
Irish residents were often mentioned. The rescue of prisoners was also common as a feature 
of other riots, particularly trade disputes, and therefore cannot be taken as an Irish monopoly; 
all that can be said is that the Irish seem to have been better able to mobilise support 
specifically for a rescue, whereas other groups usually attempted such rescues or assaults on 
the pohce only when a riot was aheady in progress. In both cases, the rescue was very often 
successful; rearrest would present considerable difficulties among overcrowded and hostile 
back-streets.
The cases given here are almost certainly a very small proportion of actual occurrences. 
Measures against assault are known only in the case of the watch; records for other pohce do 
not survive. The commissioners attempted whenever possible to prosecute after any assault, 
coUective or i n d i v i d u a l . ^ ^ e  patrols were strengthened on Saturday nights in disturbed areas.^^? 
This measure was felt by the superintendent in 1833 to be counter-productive; he claimed that
224 Min. Com. W at., 22 Feb 1833.
226 G ore's G eneral Advertiser, 26 Jan 1826.
226 E.g.Min. Com. W atch, 23 Jan  1824, 20 May 1824, 10 Jan 1826, etc.
227 E.g. Min. Com. W atch, 24 Sep 1824, 30 M ay 1835.
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fights were often started by the watch, when they attempted, unnecessarily, to arrest drunks 
who could have found their way home. "On Saturday nights, the Watchmen are Bullies, and 
the extramen their seconds", he claimed.^^ However, he based his argument on the small 
numbers of arrests on nights when extramen were not available. This circular logic does not 
seem to have impressed the commissioners.
Rescues were seen as a serious problem by the commissioners, who were refused the use of the 
dock lockup and were forced to build another.^® There was also a vehicle fitted with chains 
to transport p r i s o n e r s A s  early as 1816, the governor of the gaol had requested such a 
vehicle.2^ * In 1820, the Mayor and magistrates deliberated on the problem of rescues,^^  ^
although their decision is not known. From the early 1820s onwards, there were many 
improvements to courtrooms, bridewells, and gaols which would tend to ameliorate this 
problem, among others. Attention to the problem of rescues cannot be seen as purely directed 
to the prevention of riot. The enforcement of law requires that prisoners be secured.
Riots o f Unknown Origin
Seven incidents must remain in this category. Most public house brawls would be likely to 
remain in this group, for lack of press or official interest in searching out any cause beyond 
strong drink. In this half of the period particularly, however, incidents are also Hkely to end 
up in this group because of the longer odds against preservation of information. In most cases, 
the sentence of quarter sessions is the only information available. Then there was an attack
228 Min. Com. W atch, 5 A pr 1833.
229 Min. Com. W atch, 26 Dec 1823; Min. Com. W atch, 29 May 1829.
230 Min. Com. W atch, 28 M ar 1834.
231 Town Books, V ol.l4 , p. 597, 6 Nov 1816.
232 Town Books, Vol. 15, p. 95, 7 Jun 1820.
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by "a mob of fellows" on a resident of Read's Cour t ,w hi le  the remaining two were ascribed 
to Irishmen, one (in North Street) probably co r rec t ly the  other less convincingly; the names 
of the eight men arrested include not one which sounds Irish.^^
In the absence of more evidence, very little can be said. These cases serve to demonstrate the 
lack of press coverage of minor riots, and it is probable that many more cases were completely 
unreported. One case was described as "one of those disgraceful riots of so frequent occurrence 
in that neighbourhood", a phrase reminiscent of the Wolverhampton papers' pejorative 
headline "Another Stafford Street Row".^^  ^ If riots were so frequent, however, it seems to have 
concerned the Liverpool authorities very little. As with private battles, only the commissioners 
of the watch appear to have taken any action; their involvement probably arose partly from 
the need to protect the watchmen from assault, and partly from the connection between drink 
and violence. Their main measures, extra patrols and prosecution, have already been 
mentioned. Prosecution must have been very hit-and-miss among the overcrowded courts and 
back-alleys. Arrests at the time would be very difficult if rioters outnumbered the watch, and 
identification after the event even harder.
Conclusions, 1815-1835
Riot must have been much more frequent than appears from recorded cases, and as has already 
been stated the relative frequency of different types cannot be established. There are, however, 
sufficient cases in each category to demonstrate certain differences in handling.
233 Saturday's Advertiser, 2 Jul 1831.
234 G ore's General Advertiser, 28 Nov 1833.
236 G ore's General Advertiser, 20 Dec 1827.
236 G ore's General Advertiser, 28 Nov 1833; R. Swift ""Another Stafford Street Row" : Law, O rder and
the Irish Presence in mid-Victorian W olverhampton", in R. Swift and S. Gilley (eds.). The Irish in
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Precautions were taken very much more readily in some cases than in others. Table 1 in 
Appendix 3 summarises the findings. The highest level was the use of troops; they were called 
out when pohtical protest meetings were expected, and when trade disputes were in progress. 
Otherwise the army was used only when rioters were out-of-hand. Precautions taken against 
electoral riot were small in comparison; even though some riot was invariably expected, 
significant number of special constables were not enrolled until there was no alternative. 
Clearly, a degree of disorder was acceptable during elections. This difference cannot be 
explained by relative severity of violence, since it was extremely rare locally for either political 
protest or trade disputes to result in more than minor injuries.
Sectarian riot was not as yet predictable by the calendar, so that precautions could not be 
routinely taken. However, strong rumours of a procession in 1835 produced no reaction untd 
Irish crowds gathered to oppose it. Even less warning was possible for private battles, 
anti-police riots, or direct action riots; only precautions of a general kind were relevant, such 
as the doubling of pohce patrols or the provision of a secure vehicle to carry prisoners. It can 
be seen that these precautions were directed towards anti-pohce riots in particular.
Pohce activity during riots is much harder to analyse. Table 2 in Appendix 3 hsts the level of 
activity against the type of incident. The size and violence of the mob, their location, the 
practical difficulties in alerting the pohce and bringing them to the scene, were the major 
variables. There was httle scope for differentiation in reactive measures except where the pohce 
had the chance of preparing in advance.
The evidence of numbers of arrests is disappointing, since this was above ah influenced by 
practical considerations. Table 3 in Appendix 3 gives numbers. The high figure for Sectarian 
riot results from the single major incident of 1835; that for private battles probably comes from 
the fact that most such riots were reported only if a trial took place. The high figure for 
Anti-Pohce riots is self-explanatory.
Comparison of sentences is a much better indication of discrhnination according to type. 
Higher sentences could of course be given at quarter sessions and assizes than in summary 
trials. The choice of court is clearly part of the process which decides sentence length. It might 
be expected that that the severity of the incident, and also perhaps the number of rioters
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involved, might influence both the choice of the method of trial and the sentence. Surprisingly, 
no correlation was found. Table 4 in Appendix 3 gives the results of this test. Whatever 
influenced magistrates and judges in sentencing rioters, it was neither the number of people 
involved in a riot, nor the damage caused. In two categories there were not enough cases to 
justify a conclusion as to the relative severity of sentencing. In Pohtical Protest, the low level 
of violence meant a lack of arrests, and for Elections, the only sentences known were ^ven in 
1816 at Lancaster assizes; these extremely heavy sentences originated outside the town, at a 
time when popular disorder was a major issue in Lancashire. Summary sentences would of 
necessity have been shorter. Their absence from the records could result from a lack of arrests 
but is more likely to reflect the pressure on news-space at election times. There is reason to 
suppose that a very large number of short sentences have been lost, so that to include this 
group could tend to exaggerate the separation of sentences for riots of different types. For ah 
other types of riot, there were sufficient cases to justify comparisons of sentences.
For these types of riot, the chance of being sent to quarter sessions or assizes clearly varied. 
Table 5 in Appendix 3 gives percentages. For this period, very few summary trials were 
reported, so that comparisons are limited and also the proportion of trials at quarter sessions 
seems high. However, trials at the assizes were relatively unusual. Apart from the election 
rioters mentioned already, the majority so tried had been involved in trade disputes; three 
quarters of such trials found were at the assizes, compared with httle more than one-eighth of 
trials connected with attacks on the pohce. The choice of so expensive a method of trial was 
presumably influenced by the pubhcity which could be achieved as a warning to others. The 
theatrical setting of the trial and the pubhcity which could be obtained made this an exceUent 
method of stating pubhcly that such riots would not be tolerated; whatever the popular view, 
they were ihegal.
In order to make comparisons, however, it is possible to regard the method of trial as being 
only a step in the determination of the length of sentence. Sentences can then be compared 
regardless of their origin. Details of the method are given in Appendix 1. The result is that 
there were statisticahy significant differences in sentences recorded during this period for riotous 
offences of different types. When sentences are arranged in order of severity, the mean ranks 
for riots of different types can be represented as in figure 1. Ah sentences are ranked according
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to length. The rank of the median sentence for each type of incident is plotted on a line having 
the lowest ranks (shortest sentences) on the left, and the highest ranks (longest sentences) on 
the right. This shows in visual form the considerable discrimination shown in sentencing 
rioters according to the type of riot in which they were accused of taking part. Anti-police riots 
were severely punished; this reflects the need to protect the police in the only way possible 
short of establishing a more efficient and more expensive force. Trade disputes and Sectarian 
riots were next in order. Sectarian disorder occurred in the centre of the town, disrupting trade 
and threatening shops and pubhc buildings. Trade disputes were similarly heavily punished; 
more significantly since those on trial were frequently respectable working men who would 
have more to lose by the mere fact of being accused. In comparison, both direct action riots 
and private battles were much less severely handled.
The relative priorities revealed by the two factors, preventive measures and punishment, can 
be drawn up as in Figure 2. Punishment for pohtical protest and election riots has had to be 
omitted for lack of information. The main difference between these two hsts is that preventive 
measures against trade disputes were given much more weight than were punishments for 
taking part. The frequent use of the assize courts also suggests that they were regarded as more 
serious than even the sentences would suggest.
It is apparent that the authorities at this time did distinguish between riots of different type, 
on a scale with pohtical protest at the upper end; sectarian and anti-pohce riots and trade 
disputes were highly placed; together with election disorders, direct action riots and private 
battles were ranged towards the lower end.
Can any underlying theory be sketched in to account for this differentiation? There is evidence 
to suggest that those involved accounted for violence in a number of different ways. By some, 
or perhaps in some contexts, violence was seen as merely a property of the lowest of the low'; 
and sometimes not only of the lowest. Before better pohcing, even a wefl-to-do young man 
might be expected to engage in "nocturnal brawls, riots and dissipations."^^’ The Irish in 
particular were understood to enjoy a good fight, the race "who broke each others' heads as
237 Brooke, Liverpool in the Last Q uarter o f the Eighteenth Century, Liverpool, 1853, pp. 298-300. 
76 Riot and its Control in Liverpool, 1815-1860
2 If 4
Mean Rank out of 171
2 = Private Battle
3 = Sectarian
4 = Direct Action 
No value for type 5, Election, or type 8 , Political Protest
6 = Anti-police
7 = Trade Dispute
Figure 1. Relative Severity of Sentence by Type, I8 I5 -I836 .
an amuscment".23s This explanation can be referred to as "bmtishncss". Disgraceful thouglr it 
might be, such fighting was thought to be of no great consequence. Mere injury was 
unimportant. It could be written at election time that "there may have been a broken head or 
two," yet "never, perhaps, was an occasion of this sort less deformed by any ill-humour."^’ 
Even the Recorder, addressing the Grand Jury on the subject of unprovoked assaults on 
passers-by explained that they should concern themselves in case the attackers should turn to 
highway robbery.^*®
238 Liverpool Times, 11 M ar 1834.
239 Saturday 's Advertiser, 27 O ct 1827.
240 Saturday's Advertiser, 24 Jan 1829.
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Figure 2. Relative Strength of Prevention and Policing by Type.
Injuries, then, did not suffice to make a riot a matter for concern. However, disorder so readily 
produced could be used to provide an opportunity for theft. This explanation could be called 
"criminal motivation." One such example was a mayoral election, when disturbances were 
explained as designed to permit pocket-picking.24:
Between them the theories of "brutishness" and "criminal motivation" were probably 
predominant in most cases of private battles, elections riot, anti-police riot and riot of 
unknown origin, while the notorious tendency of the Irish towards "brutish" riot could account 
for sectarian riots in many minds.
Both "brutishness" and "criminal motivation" would be expected to be intractable, the best 
measure of prevention being severe punishment for the most serious cases. Violence directed 
against the police could only thus be discouraged.
241 Liverpool Courier, 27 Oct 1831.
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In contrast, some riot might be recognised as having a rational object. Occasionally, this might 
even justify the use of violence. This would be relatively unusual; one example was the rescue 
by a small crowd of a child from a drunken motheri'*  ^ where the mother rather than any 
member of the crowd was arrested. More often, the crowd was held to be misguided; moderate 
punishment, accompanied by explanation, might be hoped to have a beneficial effect. This can 
be seen in the cholera riots, but is much more frequent in trade disputes where the magistrate 
had a set speech on the right of all men to sell their labour without intimidation. Here, too, 
the prisoners might be sent to the Assizes, in order that the illegal and unjustifiable nature of 
their actions could be stated unequivocally and with maximum pubhcity.
None of these three explanations, "brutishness", "criminal motivation" or "rational motivation"
gave much cause for serious anxiety, apparently. This was reserved for the most alarming
rationale, "subversive riot". This was so much to be feared that it was rarely openly named.
The "demagogue" wishing to "marshal a formidable host, and make a physical demonstration
for carrying some popular doctrine or pohtical s c h e m e . o r  "a few iU-disposed persons" who
/
might steal gunpowder from an unprotected magazine^"”* were typical bogeymen. 
"Inflammatory" was a much-used word; the populace, weU-known as tending to brutish or 
criminal riot, was seen as tinder, ready to be ignited by any stray pohtical spark. For some, 
subversive riot was the only "real" riot; there can be no other explanation for the startling 
statement by Parlour, head of the Dock Pohce, that "there have been no riots at Liverpool 
while I have been in oflice".^”*^
Disorder used to coerce or blackmail the authorities into yielding pohtical power was 
insubordinate, disruptive 6f the social fabric, to be prevented at ah costs. It was to guard
242 See page 60, above.
243 Liverpool Courier, 21 Aug 1833.
244 H 044.26/1 fo 114, Jordan  to Bouverie, 5 Nov 1830.
246 Poor Inquiry (Ireland), p. 20.
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against this that pohtical meetings were so highly pohced. Perhaps trade disputes owe their 
severe handling to the direct self-interest of the corporation in the maintenance of the trade 
of the town, but the stress laid on "insubordination" might show that they were seen as related 
to this most dangerous category. The next question to answer is whether this schema survived 
the major changes in local government and pohcing which the 1835 Municipal Corporation 
Act introduced.
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Chapter Four: New Corporation and New Police
Local Government and Local Politics
On January 1st 1836, under the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, the oHgarchic common 
council of Liverpool was replaced by a council elected by ten-pound householders. The first 
such council consisted almost entirely of Whigs and Radicals who united themselves under the 
name "Reformers". Only five of 48 members were described as Conservatives.^”*® In 
consequence, fifteen out of sixteen aldermen were also Reformers.^”*’ This majority, apparently 
brought about by the temporary enthusiasm of new voters and a disHke of the old style of Tory 
local government, did not last long. It decreased, at first slowly, with each municipal election, 
until in November 1841 the Conservatives gained control, which they retained for many 
decades .2”*^
The new corporation was quick to set up its committees and take over the running of the 
town. A few senior employees of the old council were dismissed, including the superintendent
246 This nam e was already being used almost exclusively in the context o f local government in Liverpool 
to describe the party o f the right.
247 Liverpool Times, 29 Dec 1835, 5 Jan 1836.
248 G ore's General Advertiser, 3 Nov 1836; Liverpool Times, 7 Nov 1837, 6 N ov 1838, 5 N ov 1839, 3 
Nov 1840, 2 Nov 1841.
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of constables, but most remained.^^c Law enforcement was very important to the Reformist 
corporation. At its first meeting, the council discussed the appointment of magistrates, and 
resolved to petition for the appointment of a stipendiary pohce ma^strate. Two days later a 
watch committee was set up; within two months a new pohce force took to the streets(^°
The reasons underlying the creation of the new pohce forces are stiU a subject of debate; the 
latest major contribution is that of Palmer^* who argues that the Irish constabulary, formed 
with the intention of controlling rebelhon, provided a model for the Enghsh forces, set up in 
response to working class protest movements. Whatever the truth may be nationwide, the 
Liverpool experience does not fit this theory.
Liverpool had suffered very httle from protest-related disorder, yet was both prompt and 
thorough in setting up its pohce. The Reformists were prepared by their earher involvement 
in the running of the watch, and their new-pohce force was the logical culmination of the 
reforms they had proposed. The day pohce which had been created at their suggestion in 1828 
had had the main duty of supervising the streets, preventing obstructions and overloading of 
carts, and removing beggars.^^ As described in Chapter 2, they had justified their attempts to 
pohce the out-townships by reference to robberies from the person.^^ Their increase in the 
number of captains of the watch was directed against theft; juvenile theft was particularly 
mentioned.264 The preamble to the abortive pohce BiU of 1835 mentioned the increase in
249 Town Books Vol. 17 p. 39, 3 Feb 1836.
260 Town Books, Vol. 17, p .11, 6 Jan 1836; pp. 19fT, 8 Jan  1836; pp. 87fT, 27 Feb 1836.
261 S H Palm er, Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780-1850, Cambridge, 1988.
262 Town Books, Vol. 16, p. 76, 13 Feb 1828; LRO 353 PA R3/1/2, Min. Com. W atch, 20 A pr 1827; 
Liverpool M ercury, 20 Jun 1834.
263 G ore 's G eneral Advertiser, 18 Nov 1830;
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offences against persons and property.^® Nor did the force which they set up show any sign 
of being designed to combat disturbances. Patterns of duty concentrated on night patrols 
against burglary. Riot control was to be merely one of many pohce functions.
Whüe the pohce force was under the immediate control of the watch committee, the 
magistrates, under the chairmanship of the mayor and advised by the town clerk, continued 
to be responsible to central government for the peace of the borough. There was no question 
of delegating this responsibihty to the watch committee where major disturbances were 
concerned; this point was made very clearly at the parhamentary election of 1841, when the 
watch committee made a formal offer of co-operation with the ma^strates; the reply was that 
"... the conservation of the peace of the Town being the pecuhar duty of the magistrates, they 
had before the receipt of the resolution of the watch committee taken such measures as seemed 
to them desirable ... The Head Constable's reports on major riots were normally addressed 
to the Mayor, the Watch Committee receiving copies.
The magstrates maintained direct involvement also in pohtical surveillance. Wlien local 
sociahsts, a very smaU and utopian body, met in 1841, pohce observations were reported to 
both watch committee and magistrates; and in 1842, the Stipendiary Magistrate and Town 
Clerk, with the Head Constable, attended a Chartist meeting "to observe its tendency..."^’
A stipendiary magistrate was first appointed in 1836, and was an important addition to the 
legal estabhshment of the town. Appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the 
council, he would normaUy continue to serve regardless of which party locaUy held office. 
Legal qualifications were of course a prerequisite, and he thus offered an alternative source of 
legal advice, formerly provided mainly by the town clerk. Equahy valuable was the great 
experience which he acquired in the pohce courts, greater than any other magistrate could
266 G ore's General Advertiser, 19 M ar 1835.
266 LRO 352 MINAVAT 1/2, pp. 414-5, 19 Jun 1841; ibid, p. 419, 26 Jun 1841.
267 LRO 352 M IN /W A T 21/4, p. 748, 27 Sep 1841; Liverpool Times, 23 Aug 1842.
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claim. Presiding there daily, he gained a wide knowledge of local patterns of law-breaking, and 
formed a close working relationship with the police. Perhaps equally importantly, he was able 
to see disturbances in context, and was less Hkely to over-react than were part-time justices. 
The first to hold this position was T. J. HaU, who held it from 1836 untU 1839, when he was 
appointed chief magstrate to the MetropoHtan Police.^^ He was replaced by Edward Rushton, 
a noted local Radical, formerly a member of the Concentric Club, who was known as "Roaring 
Rushton" because of his loud voice and vehement speeches. Appointed on the 
recommendation of the Reformers, he held office under both parties until his death in 1851. 
He was succeeded first by J. B. Mansfield, who served until 1859, then by T. S. Raffles; both 
were conventional figures in comparison to Rushton.
The appointment of magistrates was clearly poHticaUy influenced. In 1836, the Hst of 24 names 
proposed to the Home Office included only one Tory; the Home Secretary added five more. 
Similarly, when five additional names were put forward in 1838, the Home Office took the 
precaution of checking that they were "not aU of the same poHticks".^^ The Conservative 
appointment of twelve further magistrates in 1841 reduced the bias,^ ®° yet the original 
appointments ensured a strong Reformist presence long after the control of local government 
returned to the Conservatives.
UnHke the council and watch committee, the ma^strates did not admit reporters to their 
meetings, and only occasionally communicated their resolutions to either council or pubHc. 
Minutes of their meetings do not survive. In cases involving the pohce, they seem to have dealt 
directly with the Head Constable, involving the watch committee only rarely. The Head
268 HO60.3 fo284. Lord John Russell to T. J. Hall, 2 Sep 1839.
269 H 052.29 fo468. M ayor to Lord John Russell, 12 Jan 1836; H 043.48 fo332, Phillipps to M ayor, 22 
Jan  1836; H 052.37  fo26, M ayor to Lord John Russell, 21 Feb 1838, minuted.
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Constable would in turn report to the Mayor, although the watch committee might receive 
copies of reports.2®*
The magistrates also handled almost all communication with the Home Office; usually this 
meant the mayor or his deputy, sometimes the town clerk, and the stipendiary magistrate 
became involved increasingly. Both he and the mayor were consulted when the question of 
the legality of rewards to the police was investigated in 1839.^ ®^  However, a request for 
assistance for a spy trying to infiltrate Irish Ribbon societies was sent only to the 
stipendiary,^®  ^which suggests that the Home Secretary considered him (as his predecessors had 
seen customs and postal officials) as an independent source of aid where tact was essential. 
The collector of customs and the mayor were also both involved in. delicate cases such as the 
observation of suspected transatlantic passengers or interviews with would-be informers.264
Home Office concern with general policing was at first shght. Individual complaints might lead 
to a brief correspondence,266 and bye-laws affecting the pohce were forwarded for approval, 
without much result. One reply remarked that the Home Secretary had had some reservations 
about the wide powers given to the pohce, but had paid httle attention "as the act was purely 
local."266 In other matters, such as the gaols, however. Home Office concern was increasing.
261 E.g. LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/2, pp. 340ff, 6 Feb 1841; ibid, p. 748, 27 Sep 1841.
262 H 043.57 fo l31 , Phillipps to Hall, 21 M ar 1839; H 043.57 fo l33 , Phillipps to M ayor, 21 M ar 1839; 
Liverpool M ercury, 15 Feb 1839.
263 H 043.58 fo393, M aule to Rushton, 8 Feb 1840; H 052.45  fo l83 , Rushton to M aule, 10 Feb 1840.
264 H 079.4  fo232, Phillipps to Collector o f Customs, Liverpool, 2 Feb 1838; H 041.15 fo l86 , Phillipps 
to M ayor, 2 Dec 1839; H 041.15 fo218,219, Phillipps to M ayor, 14 Dec 1839, etc.
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A long correspondence over some years was necessary before the Liverpool gaol was 
considered satisfactory. More relevant is the correspondence after a local resident warned the 
Home Office of an impending Orange Day procession in 1842.^ ®’ This was the first time the 
Home Office made serious demands for measures to be taken against threatened disorder; all 
previous communications had either been raised first by the Liverpool authorities, or had been 
niinimal. Thereafter, such communications became more pressing, particularly those 
concerning the Orange disorders of 1850-1852 described below.^ ®* There was less occasion for 
Home Office involvement in the later 1850s. Sectarian and election riots were the main causes 
of such alarm. The official view of Liverpool, as lacking troublesome Radical pohtical groups, 
is imphcit in the report of the Commander in Chief (North), at the time of the "plug plot" riots, 
that Liverpool was the one northern town from which troops could be withdrawn.^^®
Troops continued to be available to the magistrates, however. Despite government attempts 
to persuade the town to pay for the barracks, troops seem to have been kept there largely 
because the army itself required them for recruiting and escort duties.^’® Five requests for extra 
troops were made between 1836 and 1844. One quoted wild rumours of pohticahy-motivated 
attacks on shipping in the docks; this was refused. The other four, three for elections and one
267 H 043.62 fo355, Phillipps to M ayor, 23 Jun 1842; H 045.249D  fo42-50. M ayor to Sir James 
G raham , 24 Jun 1842 and encs.; H 045.249D  fo5. Resolution o f Magistrates, 25 Jun 1842; 
H 045.249D  fo2. M ayor to Sir James G raham , 28 Jun 1842; H 043.62 fo271, Phillipps to M ayor, 
29 Jun 1842; H 043.62 16381, Phillipps to O 'Connell, 4 Jul 1842; H 043.62 16390, Phillipps to 
M ayor, 7 Jul 1842; H 045.249D  f o i l .  M ayor to Sir James G raham , 8 Jul 1842; H 045.249D  1613, 
M ayor to Sir James G raham , 9 Jul 1842; H 045.249D  1616, M ayor to Sir James G raham , enc. 
report o f H ead Constable, 15 Jul 1842.
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for Orange Day, were agreed, but the troops were not called out.^’* Indeed, between 1836 and 
1860, troops caused more riots than they p r e v e n t e d . ^ ’ ^ Liverpool police proved sufficient 
throughout the remainder of the period with the exception of 1848, when fears of an Irish 
insurrection led to large numbers of troops being moved to the district. Thereafter the military 
presence was increased, together with the magistrates' nervousness. As late as 1853, the Mayor 
objected to the removal of men, in case of subversive disturbances.^’  ^Clearly, the hveliest fears 
of local authority still related to political malcontents. In normal times, however, the peace of 
the town was better protected than it had ever been before.
The New Police
On February 29th 1836, two hard-working months after the new corporation took office, the 
new pohce force went on duty. It consisted of 290 constables, with 60 extra-men as reserves 
or reinforcements, supervised by 24 inspectors and four superintendents; the rank of sergeant 
was not yet used. There were also a small number of clerks, bridcweU keepers, and other 
ancillary staff. Forty of the constables ranked as "firemen", receiving an extra shilling per week, 
on top of the constable's eighteen shillings, for serving at f i r es .There  were plans from the 
start to combine the borough force with the dock pohce as soon as administrative and financial 
problems could be sorted out with the dock trustees; this was brought about in June 1837, and
271 H 045.249 fo9 M ayor to Home Sec.,19 M ar 1842; H 0 4 1 .1 6 16292, Phillipps to M ayor, 23 M ar 1842; 
See below, pp. 115, and 127 to 128.
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made permanent in February 1840. ’^® This brought the total number of pohce to something 
over 500; in 1838, the 88 dock gatemen were also sworn in as constables.^’®
Individuals continued to serve in one or other branch of the force; the dock pohce continued 
to be paid by the dock trustees and stayed within the docks under normal conditions. The 
number of pohce routinely patrolling the town was 202 at night and 88 during the day. Several 
reasons were given for the amalgamation of the two forces; better cooperation, shared 
knowledge of habitual thieves "as the dock thieves and the town thieves are two different 
classes of persons", and the creation of a larger force to deal with both riots and fires; in the 
case of riots, it was argued that this would save about £800 p.a. formerly paid to special 
constables.^” At the election of 1841, the Head Constable had at his disposal 674 sworn pohce 
plus 30 scavengers with pohce experience; the docks were watched during this time by the dock 
sweepers, most of whom were ex-pohcemen.” * It was thus possible to provide everyday patrols 
at an economical price, the availabihty of a much larger force for riot control being achieved 
by the use of men paid for out of the income of the dock estate. So soon after the Orange Day 
riot of 1835, the need for riot control could hardly have been ignored, yet the arguments put 
forward in favour of a sufficient pohce force rarely mentioned riot. A report on crime in the 
borough produced for the new corporation concentrated upon theft, prostitution and 
disorderly pubhc houses.”  ^The pohce instruction booklet printed in 1836 gives only one page 
out of 68 to the handling of riot, which it is assumed wiU be smaU and noctumal.^^°
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Nevertheless, riot control was expected to be a major pohce function, sometimes mentioned 
in connection with fire as a possible occasion of alarm. Even so, the danger to property was 
often put to the fore: "perhaps milhons worth of property [at] the mercy of depredators..."^**
The continuities of pohcing at the start of this period are as notable as the changes. The watch 
committee took over the tasks of the commissioners of the watch, scavengers, and lamps, a 
number of its members having had experience with that body. The operational division 
between dock and borough forces remained, and a number of constables were employed 
permanently at the central pohce station with duties like those of the old town constables. 
These men were supervised by the Commissioner of Pohce, ranking immediately below the 
Head Constable. The job was designed for M. M. G. Dowling, superintendent of the dock 
pohce, and was not fihed untd he was available foUowing the amalgamation of the two 
forces.^** The Head Constable was M. J. Whitty, previously superintendent of the nightly 
watch. Thirty of the town constables, 81 of the watch, and, later, the whole of the dock pohce, 
were re-employed, and the watch committee also took over the payment of pensions to 
ex-watchmen.^*”* This continuity reflects the fact that many of the Reformers who had worked 
for more than ten years to improve the town's pohce arrangements were now in a position to 
organise them in the form they had long wanted.
The men /appointed were aged between 22 and 35, not less than 5" 7' tafl, and hterate.’*® 
References were required, and some independent enquiry was also made into character; it was 
discovered even before they took up their duties that several "worthless individuals" had been
281 LRO 352 MINAVAT 1/5, pp. 251-2, copy o f letter Dowling to M ayor, 12 Dec 1850.
282 LRO 352 MINAVAT 1/1 pp. 39-44, 24 Feb 1836.
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appointed on the strength of references *^® Some form of training was given, probably military 
in style as it was known as "drill", the same name, however, being given to training in 
firefighting.^*’ There was no fixed probation period until 1843, when it was agreed that 
extra-men must serve two months before becoming full constables.^**
The rate of turnover of men was high, both because of dismissals and because many left, often 
to join other forces.^ *® The force was no more undisciplined than its contemporaries, and was 
better than some. Taking the month of February for each of the years 1838, 1841 and 1844, 
there were respectively 129, 155, and 99 disciplinary cases handled by the daily board of the 
watch c o m mi t t e e T h e s e  were roughly equally divided between drink-related offences, 
absence, and petty neglect of duty or equipment. The figures for offences serious enough to 
merit demotion or dismissal were 9, 16 and 9 respectively. Dismissal was normal for a first 
offence Only for theft and the giving of false evidence. Severe penalties were also imposed for 
repeated offences. Assaults on prisoners were often subject only to a caution unless the victim 
was female, when dismissal was probable. This contrasts with the practice of the ma^strates, 
who normally recommended dismissal for any substantial unnecessary pohce violdnce.^^ *
286 LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/1, p. 29, 15 Feb 1836.
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The police were responsible jointly to the magistrates and, via the watch committee, to the 
conned. The fuU watch committee met weekly, and untd 1851 a board consisting of at least 
three members sat dady to consider matters such as disciplinary charges and requests for pohce 
attendance. Both the magstrates and the watch committee transmitted their commands via the 
Head Constable. At the start of the period, the watch committee in particular would give 
detaded instructions on the placing of men, but this graduady yielded to the practice of 
referring requests to the Head Constable to act as he saw fit.^ ^^  Such requests, which might be 
handled either by the fud committee or by the dady board, ranged from complaints of boys 
playing near churches on Sundays to employers asking for-pohce protection during strikes, and 
included requests for pohce attendance at both charitable and profit-making events.^ ®^  When 
complaints of inadequate patrolling were received, the Head Constable might be asked to 
investigate, his recommendations being usuady accepted without further discussion.^ '^* A 
simdar degree of rehance on the professional expertise of the pohce seems to have developed 
among the magistrates; although Whitty took instructions from the mayor, they were hkely to 
be based on plans which he had submitted for approval.^^® As Head Constable, Whitty was 
charged as early as 1836 with deciding which constables on isolated beats were to be armed 
with cutlasses; his decision to issue them during the Carpenters' Day riots in 1839 was 
discussed by the watch committee after the event, but the town clerk's legal opinion vindicated 
his action.^ ^® Whitty, for his part, was concerned to estabhsh the legal extent of his powers.
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rather than merely to follow the instructions of the magistrates. This is shown by his questions 
to the town clerk on an occasion when sectarian riots were feared. Could he prevent banners 
"obnoxious to a part of the population" from being displayed? Could he disperse a procession 
in the event of its being attacked? Could he remove interlopers at the request of the organising 
committee? The replies uniformly stated that his powers were subject to a breach of the peace 
being "imminent"; neither his opinion that breach of the peace would result, nor that of the 
committee organizing the procession, was sufficient to justify any police action. Indeed, the 
Town Clerk advised him that he could not recognize the organizing committee as having any 
authority .25^
It is not surprising that relations between Whitty and the authorities were characterised by a 
high degree of trust during the Reformers' time in office. There can be no doubt as to his 
political opinions; after leaving the police, he became editor of the Reformist Liverpool 
Journal, and he was later to found the Liberal Liverpool Daily Post. It is more surprising that 
this Liberal and Roman CathoHc Irishman seems to have been equally trusted by the 
Conservatives. He served them as Head Constable for two and a half years before retiring, for 
the sake of his health, in 1844. Although there were attempts by extreme Conservatives to 
discredit him, they were supported by only a handful of uninfluential counci l lorsThere is 
no evidence of either friction or lack of trust between Whitty and the Conservative magistrates 
or watch committee; indeed, he was to be called out of retirement by a Conservative mayor 
in 1848 to take charge of one thousand special constables enrolled against expected riots at the 
time of the Young Ireland "rising".^ ®®
The stipendiary magistrate was particularly important in the supervision of the police, because 
he was in a position to see many of the results of police activities. An editorial published in
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the Liverpool Journal shortly after Whitty became its editor shows his awareness of tliis. It 
argues that, unhke the Irish Constabulary, "...our force is local and unambitious, responsible 
to two pubhc bodies, and obliged to take instructions from both .... all actions [are] soon 
brought out into open police court ..."^ °° While the acts of individual constables were fairly 
frequently condemned, there is no evidence of criticism of collective police activity. It seems 
unlikely that the ma^strates had any major misgivings as to the methods used by the pohce.
Where riots are concerned, these methods fall into two distinct categories, dictated to a great 
extent by prevailing circumstances. When serious disturbances were expected, and precautions 
could be taken, the force was mobilised on military lines, with constables in squads under strict 
discipline. In smaller or unexpected riots, the first men on the scene had to respond as 
individuals, relying upon their own judgement and discretion as in day-to-day policing.
In both cases, only two methods were legally permitted; the dispersal of crowds, and arrest. 
The law permitted the use of force in self defence, and of "reasonable" force in the dispersal 
and arrest of rioters. It did not permit either police or troops to make war on rioters, aiming 
to kill or disable them as a means of stopping their activities. Yet a considerable degree of force 
was sometimes needed before the crowd dispersed, or before an arrest could be enforced.
The reasonableness or otherwise of the use of force by the police is very difficult to establish. 
In major riots before 1844, the force took care to avoid unnecessary confrontation with 
potentially violent crowds; police were usually kept out of sight untd needed, and the Head 
Constable or another senior officer would sometimes attempt to disperse a crowd by 
negotiating with its leaders. °^  ^ Preparations were aimed at the movement of a sufficient force 
to the site of disturbances within the shortest time possible. Mounted police were used to 
maintain communication, and senior officers often used horses.^°  ^ When confrontation was
300 Liverpool Journal, 15 Jun 1844.
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unavoidable, a variety of approaches were used; the foot police might be ordered to charge, 
presumably (although this is not stated) using their staffs; they might be ordered to stand firm 
to repel an attack; they might pursue small groups of rioters to prevent their uniting to form 
larger bodies. On one occasion, a crowd was successfully dispersed by the use of fire hoses, 
when reinforcements summoned by a fire-bell brought the fire-engine with them.^°  ^The water 
pressure during these years being notoriously weak, this can have had no more effect than a 
heavy shower, and the experiment was not tried with the most violent mobs.
In contrast to the policy of the Metropolitan Police there seems to have been no hesitation 
about allowing the police to take on a military appearance. Cutlasses were issued on several 
occasions, always to men used in squads, suggesting that it was their deterrent effect rather than 
their use in self-defence which was the deciding factor. '^’^  Armed police were sometimes also 
mounted; at the election of 1841 a troop of them, many of whom were said to have military 
experience, were used at least once to clear streets by a manoeuvre which, even though the 
arms which were carried were not used against the rioters, can only be described as a cavalry 
charge.^ °® The Liverpool Journal, with which Whitty already had strong connections, argued 
the advantage of a police force which was "..thoroughly disciplined, well officered, and properly 
armed — in fact, approaching as nearly in character to a body of regular troops as any civic 
force can This remark occurs in an editorial on the undesirability of the use of special 
constables. Throughout his period in office, Whitty was very reluctant to use them. ' When 
175 enrolled pensioners were sworn in against his advice for the 1841 election, they were found
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31 M ay 1839; Liverpool Chronicle, 16 Sep 1843.
304 p. T hurm ond Smith, Policing Victorian London, London, 1985, pp. 113-120.
305 E.g. LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/1, pp. 350-1, 29 Jul 1837; 1/2 pp. 408-12, 12 Jun 1841; pp. 421-7, 5 Jul 
1841.
306 Liverpool Chronicle, 3 July 1841; Liverpool Journal, 3 Jul 1841; Liverpool Courier, 7 July 1841.
307 Liverpool Journal, 29 Jul 1837.
94 Riot and its Control in Liverpool, 1815-1860
to be so "excited" that a police superintendent (supported by a member of the watch 
committee) had them imprisoned in the market building. Whitty kept them there until 
midnight.2°^ Apart from a small number used for specific semi-administrative tasks at elections, 
special constables were only sworn in on one other occasion between 1836 and 1844, when a 
number of gentlemen were enrolled at the time of the plug-plot disorders.
The object of both strict discipline and avoidance of untrained men was the reduction of 
injury. It seems on the whole to have been successful. The Head Constable's report on the 
1841 election states that the town's two hospitals reported only two serious casualties; one (a 
policeman) had been thrown from a horse, the other, who later died, had been shot by a 
publican whose house had been besieged by a mob.^'° Although this cannot be taken as the 
full story — at least one further injury resulted in the trial of a rioter for manslaughter — there 
is no evidence, even in the hostile press, of police causing serious injuries here or at other major 
riots during this period.
Much less is known about the handling of smaller riots. If a message could reach the central 
police station, and there was a likehhood of a serious riot developing, reinforcements, arms, 
and a senior officer would be sent as soon as possible. In one such case, a false report of a 
sectarian riot in Toxteth Park resulted in Whitty taking as many constables as could be found, 
with fifty cutlasses, to the scene using hired carriages.^^* Individual constables carried arms only 
when in isolated areas; there is no record of their use against rioters. A constable was normally 
equipped with a staff, which served both as a weapon and to call for assistance by rapping bn
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the pavement .Thi s  could bring together some four to twelve constables from nearby beats, 
depending on the area. Injuries to prisoners arrested for minor riots seem to have aroused little 
comment, so it is impossible to gauge their frequency or severity .The possibility of 
over-reaction by the police, although tempered by their small numbers, is shown by one case 
when rioters were arrested inside a house, the police gaining access by demolishing part of the 
roof.^ ^^  Some constables also believed that they were within their rights in striking criminals. 
One PC, accused of using injuring a woman while arresting her, claimed in his defence that 
he could prove that she was "a disorderly character". He was dismissed.^ '^* The police certainly 
suffered the effects of violence themselves; injuries were frequent, and deaths not uncommon.
One of the most difficult decisions made by individual constables was at what point a crowd 
should be dispersed. There seems to have been a very wide variation in individual tolerance. 
In general, however, even peaceful crowds were seen as a potential source of crime, 
pocket-picking being probably vastly more significant than violent crime. Right from the 
beginning, the watch committee dealt with many requests for police to assist in crowd control. 
If a breach of the peace was expected, for example at party political meetings where sensitive 
topics were to be discussed, no charge was made for this service.^ *^  Crowds which gathered 
informally in pubhc places were similarly pohced, even where there was Httle likeliliood of 
disturbance; for example, pohce were sent to supervise people gathering outside a house which 
was reputed to be haunted.^^® The fact that this level of crowd supervision so quickly became
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normal suggests that this was another area where the lack of a police force had already been 
felt.
Crowd control was one of the police functions which produced a favourable reaction from 
those who benefited directly,^*’ but there were unfavourable reactions as well. Criticisms were 
voiced both of too much policing and of too little. The prevalence of rescues of prisoners and 
of attacks on the police probably give the most coherent evidence of the opinions of the 
working population of the town. These will be discussed b e l o w , b u t  it should not be 
forgotten that, as Emsley points out,^ ^® some at least of the working class also made use of the 
benefits of more effective policing; it was by no means unusual for the complainant in the 
police court to be an artisan or a casually employed labourer, or a woman of similar social 
level.^ °^
The opinions of other classes are more accessible. The most notable opponent of the police 
was the ultra-tory Liverpool Mail, which opposed on principle aU things hberal or rehgiously 
non-conformist. It espoused also the cause of the publicans who suffered most directly from 
police attempts to enforce order. Personal attaeks on Whitty — "the high-horsed, well-paid, 
bog-coUeged Head Constable" — were f r e q u e n t . ^ ^ i  usual accusation, apart from oppression 
of beer-seUers, was that control of the police gave the Reformers undue political p o w e r T h e
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more moderate Conservative paper, the Liverpool Courier, complained rather of insufficient 
or inefficient p o l i c i n g . ^ ^ s  "pbe Liverpool Journal, for which Whitty had previously worked, was 
his strong supporter, and probably his mouthpiece; other Radical and Whig newspapers carried 
complaints about specific incidents, both of neglect and of excess, but were on the whole 
favourable.^ '^* Complaints received by the watch committee were usually of insufficient patrols 
in residential or business districts.^^ The police themselves seem to have experienced a 
considerable degree of hostility during the first two years; the Head Constable's report for 
1838-39 states that the early "dislike and resistance" was by then being o v e r co m e T h i s  does 
not seem an accurate statement in general terms, but Whitty probably meant his conclusions 
to apply only to the middle class and the press. Such improvement may in part have been due 
to the work of the police during the hurricane of January 1839, which was highly praised even 
by the Tory Couner.^27 campaign of the Liverpool Mail also lost much of its force when 
John Shaw, the author of some of the most virulent attacks, fled to America, to avoid 
imprisonment for keeping a disorderly house.^^  ^ One letter at least expressed concern for the 
hardship suffered by the police during a severe winter.^ ^® It can perhaps be taken that requests 
for the services of the police demonstrate some degree of acceptance of their existence. These 
came from a wide variety of sources such as church and chapel congregations, householders 
Uving on the edge of areas thought dangerous, employers, and charitable organisations. The 
resistance of the respectable classes to innovations in police arrangements found in some
323 E.g. Liverpool Courier, 8 Jun 1836, 1 M ar 1837.
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areas^ °^ was scarcely noticeable in Liverpool, and such dissent as there was seems very quickly 
to have reduced itself to the level of those complaints about cost and inefficiency which are 
almost inevitable in the case of an expensive public service.
Although the Tories' recapture of control of the Council in 1841 produced no immediate 
impact upon the police, Whitty's retirement in 1844 did. The first choice for his replacement 
was Superintendent Miller of the Glasgow Constabulary, who was introduced to the Liverpool 
force by Whitty in April 1844.^ ^^  This appointment proved disastrous. In October of that year 
a sub-committee of the Watch Committee was set up to examine police efficiency. Even before 
their report was produced. Miller by direct disobedience to an order from the Watch 
Committee rendered himself hable to dismissal, and was allowed to resign.^^  ^The local Radical 
press attempted a defence, with hints of corruption and consp i r acybut  the sub-committee's 
minutes of evidence leave no doubt of Miller's startling ignorance of procedures, his lax 
supervision, and the damaging increase in resignations produced by his high-handed style. For 
example, even men who were off duty only from 9am to 6pm were obhged to attend driU at 
2pm once per week.^^
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Dowling, the second in command, had been passed over when Miller was appointed, but now 
became Head Constable. He was not a good choice to inherit a damaged force, as he was 
already in poor health.^^ He had, however, considerable experience. After a military career, 
he had been a superintendent in the Metropolitan Police, during which time he had been 
seconded to Bristol to set up a temporary police force during the trial of rioters in 1830-31. 
He had led the Liverpool Dock Police since 1833; a few years later he was to be called to the 
bar.^ ^® However, he had none of Whitty's personal flair, and under his leadership the standard 
of the force continued to decline.
The most important symptom was an increase in unwarranted assaults by the police. Cases 
chosen randomly include two constables sent for trial for an assault on a carter, an assault on 
a woman which the magistrate described as "atrocious", a number of constables disciplined for 
attacking gentlemen involved in a civil case, two constables sent for trial for attempting to quell 
a disturbance by hitting heads at random with their s t i c k s . Th i s  dangerous practice 
continued; an inquest in 1850 gave a verdict of "excusable homicide" on a prisoner who died 
as a r e s u l t A  letter to a newspaper claimed that the writer had witnessed two cases of pohce 
brutahty against old women in one day.^ ®^ The press was very critical of the force during these 
years, the Mercury carrying a long series of letters signed "An Old Pohce Officer"^® The
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magistrates also expressed concern; in 1852, the Stipendiary warned that police sticks would 
be withdrawn if they continued to be used in this way.
The Watch Committee were apathetic, or at best slow. Occasions of public disorder provided 
ample evidence of the state of the force. Orange Day 1850 saw serious riots for which the pohce 
were unprepared;^^ an intervention of Liverpool pohce m a riot in neighbouring Birkenhead 
was a fiasco, with many injuries to both rioters and pohce;^^ and yet in 1851 the daily board 
ceased to sit, delegating responsibihty to the Head Constable. In October of that year, 
foUowiug a royal visit, the Watch Committee sought to reward the force by erasing ah 
disciplinary records; only as an afterthought was any recognition offered to the minority with 
clean records.^ In November that year, the Head Constable's integrity was questioned in a 
case concerning the hcence of a pubhcan who had dealings with prostitutes and thieves. Before 
the outcome was known, Dowling offered his resignation, ostensibly on health grounds, but 
remained in office pending a decision about his pension. Whilst discussions continued, matters 
were brought unexpectedly to a head. The structure of the Cathohc Holy Cross chapel 
threatened to cohapse during a service. The pohce, seeing the congregation escaping, concluded 
that this was a sectarian attack, and joined in. There were many injuries to Roman Cathohc 
Irish worshippers which required explanation. This led to an attempt by senior pohce officers 
to suppress evidence. Dowling's involvement was proved, and he was dismissed.^
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The Watch Committee was the only body able to control the general standards of the force; 
the magistrates could take notice only of such individual cases as came before them. Following 
the election of a conservative council in 1842, two influences made themselves felt. Firstly, 
an attempt by the Reformist mmority of the council to exclude brewers from the Watch 
Committee, from where they could interfere with police activity against licensees, was 
defeated.^*  ^Secondly, members of the Orange order were also elected. Orangeism was not yet 
the power in local pohtics that it was to become in the last decades of the century, but in some 
areas such as Toxteth it was of great influence. One councillor, James Parker, intervened to 
protect Orangemen from police activity; another, H. G. Harbord, marched openly at the head 
of Orange processions during his period as a member of the Watch Committee.^’ The 
problem of Orangeism among the pohce was a major issue in 1844. During the last months 
of Whitty's period of office, the magistrates had attempted, with the support of the Home 
Office and the cooperation of the Head Constable, to forbid membership of Orange or Ribbon 
clubs. The watch committee objected and obstructed, on the grounds that they alone had the 
authority to issue such a regulation. Although it was claimed that the very few men to whom 
the ban would apply had already voluntarily resigned their membership, there were rumours 
that there were many more who kept membership secret. '^  ^ Certainly by 1852 it was felt 
necessary to renew the prohibition.^^ The precise degree of influence is impossible to 
determine, yet toleration of any such involvement from the two worst sources of public 
disorder, drink and sectarianism, argues a very lax approach to policing on the part of the 
corporation of these years.
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The experience gained during Whitty's period in the handling of riots was lost along with force 
discipline under Dowling's command. Police belligerence will be further discussed in the next 
chapter, since it was closely related to an increase in anti-police incidents. Dowling's reluctance 
to take action against Orange disorders will also be considered there. The unjustified violence 
used by the police in clearing disorderly crowds was finally inescapably demonstrated by the 
incident which led to Dowling's dismissal.
Faced with the resulting vacancy, a faction within the Watch Committee canvassed for the 
appointment of one of their number, a Mr. Bigham. This was opposed by public petition,^^" 
and eventually Captain (later Major) J. J. Greig, commander of the town's enrolled pensioners, 
was appointed. A military man of integrity and energy, but perhaps with httle imagination or 
humour, Greig set about curing the ills of the force. On taking office in April, one of his first 
pubhc acts was to attend the pohce court, where he heard aUegations against the pohce and 
promised a fuU investigation.^* Introducing their new leader to the force, the chairman of the 
Watch Committee spoke of the unnecessary use of violence.^^ In August, at Greig's 
recommendation, the heavy bludgeon used by the pohce was replaced by a hghter stick. After 
repeated warnings even this was later removed.^^ In December he again addressed the men on 
the subject of unnecessary force, threatening the sanction of dismissal.^ '^* During his first year 
there were 161 dismissals out of a force numbering 806. With 153 resignations, this meant a 
turnover of nearly 40%.^^  ^It is not possible to teU how many dismissals were for violence; after
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the abolition of the daily board, detailed records were kept by the Head Constable in ledgers 
which have not survived. Only the summary of information in the annual report is available.
His first months were marred by the trial for manslaughter of a constable accused of causing 
the death of a woman during election disturbances; although the accused man could not be 
identified as the constable concerned, there was no doubt that a police constable had 
committed the crime.^® From 1853 onwards, discipline gradually improved, but the problem 
of police violence was not quickly solved; in 1854 even the lighter stick was withdrawn from 
daytime p a t r o l s . I t  was claimed that the courts would offer protection to the police by 
increasing sentences for attacks on the police, but there is no evidence that this had any 
long-term effect on sentences.There were also improvements in the training of recruits, who
now spent two weeks in observing police court procedure and patrolling in the company of
\
an experienced officer.^®
By the time of the first visit of inspection in 1857, the force, now numbering just under 1000, 
had apparently been restored to something like its former condition. The Inspector's reports 
were uniformly favourable; the force's expertise at mditary-style drill was singled out for praise 
more than once;^ ®° in 1860, it was stated that the force had a "knowledge of military
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movements sufficient to admit of their being brought to bear with precision and decisive effect 
upon disturbers of the public peace, howsoever numerous..."
Yet oceasions for the display of such expertise were rare. Under Whitty, military-style action 
was relatively common. Under Dowling, police discipline was ragged; the usual response to riot 
tended to become a random attack with bludgeons on nearby heads. Under Greig there were 
fewer occasions when the police acted in bodies, but there is no reason to think his methods 
very different from Whitty's; his plan for the election of 1852, one of the few recorded, shows 
a very similar disposition of men, with the same use of mounted police. The only major 
alteration brought in by Greig was the institution of a section house for unmarried men, which 
made a reserve of 90 men available for fire or riot.^ ®* This was not used in anger during the 
period under consideration.
In general, then, the handling of riots was as good as the overall efficiency of the force 
permitted. There were, however, differences in the tactics used in different types of riot, as wül 
appear in the next chapter.
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Chapter Five: Riots, 1836 to 1860
Although the essential nature of Liverpool as a commercial town remained unchanged, in these 
years alterations affected both living conditions and the nature of disturbances. Firstly, the 
town continued to grow both in area and in population. By 1860 the built-up area extended 
beyond the borough boundary. Collaboration with the county force became more necessary, 
partieularly when preventive measures were taken inside the borough but could not be 
enforced beyond the boundary. Some trades with requirements for extensive space now had 
to move outside the borough, with important consequences not only for trade disputes but 
also for the coherence of bodies of artisans. The shipwrights (as usual) show in the greatest 
degree the changes affectiug artisans. Their shipyards were replaced by docks, and shipbuilding 
was dispersed to neighbouring townships; they were threatened by the change to iron ships, 
as other trades were affected by technological change; and their poHtical influence was eroded 
by the steady decline in the number of freemen. Growth of population was a further problem, 
particularly during the years after 1846 when the Irish famine brought large numbers of 
immigrants. Living conditions were for many at their worst then; competition for housing 
forced them into wretched courts and cellars, and cholera and typhus were rampant.^®^
Nevertheless, protest against these conditions or against the system which gave rise to them 
was less frequent in Liverpool than in many other areas. Chartist and anti-com-law activity 
was relatively muted here. Protest against the new poor-law was shared by all classes, and
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eventually a local act of parliament exempted the town, allowing outdoor relief.^ ®^  Food riots 
were rare. Yet there was no shortage of collective violence among Liverpool rrien, and for that 
matter women; Irish women in particular were noted for their participation in rows, often 
providing aprons-full of stones for their menfolk to throw.^^ Whitty remarked that he "never 
knew an Irish row in which women were not c o n c e m e d ' . ^ ^ s  Qne such was Anne O'Hara, 
whose arrest needed four policemen.^ ®® Irishwomen had no monopoly, however; it was a 
Liverpool woman who used a large rasp or file to knock down seven men in a fight m 1848.^ ®’
Sectarian Riot
Both for men and women, the typically Liverpudlian form of riot in these years was sectarian. 
Sectarian violence occurred on at least 41 occasions; it was feared on at least 18 more. Neal's 
aecount of this type of violence gives much relevant detail, and rightly points out the 
association with working-class Toryism,^ ®* and the role of the Orange order in compensating 
for the lack of a close-knit community iu the lives of Liverpool workers. However, he does 
not fuUy explore the relationship between these factors and the exercise of violence, He claims 
that Orangeism gave an excuse for 'gratuitous violence'; this explains very l i t t l e  .^^9 pjg a l s o  
overestimates the importance of poHticaUy motivated instigation in the growth of the 
movement in these early years. When (by his own words) only six out of 38 conservative
363 E. C. Midwinter, Social Administration in Lancashire, 1830-1860, M anchester, 1969, pp. 17 ff.
364 E.g. Liverpool Courier, 26 May 1852.
365 Poor Inquiry (Ireland), Appendix G , p. xxi.
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councillors claimed Orange connections, their encouragement can scarcely account for the 
expansion of the order to the extent which he imphes.^ "^ ® Nor does he recognise the mechanism 
by which the Shipwrights Club provided a foundation for an Orange organisation. These men 
had lost more than most from parliamentary and municipal reform, and their special 
relationship with the Tory faction, budt up over many elections, made them ready for 
conversion. Their procession in 1839 was in effect the first Orange procession with local (rather 
than Lancashire Irish) support.^’^
Nevertheless, the fact that Orangeism became a serious force in the town about the middle 
of the 1830s seems to indicate that the movement responded to a crisis in the political life of 
local Tories as much as to the threat of Irish immigrants. Certainly the Tories were quick to 
use the weapon of sectarianism; although they cannot be said to have forged it themselves, they 
would use whatever came to hand. Feeling was roused against the Reformers by two issues, 
corporation schools and the endowment of the clergy. Conservative rhetoric rehed much upon 
the necessity to protect the Protestant constitution, the safeguard of free Britons. The 
Reformers drew support from both Catholics and dissenters, and from the more tolerant 
members of the Church of Fngland. Where the Conservatives claimed protection for both 
commerce and the established church, the Reformers advocated freedom of trade and of 
conscience. After a brief skirmish about a Catholic orphan society's use of the town hall for 
a fundraising event,^^  ^ more lasting indignation was provoked by alteration to the nature of 
religious teaching in the two corporation schools so that Catholics could also attend. Meetings 
of protest were held in July 1836; in August it was reported that some of the ex-constables 
were spreading the tale that "the Radicals have kicked the Bible out of the schools and are 
going to introduce Tom Paine's "Rights of Man"."^’^  The shipwrights, leaders of the town's
370 Neal, Sectarian Violence , p. 53.
371 See below, page 114,
372 Liverpool Courier, 20 Jan 1836.
373 Liverpool Mercury, 15 Jul 1836; Liverpool Chronicle 2 Aug 1836.
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artisans, offered the use of their rooms as a temporary school for children withdrawn for 
conscientious reasons.^ '^* The education committee affirmed that Protestant and Catholic 
religious teaching was entirely separate.^’^  Nevertheless, the schools question caused excessive 
resentment as long as the Reformers were in office.
The problem of church endowment similarly divided the parties, although it suffered as an 
issue since parsons who preached on the subject could be accused of protecting their own 
incomes, which were threatened by national proposals for changes in churchrates and tithes. 
After the failure of the Parson-Police Bdl in 1835, the old corporation had spent most of its 
last months in attempting to provide for the c l e r g y T h e  Reformists succeeded in having 
these measures overthrown. In October 1837, there were complaints that clergymen had been 
"robbed" of their incomes.^^  ^ A solution was found in 1838 only after the Home Office had 
asked the Stipendiary Magistrate to arbitrate
The theme of "the Church in danger" seems to have worked well in gaining support for the 
Conservatives; it was probably instrumental in their recovery of power. The issue was 
repeatedly raised at municipal elections. This stress on religion helped justify expressions of 
concern at the increasing proportion of Irish in Liverpool. The very numerous Lancashire 
Catholics, however, were rarely mentioned. In 1844, a Tory newspaperi^^ estimated the Irish 
population at over 49,000; magistrates guessed that 25% of the 1841 population of 290,000
374 Liverpool M ail, 22 Jul 1837.
375 Liverpool Journal, 2 Oct 1837.
376 Town Books, Vol. 16, pp. 480-598, 7 Oct to 2 Dec 1835.
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had been Catholics.^®” Presentiments of trouble led to exaggeration; even in 1851, after the 
famine immigration, the census showed only 22.3% of the town's population to be Irish-bom, 
a figure which dropped to 18.9% ten years later.Nevertheless, the numbers were quite high 
enough to account for local fears. These became most acute in 1847-8, when the influx of 
starving and diseased famine victims overwhelmed relief agencies. The local press made capital 
out of the numbers of Irish appearing in the police-courts,^*^ and in the Council Mr. Parker, 
a known Orange-supporter, was quick to complain of fever being spread by famine refugees.***
Anti-Catholic rhetoric in the press responded to national events, being shriller during the 
debate over the Maynooth Grant in 1841-2, during the Repealers' "monster meetings" in 
1842-3, and during the agitation over "papal aggression" in 1855. There were also quiet periods; 
in 1850, the Mercury prematurely welcomed "new tolerance between Roman Cathohc and 
Protestant".**^
Throughout all these ups and downs, the most prominent Protestant agitator was the Rev. 
Hugh McNehe, an Ulsterman, noted for his oratory and manly good looks,**  ^ who never 
hesitated to involve himself in party pohtics,**® or to associate himself with the Orange
380 HO45.2410B fo 639, Report o f Committee o f Magistrates, 8 Jul 1848.
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Order.**  ^ His language was extreme, as when he asked his audience rhetorically "....are you to 
be deposed and murdered as heretics?"*** The clergy who supported him were known as 
"McNeile's thirty-nine articles," although their number declined when the settlement of the 
church endowment question removed their financial motives.**’ He was a prime mover in the 
Operative Protestant Association, whose membership included many shipwrights.*’® This was 
succeeded by the Liverpool Working Men's Protestant Reformation Society. These relatively 
respectable, non-secret organisations were recognisable as close relatives of the Orange Order 
by their use of orange banners and of "Kentish Fire", a method of applauding speakers using 
hands and feet.*’^
During these years, support for the Orange Order grew, as more local men joined the largely 
Irish membership of earlier years. The dissolution of the Grand Lodge of Ireland in 1836 left 
the order without a head. Local Orangeism continued and in 1841 a new Grand Lodge met in 
Liverpool;*’* by 1844, there were two rival organisations, the Loyal Orange Institution and the 
Grand Protestant Confederation of Loyal Orangemen, which amalgamated under the title of 
The Grand Protestant Association of Loyal Orangemen.*’* In 1846, links were re-formed with
387 E.g. Liverpool M ercury, 29 Jul 1842.
388 Liverpool M ail, 26 Nov 1839.
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the Irish Grand Lodge.*’’ It was claimed that in 1849 there were at least 40 lodges meeting in 
the town, while by 1860 a figure of 100 was given.*’^  The order maintained friendly relations 
with respectable Tories,*’® while drawing the bulk of its support from the poorer workers, 
particularly dock-porters.*”
Ribbonism also persisted throughout these years, with lodges masquerading or doubling as 
friendly societies.*’* Police estimations of their danger differed, Whitty regarding them as 
troublesome but needing serious consideration "only as they refer to Ireland", whereas Dowling 
took great interest in their activities.*”  The Catholic clergy were generally opposed to them, 
and would refuse communion to known members.’®® Processions were a common occasion for 
trouble; there was opposition even to peaceful pageantry, as interfering with business.’®^ It was
394 Liverpool M ercury, 22 May 1846.
395 Liverpool M ercury, 20 Oct 1849; Liverpool Courier, 6 M ar 1860.
396 E.g. Liverpool M ercury, 16 Jul 1841.
397 E.g. Liverpool Journal, 28 May 1842; LRO 352 M IN /W A T 21/6, pp. 479-80, 16 Jul 1842.
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still claimed that St Patrick's Day processions led to sectarian fighting;’®* this was untrue, 
although drunken disorderly behaviour was frequent. The notions of legtimacy inherent in 
Orangeism demanded that its members should not be the first to attack, however much they 
might use insults to provoke attack by others. Nor did Irish nationalist processions use the 
provocative banners and symbols seen on Orange Day. Protestants could and did join in at 
least until about 1840, both in Liverpool and in Ireland.’®* Only once is there any suggestion 
of Protestant attack; in 1845 the route was changed to avoid an Orange ambush.’®’ 
Nevertheless, priests came to oppose such parades, both because they occasioned drunkenness, 
and because co-operation with magistrates in this matter was essential to Catholic claims to 
respectability.’®® November 5th, another date which elsewhere was marked by disorder, caused 
no more trouble than it had before 1836.
During the time of the Reformist council, no Orange procession was attempted. The 
magstrates were firmly opposed to all such parades, and even prevailed upon the Welsh to 
give up their public celebrations of St.David's Day (never an occasion for trouble) to avoid 
giving an excuse to others.’®® However, the procession and church service of the shipwrights, 
which had been allowed to lapse some 8 years earlier,’®’ was revived. The text for the Anglican
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sermon was "My son, fear thou the Lord, and meddle not with those that are given to change." 
Although some Cathohcs also took part, attending separate services, many of the banners bore 
provocative orange-bordered Protestant slogans.’®* The procession was peaceful despite this, 
but later that day coach-loads of apprentices (who had been drinking) drove through streets 
well-known as Irish enclaves, and serious riots followed. The following two years saw similar 
processions, but these were strongly policed and disorder was kept to a minimum.’®’ In 1841, 
it was feared that a teetotallers' procession to be held on 12th July would be similarly used for 
the display of Orange banners, and Whitty took the precaution of ascertaining his legal powers. 
The town clerk's opinion was that the police could only act if there was an observable 
tendency to a breach of the peace.’*® This legal opinion formed the basis of police activity for 
some years, limiting magstrates to advising (rather than ordering) that no procession should 
be held, while the pohce were held to be unable to threaten arrest until breach of the peace 
was imminent.
Within months of the Tories regaining control of the conned, the first Orange procession for 
many years was held. This was a funeral, where no breach of the peace occurred, and about 
which the pohce took no action.’** FoUowing this, the Orange order attempted to get mayoral 
permission for a procession. The Mayor wrote to the Home Office, regretting that he did not 
have the power to prevent the parade but saying that the Orangemen had agreed not to march. 
It was nevertheless arranged that troops should be avadable.’** In the event, however, the 
procession which was held was claimed to be the shipwrights procession, "postponed" from
’°* Liverpool M ercury, 31 M ay 1839.
’®’ Liverpool M ail, 30 M ay 1840; Liverpool Journal, 30 May 1840; Liverpool M ercury, 5 Jun 1840; 4 
Jun 1841; Liverpool Chronicle, 5 Jun 1841.
’*® H 045.249D  fo 7, headed "Queries put by M r. Whitty, 10th July 1841."
’ ** LRO 352 M IN /W A T 21/6, p. 254, 7 M ar 1842.
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Royal Oak Day to July 12th. This was essentially an Orange procession, with Orange flags, 
although some who were not Orangemen took part.’** For the next eight years, major disorder 
was prevented by a variety of means. Prohibition was successful only when the Orange order 
agreed, as they did in 1848 in view of the major unrest of that year.’*’ In general, their 
co-operation was conditional upon there being no St. Patrick's procession;’*® nor was their 
agreement altogether reliable, either because their control over the order's young men was 
incomplete, or because they observed the letter of the agreement only, permitting large-scale 
funeral processions to be held.’*® In 1844, requests for legal powers against such processions 
were renewed with no effect, the Home Office advice being that the current law was sufficient 
to allow the prosecution of those taking part in processions which broke the peace. This did 
not satisfy the ma^strates, who wanted the power to stop a parade before that stage had been 
reached.’*’ No major disorder arose until 1850, but in that year a relatively small disturbance 
had serious consequences. A mob surrounded a pubhc house, where an Orange lodge met. 
They returned on the following day to continue their siege, despite the pubhcans appeals for 
pohce protection. The pohce response was casual; no constable was present when one of the 
crowd was injured by pistol-shot. He later died.’**
’ *3 Liverpool M ercury, 3 Jun 1842; Liverpool Chronicle, 30 Jul 1842.
’ *4 Liverpool M ercury, 18 Jul 1848.
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Requests for legal powers to ban processions were renewed, but rejected. In 1851 a procession 
was again permitted. A warning had been received that lives would thereby be endangered. 
Dowling, already a sick man, reported unjustifiably that he had no reason to fear riot.'*^ ® He 
held police in reserve, rather than deploying them to accompany the marchers, and was proved 
wrong when serious disorder broke out.'*^ ° This prompted Home Office accusations of 
inefficiency to which the Mayor replied by again quoting the need for greater legal p o w e rs  
An anonymous letter put forward the alternative view that Dowling's reluctance to act was a 
result of Orange influences in the police force and among the magistrates."*^  ^ Such rumours 
were extremely persistent. Since the attempt m 1844 to prevent police belonging to Orange 
s lodges had been defeated, the matter had been ignored, and known Orangemen had been 
allowed to become watch committee members. Relations between the police and the Irish left 
much to be desired; the annual report for 1849 had stressed the frequency of injuries to police 
in Irish areas,"*^  ^ and recent events when Liverpool police became involved in a riot with 
Catholic Irish in Birkenhead showed that they were quite ready to meet violence with 
violence."’^ '* Significantly, it was immediately after Dowling's resignation and the scandal
H 045.3472M  fo26. Petition of A rthur McEvoy, 2 Jul 1851; ibid, fo 10, Dowling to M ayor, 7 Jul 
1851.
"*20 H 045.3472M  fo 18, Dowling's report o f 14 Jul 1851.
"*21 H 043.79 fo 292, W addington to M ayor, 14 Jul 1851; H 045.3472M  fo 22, M ayor to Hom e 
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"*22 H 045,3472M  fo 16, A non to Home Secretary, 19 Jul 1851.
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relating to it that the magistrates renewed their attempts to outlaw Orangeism from the force, 
the decision being agreed this time by the Watch Committee."*^
The following year the magistrates again attempted to prevent a procession, and several lodges 
agreed to substitute a railway excursion. However, others persisted; the procession was held in 
August after a July election."*^  ^ Although the magistrates had not acquired any more legal 
power than they had had in 1842, they now apparently felt that they could act. They were 
encouraged in this by the Home Office, who recommended the use of special constables. 
The regular police were sufficient, however. Gfreig had now taken over as Head Constable, 
and under his firm leadership the police were out in force to meet prospective marchers. 
Several exemplary arrests were made,"*^  ^ and serious trouble was averted. After this date, the 
procession was consistently banned within the borough. Attempts to substitute a funeral or a 
total abstinence demonstration with full Orange regalia were met with similar firmness"*^  ^ and 
thereafter processions were held outside the borough, the police protecting the borough limits 
from Orange incursions."*^ ** For the time being at least, these riots were reasonably successfully 
contained.
425 LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/5, p. 382, 9 Aug 1851; Liverpool Chronicle, 6 Sep 1851; LRO 352 
M IN /W A T 1/5, p. 516, 27 M ar 1852.
"*26 HO45.4085 fo 85, poster; ibid, fo 86, M ayor to W alpole.
427 HO41.20, fo 22, Joiliffe to M ayor, 11 Aug 1852.
428 HO45.4085F fo 88, extract from N & S Division R eport Books, 10 Aug 1852; ibid, fo 93, Town 
Clerk to W alpole, 12 Aug 1852. PL 27.13/2 Liverpool Albion, 16 Aug 1852; Liverpool Mercury, 
13 Aug 1852; Liverpool Chronicle, 28 Aug 1852.
429 LRO 253 M IN /W A T 1/6, p. 46, 27 Nov 1852;H045.5128 fo 552, police report o f the events of 28 
Jun 1853.
430 Liverpool M ercury, 14 Jul 1854; Liverpool Courier, 18 Jul 1855; Liverpool M ercury, 13 Jul 1858, 
13 Jul 1859; Liverpool Chronicle, 14 Jul 1860.
118 Riot and its Control in Liverpool, 1815-1860
Political Protest
As in the first half of the period, violent political protest was often anticipated but rarely 
amounted to much. Disorder occurred on eleven occasions; precautions were taken on a 
further nine. Disorder at protest meetings was largely caused by attacks by Conservative 
working-men on Radicals. Popular politics in Liverpool for many meant membership of the 
Operative Conservative Association, whose address to the working classes of Great Britain and 
Ireland in 1837 (referring to its members as "the humbler classes of the Empire") objected to
the prospect of government by "papists, infidels, socinians To these men, legitimate
political power derived from true religion, as it had done for 17th century theorists. At election 
time, "the pulpit beat its "drum ecclesiastick"". "Popery and democracy have both had ample 
concessions", claimed the conservative p r e s s a n d  nobody thought the conjunction of ideas 
strange. It was not surprising, then, that sectarian violence should spill over into meetings 
whose objective was democratic.
One of the first occasions was at a meeting of the Working Men's Association in 1839 in favour 
of universal suffrage. The old freemen were still at this date threatened by disfranchisement. 
Recognisable numbers of them were observed "linking themselves together, and pushing, 
swaying the crowd in different directions.""*^  ^This tendency was observed also at anti-com law 
meetings. The Anti-Com-Law League never won much support from local working men, and 
attempts to found operatives' anti-com-law or free trade associations had little success."*  ^ In 
part this was related to the supposed sympathy between supporters of reform, of whatever 
kind, and the Irish Catholics. A meeting in June 1841 was broken up by a body of young 
men, identified by some sources as apprentice shipwrights, led by two or three carrying
431 Liverpool Mail, 25 Jul 1837.
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makeshift orange flags."*^  This produced a revenge attack on a pub known as an Orange 
meeting-place, and on the windows of two Anglican churches. The police eventually restored 
order, and when soon after the sectarian demagogue McNeile spoke publicly about the 
com-laws, the pohce stood by and Catholic priests issued handbills urging restraint
Major public meetings were of course routinely given a police presence, even where nothing 
controversial was anticipated. There was also a move towards meetings being held within 
doors. Where the meetings of working men in the 1820s had been held in Mosslake Fields, 
by the mid 1840s they were held at assembly rooms such as The Portico.'*^’ For the most part, 
admission was by ticket only, the price in itself acting as a restraint."*^ *
Two groups were responsible for most of the anxiety over possible political riot. Chartists and 
Irish nationalists. The former were not noticeably numerous or active in Liverpool. 
Prominent speakers sometimes drew good crowds, but this did not produce any lasting interest; 
the next meeting would be as small as e v e r ."*39 During the Plug Plot crisis in 1842, the 
Commander-in-Chief for the North noted that Liverpool was the only town from which he
435 Liverpool M ercury, 18 Jun 1841; Liverpool Chronicle, 12 Jun 1841; Liverpool Mail, 12 Jun 1841; 
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could safely remove troops,"*"*** and trials of Chartists were held at Liverpool Assizes for 
safety."*^ * Chartist speakers themselves scolded the town for its apathy."**^
The Irish were a different matter; Daniel O'Connell's following in the town considerably 
outnumbered Feargus O'Connor's. His public appearances drew large audiences, and 
demanded a large number of police."*^  ^ He first suggested a Liverpool branch of his Repeal 
movement in August 1840,"*"*"* and it was in existence by January 1841."*"*^  Estimates of 
membership vary, but the Repeal Rent suggests a figure of about 5,000."*"*® The Repealers were 
always regarded with suspicion. When supporters gathered to say goodbye to O'Connell's son 
John at the end of a visit to the town, and were, on the spur of the moment, given the use of 
a theatre, the Head Constable was called to account by the Mayor for not giving warning of 
a political meeting."*^  ^ In 1846, the Repeal movement divided, unable to agree on the use of 
violence. Those who seceded from the main body became known both as "Young Ireland" and 
as "Confederates". This division also spht the Liverpool m ovem ent.^^*
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In 1848, fears of collaboration between Chartists and Confederates produced alarm on a vastly 
more serious scale than ever before. The link between the two was not entirely new. In 1843, 
the Chartists had attempted to link the ideas of Irish Home Rule and self-rule via the Charter, 
at a meeting which was in the event disrupted by attack by a gang of young men said to be 
'carpenters'."*"*^  Feargus O'Connor when visiting the town in 1844 had spoken mainly about 
Irish issues, clearly expecting a better response from Repealers than from Chartists.'*®'* In 1848, 
Manchester Chartists had held a combined meeting with the Irish on St. Patrick's Day,"*®* and 
there were moves towards joint action."*®^  Similar moves were made in Liverpool; a joint 
meeting was held in April, and another in June,"*®® but here (although the authorities and the 
press referred to fears of Chartists) the events of 1848 were almost entirely Irish in inspiration. 
The link between the two movements was Lawrence Reynolds, the most prominent of the 
Irish activists, and also a Chartist.
The first sign of trouble came at the end of a series of protest meetings by dock-labourers 
against changes in employment practices. This coincided with the presentation of the 
Chartists' monster petition, and with riots in London, Glasgow and Edinburgh."*®"* Whilst 
earlier meetings had been orderly and even deferential, towards the end of the week placards 
were displayed which called for a more general protest among the town's working population, 
and the dockers' numbers were swelled by others who the police found more difficult to deal
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with, although there was no actual disorder. Troops were called for, but were not required."*®® 
At about the same time, Liverpool's Confederates voted to join the Chartists in their petition 
to the Commons. Two prominent Confederates, Meagher and Doheny, also visited Liverpool 
from Ireland, apparently intent on forming revolutionary clubs on the lines of those already 
in existence in Ireland."*®® These men were soon under surveillance."*®? These combined events 
caused such alarm that 500 special constables were sworn in, "gentlemen" having been 
specifically chosen; the information that this had been done was the first item in a long 
correspondence with the Home Office."*®^  Soon afterwards, the enrolled pensioners were 
alerted."*®? Fears were particularly enflamed by rumours passed from Dublin Castle to Head 
Constable Dowling that the Chartists and Young Irelanders intended to set fire to Liverpool 
and Manchester on St. Patrick s Day."*®** As usual, the main fear of the merchants was for their 
goods. The Irish readily gave up the St.Patiick's parade in the interests of public safety,"*®* but 
pamc was unabated. Guns were removed from gunsmiths' shops, more special constables were 
sworn in, there were rumours of an influx of strangers "of that class generally seen at meetings
"*®3 HO45.2410B fo 1116, M ayor to Home Secretary, 8 M ar 1848; ibid, fo 889, Poster; ibid, fo 891, 
M ayor to Home Secretary, 9 M ar 1848. ibid, fo 1108, Rushton to Home Office, 7 M ar 1848.
■*36 C. G avan Duffy, Four Years o f Irish History, London, 1883, pp. 618-640; L. Bisceglia "The T hreat 
o f Violence: Irish Confederates and Chartists in Liverpool in 1848" in The Irish Sword, Vol X IV  no 
56, Sum m er 1981, pp. 207-216, gives an account o f the events o f 1848, but gives too much credence 
fo exaggerated estimates o f violence current at the height o f the panic, rather than the m ore sober 
picture which emerged after the arrest and trial o f some o f the participants.
"*39 HO45.2410B fo 854, M ayor to Home Secretary, 17 M ar 1848.
438 HO45.2410B fo 891, M ayor to Home Secretary, 9 M ar 1848.
439 H 0 4 1 .19 fo 42, Phillipps to M ayor, 14 M ar 1848.
460 HO45.2410B fo 1170, Mcgregor (Constabulary Office, Dublin Castle) to Dowling, 15 M ar 1848.
461 Liverpool Mercury, 17 M ar 1848; Liverpool Journal. 18 M ar 1848.
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of the Chartists"."*®** Troops were called in."*®® With little justification, the Tory press claimed 
after the event that only "a large military force" had prevented serious disturbances on the 
17th."*®"*
Throughout the next five months the local authorities continued to be on the alert. 
Arrangements were made for telegraphic communication, an important technological advance 
which allowed the immediate involvement of central government."*®® When Chartists and 
Repealers met in a public place, the police were standing by in large numbers, in hiding; they 
were not required. At other meetings (held indoors), notes were taken of the contents of 
speeches, which were reported to the Home Office."*®® The Confederates were watched closely; 
on one occasion, their meeting was prevented, using legislation more often used against pubs 
which harboured prostitutes."*®? Reynolds set up a shop selling pikes for sixpence-halfpermy; 
these were knives sold by ships' chandlers as a common item of trade, and gave little 
justification for police action."*®* The police also had at least one informer, motivated by fear
462 Liverpool Chronicle, 18 M ar 1848.
463 HO45.2410B fo 1166, M ayor to Home Secretary, 16 M ar 1848.
464 Liverpool Courier, 22 M ar 1848.
465 HO45.2410 fo 898, fo 895, give details o f national telegraphic network a t this date. F or Liverpool 
arrangem ents, see HO45.2410B fo 905, Rushton to Hom e Office, 6 A pr 1848.
466 H 0 4 5  2410B fos 498-507, Abstract o f Speeches at a Public Meeting, held at the Music Hall in Bold 
S tre e t,... 31 M ar 1848; HO45.2410B fo 1054, M ayor to Home Secretary, 10 Jun 1848; HO45.2410B 
fo 619, R eport of T . A. Redin, 29 Jun 1848; HO45.2410B fo 639, Report o f Committee of 
Magistrates, 8 Jul 1848.
467 Liverpool M ercury, 14 A pr 1848.
468 Liverpool M ercury 2 M ay 1848.
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of the scale of the movement he had involved himself in."*®? The information was alarming 
enough; the clubs, which had taken names such as 'The Sarsfield", 'The '82", and 'The Robert 
Emmett", were engaged in collecting money to buy pikes and guns, and it was estimated that 
they might have as many as 4,000 armed members. Their role was to be to rise at the same 
time as the Irish, to create a diversion and to prevent troops from being sent to Ireland. The 
Liverpool authorities had by July no fear of Chartist involvement; this was "comparatively 
extinct" in Liverpool,"*?** but they did fear greatly the prospect of a an armed uprising. As events 
in Ireland became more threatening, more extreme measures were taken in Liverpool. 1,500 
muskets and 2,000 cutlasses were made available and the police were trained in their use. 
Police numbers were increased from 830 in July to 1,090 by September 16th."*?* As many 
troops were sent as could be accommodated; and a house was rented for use as a barracks."*?® 
The Duke of Wellington, scenting battle, drew up plans for the defence of Liverpool, while 
regretting the restraint placed on magistrates by the need to read the Riot Act."*?® Alarm quickly 
reached such a level that there was even a petition, signed by many, to extend the suspension 
of Habeas Corpus from Ireland to Liverpool."*?"* Fortunately these plans were not needed. 
Although there were a couple of tense days, when rumour could have triggered fighting, the
"*®? HO45.410B fo 680, Report o f Head Constable, 19 Jul 1848.
"*?** HO45.2410B fo 626, M ayor to Home Secretary, 8 Jul 1848.
"*?* LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/4 pp. 518-9, Report o f Sub-committee on Increase in Police Force, 16th Sep 
1848.
"*?® H 041.19 fo 242, W addington to M ayor, 13 Jul 1848; HO45.2410B fo 668, Dowling to M ayor, 15 
Jul 1848; H 045.2372 Trevelyan to O rdnance Departm ent, 20 July 1848; HO45.2410B fo 695, 
M ayor to Hom e Secretary, 20 Jul 1848; H 041.19 fo 252, Cornewall Lewis to A rbuthnot, 21 Jul 
1848.
"*?® H 045.2369, Duke of Wellington to M arquis o f Anglesey, 17 Jun 1848.
"*?"* Liverpool Journal, 29th July 1848; J. Saville, 1848: The British State and the Chartist M ovement, 
Cambridge, 1987, pp. 154-5.
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outcome was an anticlimax. On 23rd July, an employee of Reynolds was arrested carrying 
pike-heads in a sack; there was some doubt about the legal position, but the Home Office sent 
by telegraph the instruction to detain him until further orders."*?® Troops ensured that the town 
remained calm."*?® Many more special constables were enrolled; 500 Irish dock-workers who 
refused to serve as specials lost their jobs."*??
The arrest led to a handful of others; evidence at the trials soon showed how exaggerated local 
fears had been as the number of potential revolutionaries fell from thousands to scores."*?* For 
a time, the Liverpool authorities were reluctant to believe that all was over. The Home Office 
soon insisted that the police should be disarmed, and later had to request that marines provided 
for the protection of the docks should be released."*?? Even so, large numbers of troops were 
retained."**** The Mayor wrote plaintively " ....I understand that we have the character of being
unnecessarily alarmed here ""*** This was by far the most dramatic case of protest-directed
activity during the first half of the century in Liverpool; it exhibits in full measure the excessive 
alarm and easy recourse to troops which characterised the treatment of political disorders.
473 H 041.19 fo 256, Hom e Office to M ayor of Liverpool "By Electric Telegraph", 24 Jul 1848.
476 HO45.2410B fo 721, M ayor to Hom e Secretary, 23 July 1848.
477 HO45.2410D fo 621, W arre to Asst. A djutant General, 1 Aug 1848.
478 PL26.176 Indictments, Liverpool Assizes, Summer 1848; PL27.12/1 Depositions, ditto.
479 H 041.19 fo 276, W addington to M ayor,, 4 Aug 1848; ibid fo 304, same to same, 31 Aug 1848.
480 H045.3131 fo 54, Cathcart to W addington, 27 Nov 1850.
481 HO45.2410B fo 811, M ayor to Hom e Secretary, 5 Aug 1848.
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Elections
Of ten parliamentary elections between 1836 and 1860, one was not contested and two were 
apparently completely orderly. The freemen now shared their privilege with the ten-pound 
householders, and there was a certain amount of tension between the two groups. Although 
the disfranchisement question was stül an issue as late as 1855,"**® no violence is reported as 
arising from this source. Yet the freemen must still be regarded as the trustees of the old 
heritage of election violence, and their increasing dilution by householders as one of the 
changes tending to decrease riot. There is no record of disturbance at municipal elections, at 
which only householders voted. In 1835, freemen formed just over one-third of the electorate; 
by 1841, although they had increased in numbers, they were only a quarter. Their proportion 
continued to fall thereafter. In 1837, only 600 voters had both qualifications."**®
Most important in producing violence, however, was sectarianism. The election of 1841 was 
one of the first major trials of the new police, and this year the Tories' campaign was based 
on a two issues; Protestantism, and the Reformists' attempt to disfranchise the freemen."**"*
Some changes tending towards more orderly elections had already been achieved, with the legal 
curtailment of the period available for voting and the use of booths. Police precautions were 
extensive."**® The police were permitted to vote if qualified, but were cautioned strongly against 
political comment."**®
482 Liverpool M ercury, 27 M ar 1855.
483 Liverpool Times, 29 Jun 1841; Liverpool Chronicle, 19 Aug 1837.
484 Liverpool Courier, 30 Jun 1841.
485 E.g. LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/1, pp. 350-1, Head Constable's R eport following election, 29 Jul 1837; 
ibid pp. 417-8, Report prior to election, 26 Jun 1841.
486 LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/2, pp. 421-7, 5 Jul 1841.
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Despite all precautions, there were outbreaks of severe rioting. In 1837 sectarian propaganda 
beforehand gave reason to fear trouble, and troops were brought to the boundary of the 
borough in readiness."**? They were only to be used if the new police failed, however, and 
despite some errors (such as allowing the Tory and Liberal processions to meet) they coped. 
There were outbreaks of fighting in many areas, and rumours that the Liberals had imported 
1500 Irishmen from Dublin to intimidate the Tories."*** Many injuries occurred, but on the 
whole the police succeeded in dispersing rioters and preventing looting and widespread 
disorder."**? The maintenance of order without the use of troops was not quite so revolutionary 
as it might appear, mounted police armed with cutlasses being used."*?** The 1841 election 
showed this similarity even more strongly, when mounted police with drawn cutlasses were 
formed into a square at the junction of four streets; they then divided into four squads which 
charged simultaneously along the four streets."*?* In both these years, many rioters were 
arrested. Sentences in 1837 were relatively light. In 1841, two deaths resulted, and while those 
accused of manslaughter were acquitted this probably helped to produce rather heavier 
sentences in general.
In 1847, the election was relatively peaceful, much of the credit being given to the decision not 
to use party colours."*?® 1852 was also a troubled election. Stockport had recently suffered severe
"*^7 H 052.34 fo210, M ayor to Ld J Russell, 28 Jul 1837; HO40.35 fo 135, Wemyss to Phillipps, 26 Jul 
1837; HO40.35 fo 137, Campbell to OC 7th Fusiliers, 25 Jul 1837; HO40.35 fo 142, Wemyss to 
Phillipps, 29 Jul 1837.
"4*8 Liverpool M ail, 27 Jul 1837.
"*^? Liverpool M ail, 25 Jul 1837; Liverpool M ercury, 26 Jul 1837; Liverpool Journal, 29 Jul 1837; 
Liverpool Courier, 24 Jul 1837; Liverpool Chronicle, 29 Jul 1837.
490 LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/1, pp. 350-1, 29 Jul 1837.
491 Liverpool Chronicle, 3 Jul 1841.
492 Liverpool Journal, 24 Jul 1847, 31 Jul 1847.
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anti-Irish rioting,"*?® and the Orange order in Liverpool were deeply involved in the election: the 
conservative candidates had specifically addressed the order. The police had even made a 
seizure of weapons which were claimed to have been prepared for use in sectarian riots."*?"* 
Despite the good results achieved in 1847 by giving up party colours, the Tories this year had 
insisted on their use,"*?® and the Conservative procession contained a number of men in orange 
colours, some of whom carried pistols."*?® The Liberals also held a procession, and engaged 
M. J. Whitty to take charge of the maintenance of order."*?? Trouble started when the 
procession was attacked on its way past Jordan Street, an Irish enclave, but the police acted 
quickly and no very serious rioting ensued,"*?* although the day was marred by two injuries 
which later resulted in death; there was some question of police involvement in one case, but 
the evidence was unclear and the inquest verdict exonerated them."*?? Both occurred outside the 
town centre, in areas where police precautions were less effective. Drink was also a factor; an 
election enquiry later established that several public houses had been "open" in the 
conservative interest.®*"* '
The years 1853 and 1857 saw noisy but non-violent elections. Despite the deaths which 
occurred in 1852, it is clear that police precautions were effective in preventing widespread
"*?3 Liverpool Journal, 3 July 1852.
"*?"* Liverpool Albion, 5 Jul 1852.
"*?3 Liverpool Chronicle, 26 Jun 1852.
"*?® Liverpool Mercury, 9 Jul 1852.
"*?? Liverpool Journal, 3 Jul 1852.
"*?* Liverpool Times, 8 Jul 1852; Liverpool Chronicle, 10 Jul 1852.
"*?? Liverpool Mail, 24 Jul 1852.
®**** Liverpool Mercury, 31 May 1853, 7 Jun 1853, 27 Jun 1853.
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disorder, even though they could not prevent localised outbreaks in peripheral areas. As with 
sectarian disturbances, the police were successful also in controlling or containing election 
disturbances from a relatively early date.
Trade Disputes
Collective violence was recorded in the course of trade disputes on 26 occasions during these 
years, and police precautions at three other times. Most were related to strikes; the only 
exception was an attack on a wages-clerk in reaction to stoppages from wages.®***
As in the earlier part of the period, disputes were mostly resolved peacefully and without a 
strike. This might be because the workers had not the power to resist a reduction of wages or 
an increase in hours,®**® or because their request was granted.®**® The movement for reduction 
of working hours in the 1840s saw an innovation in the formation of associations to appeal to 
public opinion, which were not necessarily restricted to a single trade.®*** Petitions were now 
less frequent, but the dock-porters still used this method as late as 1857.®**® The personal 
element in employer-employee relationships remained: for example the coachmakers showed 
their gratitude for a shortening of hours by inviting their employers to a dinner,®**® while the 
sawyers of Gregson's rmll accepted the gift of free "sittings" in St Matthew's church.®**?
301 Liverpool Courier, 26 Jan  1853.
302 E.g. Saltheavers: Liverpool Courier, 26 Jun 1839; Plasterers: Liverpool M ercury, 17 M ar 1848.
303 E.g. Coopers: Liverpool M ercury, 5 M ay 1854; Coachmakers: ibid, 20 Jul 1860.
304 E.g. Liverpool M ercury, 27 Jul 1847, 19 Nov 1847, 22 Sep 1848.
303 Liverpool M ercury, 31 Jul 1857.
306 Liverpool M ercury, 20 Jul 1860.
307 Liverpool M ercury, 16 M ay 1854.
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Traditional trade societies remained usual for the trades of the port, whhe the builders made 
at least one further attempt at national unionisation in 1846.®*** Associations were also from 
time to time formed in response to a particular need, for example to make effective a reduction 
in hours nominally granted to stonemasons.®**? Less powerful workers often relied on burial 
societies, which maintained a flimsy covering of respectability. The Dock Labourers' Christian 
Burial Society included among its functions negotiation with employers;®*** the Cotton Porters' 
Burial Club ran into trouble by spending its funds during a strike in 1853.®** A sign of the 
developing profession of trade-union organiser was seen when the brickmakers' union 
employed a "gentlemanlike" secretary in 1840.®*®
The relative scarcity of industrial violence during this period is remarkable in view of the many 
influences affecting workers at this time. Mechanisation and other technical changes, attempts 
to impose London standards for working hours, the cancellation of agreements about numbers 
of apprentices, and legal changes such as the registration of merchant seamen, aU produced 
their problems.®*® Other changes tended to reduce the chance of conflict, such as the
®**^ Liverpool M ercury, 24 A pr 1846; 15 May 1846; Liverpool Courier, 13 M ay 1846.
309 Liverpool Mercury, 27 Jun 1845.
310 Liverpool M ercury, 26 M ay 1854.
311 Liverpool M ercury, 12 Aug 1853.
312 Liverpool Courier, 15 Jul 1840.
313 E.g.. Liverpool Chronicle, 3 Sep 1842, increase in apprentice shipwrights; Liverpool M ercury, 3 
Oct 1845, growth o f iron shipbuilding; ibid, 4 Dec 1849, joiners reject London hours; ibid, 16 Nov 
1849, effects o f repeal o f navigation acts; Liverpool M ail, 12 Oct 1850, proposal to 'privatise' the 
graving dock; Liverpool Mercury, 25 Feb 1851, & Liverpool M ail, 22 Feb 1851, sailors resist 
registration under new Act o f Parliament; Liverpool Chronicle, 5 N ov 1853, acceptance of 
incomplete apprenticeships; Liverpool Mercury, 18 Jul 1854, increase in no o f apprentice sailmakers; 
ibid, 19 Jan  1855, resistance to use o f steam in unloading ships.
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displacement of shipyards by docks and the removal of trades requiring large amounts of space, 
notably roperies, beyond the borough boundary.®*"* Both these trades had been notable for the 
use of collective violence.
The approach of trade organisations to violence continued to be very disparate, as before 1835. 
It is perhaps significant that the same trades on the whole continued to be responsible for the 
majority of violent incidents, with less of either individual or collective violence from growing 
trades such as engineering. There were some exceptions, such as allegations of intimidation 
during a strike of railway-porters.®*® Sawyers continued to be notable for the use of extreme 
violence by individuals, with reports of vitriol-throwing®*® and incendiarism.®*? With other 
trades, "intimidation" might be no more than verbal.®**
The shipwrights' continued to use collective violence as their typical weapon. Their 
involvement with Protestantism in the first years of this period coincided with a period of 
apparent industrial peace in that trade, when the local Reformist regime was repugnant to men 
and masters alike. This came to an end in 1842, when a new association was formed in 
response to depression in their trade.®*? This body publicly disowned religious and party 
allegiance, and accused the masters of circulating lies about the men. It claimed the traditional 
right of Liverpool men to preferential employment. According to evidence given to the 
Council in 1850, a new shipwrights' association was formed again in 1844, which claimed to
314 Com parison o f Thom as Kaye's plan of Liverpool, 1810, with SDUK m ap o f 1836; Liverpool Times, 
12 Sep 1850; Liverpool M ercury, 28 Jul 1852.
313 Liverpool M ercury, 4 Aug 1856.
316 Liverpool Courier, 12 Dec 1838.
317 Liverpool M ercury, 14 Jan 1851.
318 E.g. Liverpool M ercury, 24 A pr 1846; striker bound over for crying "Baa-ah" a t "black sheep".
319 Liverpool Journal, 12 Nov 1842; Liverpool Times, 15 Nov 1842; Liverpool M ercury, 18 Nov 1842.
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have had 1,500 to 1,700 members throughout its life and took pride in the protecting former 
members from the workhouse.®®** Tory candidates continued to be honoured guests at election 
times; their welcome was certain; as one anonymous shipwright claimed: "We have always 
been a Tory town, and always will be."®®* This society too claimed preference for local men,®®® 
and assaults on outsiders were not infrequent;®®® However, the numbers involved in these 
attacks were lower than they had been in 1815-35. Only once was a crowd over 50 reported.
when 70 men threw stones at outsiders. Otherwise, the number was usually about 25. Serious 
injury was confined to one man thrown into the hold of a ship.
The shipwrights' forceful tactics contrast sharply with the restraint of an even more numerous 
body, the dock porters. Their conditions of work were seriously threatened by organisational 
changes; in 1846, when these were first proposed, the porters met to discuss resistance to 
measures intended speed the handling of cargoes, and free dock-berths more rapidly, by 
insisting that a single master-porter take charge of each ship. It was argued that this would 
result in lower wages, and lower standards of work, since these middle-men would intervene 
between merchants.and porters, maximising their profits by employing the cheapest and least 
skilful men. Discussions dragged on; in 1848, a series of meetings were held which caused 
disproportionate alarm by coinciding in time with fears of Chartist and Irish disturbances.®®"* 
Troops were made available, and special constables sworn in,®®® because of more general fears
320 Liverpool M ercury, 10 Sep 1850.
321 Liverpool M ercury, 27 M ar 1855.
322 Liverpool M ercury, 21 Oct 1853, 28 Oct 1853.
323 E.g. Liverpool Times, 15 Dec 1842, 8 Sep 1846; Liverpool Courier, 7 Jul 1852; Liverpool Chronicle, 
29 Jul 1854.
®®"* Liverpool Mercury, 10 M ar 1848; Liverpool Mail, 11 M ar 1848; HO45.2410B fo 979, Rushton to 
Home Office, 6 M ar 1848; HO45.2410B fo 859, M ayor to Home Office, 7 M ar 1848.
323 H 041.19 fo 22, Phillipps to Mayor, 9 Mar 1848 Liverpool Mail, 11 Mar 1848.
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and because of the proximity of St Patrick's Day. The dock committee agreed to negotiate, 
as the merchants supported the dockers,®®® although agreement was not reached until 1850.®®?
A further dock-strike in 1853, in support of demands for 4/- per day and a limit on the 
employment of new workers, was similarly peaceful. Nevertheless, the authorities were 
conscious of the potential for disorder of so many thousands of men; the Head Constable 
cancelled his leave-of-absence, and the Home Office was informed.®®* The police claimed in 
their annual report to have maintained order; the credit is probably due rather to the strikers' 
moderation.®®?
The degree of pohce involvement in strike prevention is not easy to estimate, since requests for 
their services are rarely recorded in the Watch Committee minutes, unlike requests for pohce 
to attend theatres or pubhc meetings. One of the few such items found suggests that 
attendance at strikes was free, whereas in other cases a charge was made.®®** In some instances 
the request may have been made direct to the Head Constable, but it is improbable that this 
was usual. The most hkely explanation is that the magistrates (whose papers have not 
survived) acted as mtermediaries between employers and pohce for these requests.
®26 Liverpool M ail, 6 May 1848.
327 Liverpool M ercury, 22 M ar 1850.
328 LRO 352 MINAVAT 1/5, p. 169, 11 Jun 1853; H045.5128 fo 543, M ayor to Home Secretary, 13 
Jun 1853; H 0 4 3 .83, fo 29, W addington to M ayor, 22 Jun 1853.
329 LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/5, p. 331, 1 A pr 1854.
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Police protection was frequently ^ven to strike-breakers;®®* at least once, plain-clothes police 
crossed a picket-line, apparently as provocateurs.®®® It appears that during Whitty's period of 
office the police were more neutral than they became later. When asked to protect 
dock-workers from assault by trade-society members, Whitty's investigation found no evidence 
of such attacks, the dock police reporting that members conduct had improved since the 
formation of the society.®®® This may be contrasted with Dowling's intervention in a dispute 
of ship-joiners where he attempted to exceed his legal power in applying for legal redress on 
behalf of men dismissed for not joining the Union.®®^  Prosecutions for assault or intimidation 
relating to strikes were normally brought by the employer, and the police would intervene 
usually at an employer's request; they readily supported the employers in all such cases despite 
the often minimal levels of violence.
Private Battles
32 incidents of this type were found, all involving actual violence. Those involved included, 
as before, schoolboys, Irish regionalist groups, and navvies; there were also territorial disputes 
between the residents of adjoiamg areas, and fights involving groups of soldiers. At least one 
fight took place by appointment; a barrel of beer was set up, and an estimated 300 men joined 
in "what the Americans call a free fight."®®®
®®* E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 5 Feb 1841, 28 A pr 1853.
®®2 Liverpool Courier, 4 M ay 1853.
5®® LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/2, p. 65, 12 Oct 1839.
®®4 Liverpool Mercury, 1 May 1849, 4 M ay 1849.
®®® Liverpool Daily Post, 10 May 1859; Liverpool Albion, 16 May 1859.
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Schoolboys were not taken very seriously; their stone-throwing was sometimes brought to the 
attention of the police,®®® and a batch of 2s6d fines might be imposed.®®? There was similar 
tolerance for the snowball fights which on three occasions broke out among merchants (grave 
and serious businessmen, as a rule) on Exchange Flags. Twice, windows were broken, and the 
Head Constable himself was struck by sriowballs; a number of gentlemen were even taken into 
custody, but were released almost immediately.®®* On the third occasion, five young clerks were 
each fined 2s6d.®®? Soldiers were a more difficult proposition; they generally saw the police as 
their natural enemies, so that these cases are classed as "Anti-police"; although there were clear 
parallels with private battles, in that both sides were apparently keen to engage the enemy, the 
perceived need to protect the police produced different treatment for these cases.
The Irish were pre-eminent, but not alone, among those forming fighting alliances. Apart from 
the regional loyalties, and the anti-protestant Ribbon clubs, already mentioned,®"*** there were 
family groups such as the "Kellys, Fitzpatricks and Murphys", or "Sweeneys, Cusacks and 
Barretts".®"** A further faction was the mysterious "Molly Maguires", first mentioned in 1853.®*® 
The name was believed to relate to an organisation of peasants who wore women's dress and 
other disguises for the purpose of attacking rent collectors in rural Ireland; it was to surface
336 LRO 352 POL 1/1, p. 63. 30 A pr 1836; Liverpool Mail, 3 Feb 1849.
337 Liverpool Chronicle, 2 Jun 1849.
338 Liverpool M ail, 7 Jan  1854; Liverpool Albion, 9 Jan  1854; Liverpool M ercury, 6 Jan  1854;
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again in the USA in the 1860s,®"*® They met in an alehouse in Sawney Pope Street, being 
reputedly sworn to give mutual help, "an insult..... to one being taken as an insult to all, for 
which is sought satisfaction". Members also benefited if prosecuted for assault.®"*^  A prisoner 
accused of an individual assault who unwisely boasted that the "Mollies" would pay any fine 
imposed upon him was given a sentence of two months without the option.®"*®
Resulting prosecutions, unless brought by the police, got little attention from magistrates, who 
might decline to act saying there were faults on both sides.®"*® They often failed to establish the 
facts of the case, complaining of the "desperate swearing (ie perjury) of you Irish when you 
begin to fight".®"*? Sometimes, too, they were confused by Irish idiom, such as the use of "dead" 
to mean "unconscious".®"**
There were probably many more riots of this type than have come to light. Constables were 
content to stop disorder, without necessarily making arrests. For example, police had dealt 
with a series of riots which had been "agait [sic] for a fortnight" before making the first 
arrest.®"*? Some cases were recorded only because of private prosecutions, when there is doubt
®"*® The Oxford English Dictionary traces the nam e to 1843rgiving as source W. S. T rench, T he Realities 
o f Irish Life, 1858.
®"*4 Liverpool Journal, 17 A pr 1858.
®"*3 Liverpool Courier, 12 Jun 1858.
®"*® E.g. Liverpool Journal, 24 Aug 1844, where prosecutors were said to have started the battle and then
come off worst; Liverpool Times, 17 Nov 1840, when verdict was that all those involved were drunk.
347 Liverpool M ercury, 1 Dec 1848.
348 E.g. Liverpool Courier, 2 May 1849.
®4? E.g. Liverpool Journal, 16 Jul 1853.
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as to whether the assault was individual or collective®®'* Many disturbances were private also, 
in a sense, in their location. The poorer areas of town were warrens of courts and alleys; half 
an acre could contain as many as 130 houses.®®* The courts, which could be entered only via 
a narrow tunnel, were not part of the official police beat. This in itself supports the conclusion 
that this type of riot was of little importance in the minds of police and authorities alike.
Direct Action Riots
There were 34 recorded cases which were more or less violent, and fears of direct action led to 
precautions being taken three times, twice during Crimean War celebrations and once when 
the police arrested unemployed men who were begging in large groups.®®® There were varying 
degrees of spontaneity; some might even engage in minor riot for payment; 50 men were hired 
to prevent the USS "Victoria" from leaving port before legal proceedings could be taken against 
her;®®® a bankrupt stül could command the price of a mob prepared to throw the bailiffs out 
of his house;®®"* and 40 "roughs" were engaged to recapture the valuable showpiece and souvenir 
of the Crimean war. Prince MensdukofTs carriage.®®® On the other hand, there were occasions 
when resentments against "the gentry" could be unexpectedly vented, as when a mob of up to
330 E.g. Liverpool Chronicle, 15 Jun 1839, 24 Sep 1836, 22 Feb 1840; Liverpool Times, 4 Jan 1842.
331 I. C. Taylor, "The Court and Cellar Dwelling; the Eighteenth Century Origin o f the Liverpool Slum" 
in TH SLC , Vol. 122, p. 82.
®32 Liverpool Courier, 10 Oct 1855; Liverpool Mercury, 30 May 1856; Liverpool Daily Post, 4 Dec 
1857.
®33 Liverpool Journal, 23 M ay 1840.
®®"* Liverpool Times, 18 A pr 1850.
®®® Liverpool Courier, 15 Aug 1855.
138 Riot and its Control in Liverpool, 1815-1860
300 took to knocking off gentlemen's hats while the police were occupied at a major fire.®®® 
The use of effigies to express public feelings was usually associated with elections. Rough 
music was only recorded once, among Irish women who crossed town to shame the supposed 
mistress of a well-known Irish publican.®®? A similar imposition of group norms can be seen 
in the case of a shipwright, subjected to a punishment known as "dozening" by his workmates 
for failing to pay his shilling towards the shipwrights' procession.®®* He was told that "we must 
serve thee as any other person for the violation of rule. Thou'lt have little to complain of, for 
thou'st been the first dozener in the yard." In this case, the magistrate declared that he "must" 
impose a fine, but made it small.
Illuminations had not given cause for serious concern for some time, being now too well 
organised and policed for trouble. The entire police force was available for the victory 
illumination in 1855, which was described as "orderly"; the Head Constable's house displayed 
a particularly tasteful illuminated transparency.®®?
There were, however, new causes of disturbance to worry about. As the EvangeHcal 
movement gained pace, there were often riotous reactions to missionaries preaching in public 
places, sometimes but not always sectarian. Some of the clergy expected a degree of quiet 
attention which the magistrates were unwilling to enforce,®®** although evangelists not in Holy
®36 Liverpool Mercury, 16 Sep 1859.
®®? Liverpool Mercury, 12 Nov 1855.
®®8 Liverpool Mercury, 25 Jun 1841; Liverpool Journal 19 Jun 1841.
®3? Liverpool Courier, 10 Oct 1855.
®®** E.g. Liverpool Mercury, 1 Jul 1857; Liverpool Courier, 14 Apr 1858.
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Orders might find that they, rather than their audience, were arrested.®®* Anyone who shouted 
slogans likely to rouse sectarian feeling would be subject to the same reaction.®®®
A new type of conflict which made its first appearance in the press during this period was that 
between black and white. There were signs of racial prejudice among the police: one constable 
was fined for "insulting a man of colour" in 1836,®®® and in 1840 evidence that a tavern had 
black men among its customers was offered as demonstrating its disorderly character.®®^  As yet, 
however, there was little cause for tension, black people being regarded mostly with mild 
curiosity. Racial assaults were a monopoly of American saüors; a number were brought into 
the police-court, where they were assured that "the aristocracy of the skin" would not be 
accepted in England.®®®
The traditional cause of direct-action riots was lack of food. There were many years where 
suffering was widespread; in 1838, 1841 and 1842 most trades were affected by severe 
unemployment, and soup-kitchens were the only resource of many.®®® In 1847-48, the influx 
of famine-stricken Irish meant widespread misery. There were also crises in individual trades 
in other years. Yet there was no disturbance during these years, the only police measure
361 E.g. Liverpool M ercury, 16 M ar 1857; Liverpool Courier, 15 A pr 1857.
362 E.g. Liverpool Daily Post, 1 Nov 1855.
363 LRO 253 M IN /W A T 21/1 p. 127, 7 Sep 1836.
364 Liverpool M ercury, 1 May 1840.
365 Liverpool M ercury, 21 Aug 1847; Liverpool Mail, 17 Jul 1847; Liverpool Courier, 23 Jan  1850, 30 
Jan  1850.
366 Liverpool Chronicle, 20 Jan  1838; Liverpool Mercury, Jan  & Feb 1838, throughout; 8 Jan  1841; 
Liverpool Courier, 27 Jan  1841; Liverpool Chronicle, 6 M ar 1841; Liverpool Journal, us off;16 Jan 
1841; Liverpool Times, 11 Jan 1842, 25 Jan  1842; Liverpool Journal, 22 Jan  1842.
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against disorder being a constable or two to control queues at the soup-kitchens.®®?. This 
complacency was shaken in 1855. Bread had already been dear the previous summer; the 
problem grew worse throughout the winter, with the com-porters ominously complaining that 
they had worked only two-and-a-half days per month since April.®®* The winter was extremely 
severe, with navigation in the Mersey impeded by ice-floes.®®? The usual nrinimal charitable 
provisions were completely inadequate. In February, crowds collecting in the hope of 
receiving food were dispersed by the police.®?** The next day, crowds milling about in the streets 
coalesced into a formidable mass. Bread-shops were attacked, loaves and money being 
demanded and taken by force.®?* Very few other targets suffered, with the exception of 
spirit-vaults where only money was taken; significantly, the rioters refused drink when it was 
offered.®?® The police were unable to make much impression on the rioters, who dispersed in 
front of them only to re-form elsewhere. 200 "respectable" porters were sworn in as special 
constables; mounted police and enrolled pensioners were called out;®?® order was restored by
367 LRO 352 M IN /W A T 21/6, p i 54, 7 Jan 1842.
368 Liverpool M ercury, 21 Jul 1854, 9 Feb 1855.
369 Liverpool M ercury, 20 Feb 1855.
370 Liverpool Journal, 24 Feb 1855.
®?* Liverpool Courier, 21 Feb, 28 Feb, 4 A pr 1855; Liverpool Times, 22 Feb 1855; Liverpool Journal, 
24 Feb, 3 M ar, 31 M ar, 7 A pr 1855; Liverpool M ercury, 20 Feb 1855; Liverpool Chronicle, 24 Feb 
1855; Liverpool M ail, 17 Feb, 24 Feb 1855; HQ41.20 fo92, W addington to M ayor, 19 Feb 1855; 
ibid fo 93, Fitzroy to M ayor, 22 Feb 1855; PL27 13/1 & PL27.13/2, Depositions; PL26.204 
Indictments, Liverpool Assizes, Spring 1855; LRO 347 QUA, Q uarter Sessions Indictments, M ar 
1855.
372 Liverpool Journal, 24 Feb 1855.
373 HO41.20 fo 92, W addington to M ayor, 19 Feb 1855; ibid fo 93, Fitzroy to M ayor, 22 Feb 1855; ibid, 
fo 95, sam e to same, 24 Feb 1855.
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the end of the day, although people continued to stand around in little knots,giving grounds 
for continuing anxiety during the next day.
Over 100 were arrested, the vast majority being Irish in Sentences were harsh, with
many prisoners being committed to the Assizes, a measure rarely used against rioters in 
Liverpool. The press justified such severity against starving people by proclaiming that 'This 
was not a riot of the working men";^^  ^ despite their moderation in attacking primarily 
bread-shops, those taking part were, the Press insisted, known criminals, "Manchester 
desperadoes", "pickpockets and prostitutes".^’*^ Yet one of the most vociferous papers itself 
stated that out of 65 tried in one day in the police-court, only two were known to the police, 
and these merely for drunkenness.^”  Only Whitty's Journal took a more sympathetic line, 
explaining the genesis of the riot in some detail without condemnation, and noting in passing 
the apparent exhilaration of the rioters: "the people nowhere seemed low-spirited, in
consequence of the excitement."^’®
Following this riot, the authorities became more sensitive for a time to the threat of hungry 
men, and a group were arrested in 1857 for going about in gangs and begging. The Stipendiary 
Magistrate in sentencing them to 30 days imprisonment remarked that "It must be known that,
whether people were suffering or n o t, order should be maintained in this town."^’® On the
whole, however, direct action riots were left to the police to deal with as they saw fit, and police 
priorities were decisive.
574 p p  1854-5 X III.313, R eport o f Select Committee on Poor Removal, p. 297.
Liverpool Courier, 21 Feb 1855.
Liverpool Chronicle, 24 Feb 1855.
Liverpool Courier, 21 Feb 1855.
Liverpool Journal, 24 Feb 1855.
Liverpool Daily Post, 4 Dec 1857.
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Anti-Police Riots
These were by far the most numerous, no less than 90 being found. The vast majority were 
rescues of prisoners: the problem, according to the Stipendiary Magistrate, "is not the finding 
of the prisoners, but the taking of them into custody, arising from the impertinent interference 
of other parties."^ ®® Some constables traded on the magistrates' concern about rescues to 
prevent even peaceful intervention. A bystander who offered to pay for damage in a shop was 
arrested for interference in the arrest of the person responsible,^®/ and two respectable citizens 
were fined 10/- for expostulating with the police for excessive use of force. The magistrate 
added that "persons ought rather to assist than interfere with the police."^ ®^
There were occasional attacks which did not result from police actions: one case suggests that 
a constable entering a court might be resented as a trespasser.^®  ^The police also risked assault 
when they interfered in popular pastimes like prize-fighting or dog-fighting. An inspector was 
killed, and a constable later lost his sight from wounds received, when attempting to stop a 
fight in 1838.^ ®^  Despite police efforts, prize-fights remained frequent; in 1860, a letter to a 
newspaper complained of seeing a crowd of 2-300 watching a fight with "no fear of the 
authorities."^®  ^ Bear-baiting, dog-fighting, pitch and toss, and Sunday cricket all received
Liverpool M ercury, 3 July 1840.
Liverpool M ercury, 9 M ay 1848.
®^^ Liverpool M ercury, 17 A pr 1855.
®^3 Liverpool Courier, 25 Feb 1857.
®^4 Liverpool M ercury, 15 Jun 1838; LRO 352 M IN /W A T 21/3, p. 82 ,15  Jun 1838; ibid, 1/2, pp. 152-3, 
15 Feb 1840; Liverpool Journal, 4 Jun 1838; PL 26.130.
Liverpool Mercury, 12 Jul 1860.
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attention/®® "Lifting" at Hocktide was a tradition whereby young men lifted women off the 
ground until they bought their freedom with a penny or a kiss. Women reciprocated the next 
day. This also led to scuffles with the police®®’ yet survived their attentions by several years.®®® 
Beside acts of resistance, there were also revenge attacks,®®^  and one account of an unpopular 
pohce inspector's efflgy having been burned just outside the borough.®®"
The frequency of recorded attacks on the police, rescues or not, rose at the time when force 
discipline degenerated seriously.®®* As would be expected, there is little direct evidence of police 
aggression in normal cases, but the incident which brought about Dowling's dismissal shows 
the police attacking indiscriminately an Irish crowd. The Watch Committee thereafter tacitly 
admitted that they understood sectarian prejudice to have been involved when they renewed 
measures to exclude Orangemen from the force.®®^  Greig's curative measures also were designed 
to reduce police aggression, clearly identified as a serious problem.®®^  The police were deprived
586 E.g. LRO 352 MINAVAT 21/1, p. 52, 27 M ay 1836; Liverpool Journal, 15 Jun 1839; Liverpool 
Albion, 12 Sep 1836; Liverpool M ercury, 18 Jul 1854, 22 Jun 1858.
587 Liverpool Journal, 13 A pr 1844; Liverpool M ercury, 28 M ar 1845.
588 Liverpool M ercury, 16 A pr 1852.
589 E.g. Liverpool Courier, 28 A pr 1852.
590 Liverpool Albion, 30 M ay 1859.
591 1836-44: 16 cases, 20.8% o f known riots; 1844-52: 40 cases, 37.4%.
592 Liverpool Journal, 28 Feb 1852; Liverpool Mail, 28 Feb 1852; LRO 352 M IN /W A T 1/5, p. 486, 
28 Feb 1852; ibid, p. 516, 27 M ar 1852.
593 See above, p. 103.
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of their sticks; they were promised instead the protection of heavy sentences for offenders/®  ^
but the statistics do not show that this had any real effect. Taking as sample all reports given 
in a single newspaper for a year, the mean sentence for assaults on the pohce was only 
insignificantly and marginaUy higher than the mean for all assaults.®®®
No significant reduction in attacks was achieved under Greig's regime. Rescues continued to 
be frequent, and there were a number of battles between the pohce and troops stationed in the 
town which began with insults and escalated into brawling.®®®
Whether the pohce exceeded their duties or not, however, the vast majority of incidents were 
sthl reactions to specific pohce actions. The generahsed resistance to the imposition of the rule 
of law which Storch claimed is not apparent.®®’ The pohce reaction was equaUy ad-hoc; 
wherever sufficient force was available they persisted in their intentions, and arrests for assaults 
on the pohce were very frequent. It was difficult to guard against these sporadic incidents, 
beyond increasing patrols in troublesome areas, and the individual constable's response and the 
availabüity of men nearby were of major importance in deciding the outcome.
Riot o f Unknown Origin
43 incidents have no known cause. Many of them occurred in areas recognised as disorderly, 
such as VauxhaU Road, Scotland Road, or St James Street. Ben Jonson Street, near VauxhaU
59'^  Liverpool Chronicle, 29 Jul 1854.
®®® Liverpool Daily Post, 1857, passim. M ean for assaults on police, 69.1 days; m ean for all assaults, 
68.9 days.
®®® Liverpool Chronicle, 23 Dec 1848; Liverpool M ercury, 12 Jan 1849; Liverpool Chronicle, 5 Jul 1851; 
Liverpool Albion, 7 Jul 1851; Liverpool Mercury, 8 Jul 1851; Liverpool Daily Post, 14 Sep 1858; 
Liverpool Courier, 15 Sep 1858; Liverpool Journal, 18 Sep 1858.
®®’ R  D. Storch, "The Plague of the Blue Locusts" in International Journal o f Social History, 20, pp. 
61-90.
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Road, was a notable trouble-spot; it contained 19 "mendicant lodging houses" and 8 brothels 
within a length of 200 yards, and was normally given three extra constables, with a further one 
during the services in a nearby chapel/®® Another problem was Brook Street, where fights and 
riots were said to occur daily/®® VauxhaU Road was so notorious that to be detained there by 
a disturbance was a classic excuse for late arrival by a police officer/"" Here, and probably 
elsewhere, the character of the public houses was probably a factor in the equation. The 
publican of one, shown to have harboured prostitutes and pickpockets, kept his licence 
because it was claimed that every house in the road was as bad.®"* By 1856 Lime Street alone 
had six constables to deal with drink-related problems; this street contained the main railway 
station, which probably explains why so many men were provided.®"  ^ It is often recorded that 
those charged with riot or assault were drunk, but no systematic data is avaUable. Although 
the connection was taken for granted, the likelihood of riot was given httle prominence by 
temperance campaigners. Poverty and sexual immorahty were both more frequently citediin 
cautionary tales than the possibility of injury in brawls. Drunken men, and women, might 
fight in the street; the event was of no great interest.
AU eight types of riot having been considered, comparison of the precautions, poUcing and 
punishment between types, and between the first and second halves of the period, is the subject 
of the next and last chapter.
598 LRO 352 M IN /W A T 21/4, p. 515, 25 May 1841.
599 Liverpool Journal, 13 Jul 1844.
600 LRO  352 M IN /W A T 21/9, p. 284, 21 Jun 1845.
601 LRO  352 M IN /W A T 1/5, p. 546, 1 M ay 1852.
602 Liverpool M ercury, 17 Nov 1856.
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in organisational changes and in policing.
It has already been argued that the relative frequency of different types of riot cannot be used 
to draw conclusions about popular behaviour, since the probability of a riot's being reported 
cannot be established. The increase in recorded cases probabiy also is a function of better 
recordtng. It might be argued that the true frequency of coUcctive violence decreased, but that 
the mcreasing distaste of Victorian society for violence led to a greater interest in it. and a 
greater hlceUhood of its being reported. This argument suffers from the fact that press reports 
are st.ll brief and unexcited, which suggests that this interest was limited, so that any such effect 
can have been only small. The amount of collective violence might have increased somewhat,
It mrght have decreased somewhat, or it might have remained about the same. There is no 
support, however, for the idea that this period saw any general 'transition to order', unless 
'order' means only the absence of protest-related, rather than casual or personal, riotous 
behavtour. On a national scale, political protest probably did decline; locally it is clear that 
crowds continued to be ready to use coUective violence for a wide range of other purposes. 
Whatever the tore level of violence may have been, there was still a steady supply of incidents.
Nor rs there evidence of any appreciable decline over the years 1836-1860. Figure 4 shows that,
if the second half of the period is divided into three, there is Uttle sign of a reduction in the
number of disturbances even as late as 1852-60.
Chapter Six: Conclusions 147
No o f  
Incs
100-i
90 _  
80
70
60
50
40
30_
20
1 0 .
0 .
Type
I
Q ]  1815 -  1835 
I I 1835 -  1860
1 = Riot o f  Unknown O rigin 5 = E lec tio n
2 = P rivate B a t t le  6 = A n ti-p o lic e
3 = S ectar ian  7 = Trade D ispute
4 = D irect A ction  8 = P o l i t i c a l  P ro tes t
Figure 3. Annual M ean Number of Riots
There were some small signs of reductions in estimates both of the numbers involved and of 
severity, but neither were statistically significant. Table 7 in Appendix 3 gives the results. It 
would appear that riots in the period 1836-1860 were broadly comparable with those of 
1815-1835. There were also sufficient incidents in each category to make comparisons 
meaningful.
How, then does the differentiation in handling compare? The main alteration is that 
differentiation was much reduced. Preventive measures are summarised in Table 8 in 
Appendix 3. The most extreme measure was the provision of military force in advance of 
need. Before 1835 this was restricted to trade disputes and political protest. After 1836 it was 
found in six out of the eight categories. The same table shows that the level of preventive 
measures was higher for all types of anticipated riot. This is not unexpected; there was more 
manpower available for policing. Political protest sthl attracted the most extreme measures, 
but now election and sectarian disorders were taken more seriously, while on the other hand 
.the approach to trade disputes was rather more tolerant. This evening-out of differences in
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preventive measures must be taken to reflect an underlying belief in the equal illegality of riot 
of all kinds, whether directed against employers or against neighbours. Where previously 
disorder and even violence had been apparently taken less seriously than interference with 
trade, for example, or with peace officers, now it is clear that violence and disorder themselves 
were coming to be considered as worthy of attention.
Table 9 shows the relative measures taken to police riots which had actually started. Between 
1836 and I860, troops were never used against rioters; they had been used in nearly 10% of 
cases in the earlier period. The trend towards greater uniformity of response here reflects the 
increased strength of the police, which rendered military force unnecessary. In other words, in 
speaking of 'normal policing' after the reforms of 1836 we are talking about something very 
different from earlier 'normal policing.' These reforms had made stronger measures available 
which were now used against most types of disorder.
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The most discriminating measure of differentiation for the first period, however, was 
punishment. This can, of course, only take effect when the are prisoners available to be tried 
and sentenced. Table 10 shows the numbers of known arrests and prosecutions for the second 
period arranged according to the type of riot. As for the first period, the results reflect not only 
policy but also factors (such as advance warning of a potential riot) which determined the 
possibility of making arrests. The very large numbers of arrests in the 1855 bread riots account 
for the high figure for direct action riots. Only in this category and in election riots were the 
mean numbers of arrests per incident higher than they had been in the first period. The 
reduction in this average probably relates to an increase in the reporting of smaller incidents 
where few arrests were made, rather than to a change in policy.
The distribution of trials between police courts, quarter sessions, and assizes is ^ven in Table 
II. With many more reports of summary trials, these figures are more helpful than the 
corresponding figures for the earlier half of the period. With only twelve trials resulting from 
political protest incidents, the high proportion of trials at assizes for this category cannot be 
taken too seriously. For all other categories, however, the probability of being sent for trial at 
quarter sessions or assizes is now much more uniform. In comparison with the first part of 
the period, the chance of summary trial was a little higher for those arrested for taking part in 
private battles; in the case of sectarian riots, they were a little lower. Figures for trials at the 
Assizes are likewise broadly similar, with the highest value being for sectarian riots. This 
reflects the events of 1852, when 15 prisoners were sent to the Assizes to mark the new policy 
of preventing Orange processions; aU were discharged with a warning. The use of this method 
of demonstrating official disapproval was clearly still considered valuable. The figure for Direct 
Action rioters tried at the Assizes likewise comes from a single case, the 1855 bread riots; in 
this case the court took full advantage of its ability to pass longer sentences.
The results of these trials, wherever they were held, is of interest. Sentences from the second 
period were converted into numeric data in the same way as those from the first period. 
Detailed figures are ^ven in Table 12 in Appendix 3. Figure 5 shows the mean relative ranking 
of sentences for each type of riot for the two periods in graphical terms, and compares it with 
that found in the earlier period.
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The tendency to closer grouping is ver\' clear. Political riot is obviously a case apart; otherwise, 
sentences are applied more evenly across all types of riot. Such differentiation as there is is still 
statistically significant, but is very much smaller.
Correlation between sentence and the size and severity of incident was not found in the earlier 
period. The results of similar tests on the data for the second period are given in Table 13; they 
show that again these factors did not affect sentences. No measurable relationship is found. 
The conclusion that emerges from the data on sentences, then, is that punishment for riot of 
any type except political protest was very much more uniform. Those arrested while taking 
part in collective violence were to be punished, it would seem, purely for having rioted. Neither 
their motive, nor the outcome of the riot, was likely to affect their sentence. When seen in 
conjunction with the greater uniformity in precautionary and policing measures, an overall 
picture can be seen of a new and more consistent approach to the control of collective violence, 
political protest always excepted. Riot was ceasing to be interpreted according to its motives; 
the fact of having engaged in violence was increasingly seen as cause for punishment, whatever
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the objective. The private nature of a quarrel was no longer seen as making public interference 
urmeccssary. Here is another sign of the growing interest of the authorities in the life of the 
streets which Storch and Swift have noted.®°^
The varied sentences and precautionary measures of 1815-35 had been decided by magistrates 
who owed their legal function to their position as mayor or alderman. They were amateurs in 
law enforcement. Although amateur ma^strates continued to be appointed, their influence 
was reduced greatly by the appointment in 1836 of a stipendiary magistrate who presided over 
the vast majority of trials for riot or assault. He also advised the mayor and the committee 
of magistrates when they considered questions of public order; this body benefited too from 
the advice of the Head Constable. In less serious cases, the police acted without magisterial 
advice. The keynote for this period was professionalism. The statistical evidence shows the 
result. To the professional law enforcer, a riot was a riot; it was a disturbance of the peace 
which he was to maintain. In writing of the whole range of crime during this period, Emsley 
has identified a tendency for it to be perceived as "a  national and impersonal problem", 
"perpetrated .... against respectable people..."®*  ^The result found in the case of riot in Liverpool 
supports this. Increasingly, the policing of public disorder could be seen as the protection of 
the right of 'respectable people' to live in a peaceful setting. While the range of preventive and 
policing measures was as wide as ever, they were now applied more evenly. Small riots in 
courts and backstreets might be ignored; any riot which came to the notice of the police force 
by disturbing public thoroughfares or interrupting the smooth running of the town must be 
prevented or put a stop to, whatever its origin.
R. D. Storch, "The Plague o f the Blue Locusts" in International Journal o f Social History, 20, pp. 
61-90, and "The Policeman as Domestic Missionary" in Journal o f Social History, Sum m er 1976, 
pp. 481-509; R. Swift, "Another Stafford Street Row" ; Law, O rder and the Irish Presence in 
mid-Victorian W olverhampton", in R. Swift and S. Gilley (eds.). T he Irish in the Victorian City, 
London, 1985.
C. Emsley, Crime and Society in England, 1750-1900, London, 1987, p. 42.
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Similarly, sentences were no longer much influenced by the category of riot, nor even by its 
size or severity. This is not to say that individual sentences were more uniform. The range 
was as wide as ever, but now the individual's actions seem to have been the most important 
determinant. Inciting others would attract a heavier sentence than following a ringleader. 
Assaults on bystanders or police outweighed lighting between supposedly willing participants. 
Anything Hke theft would increase the sentence. The following examples are drawn from a 
single incident, the Orange procession of 1851.
Josh. Athem Stonethrowmg 10/- or 7 days
Wm. Bates Leading mob, being armed 10/- or 7 days
Martin Quinn Stoning police 20/- or I month
John Kelly Assaulting a woman 40/- or 3 months
Wm Graham Being drunk, armed 5/- fine
John Lloyd Breaking windows 2/6d fine
Mrs. Collins Assault on PC and wife 100/- or 2 months
Mrs. Eslip Assault on man carrying orange lUy 2/6d fine
The legal notion of the collective guilt of rioters was in practice replaced by a rough — 
extremely rough — approximation to a measurement of individual guilt.
Nor did the uniformity of handling mean that any new theory of riot took over from the ideas 
of brutish, rational, or criminal motivation of earlier years. The Irish in particular were, as the 
Stipendiary Magistrate put it, apparently "activated by a spirit as ungovernable and reckless 
as .... savages."®°^  According to Head Constable Dowling, Irish districts "but for the presence 
of the police would be a scene of constant uproar and bloodshed."®^® It was not the Irish alone.
Liverpool Mail, 13 July 1844.
606 LRO 352 MINAVAT 1/5, p. 5, 28 Jul 1849.
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however, who were held to be so wild. Increasing references to "roughs" occur. Pearson®®’ 
points out that fears of "roughs" were to increase over the next twenty or thirty years, 
culminating in the 1880s, the decade when Stedman Jones®®* has identified a crisis in public 
confidence caused by fears of "the residuum". Stevenson®®’ notes that after 1848 the Irish and 
the "roughs" between them increasingly took the blame for the persistence of disorder. Storch 
has claimed that as early as the 1830s and 1840s the lower orders were feared because they 
"aimed somehow at the utter unravelling of society."®^ ® This is rather too dramatic to be 
accepted unqualified as a description of the position in Liverpool, but faint echoes of such 
ideas are discernible. Emsley's picture of more rational fears of the residual 'dangerous classes', 
which he identifies as a major influence on perceptions of crime in the mid nineteenth century, 
fits the case much better.®^  ^ "Instead of respectable workingmen," the Head Constable was on 
one occasions confronted with "the blackguards from VauxhaU Road and Toxteth Park."®^  ^
And there were frequent cases where "brutish" and "criminal" ideas are linked. The element 
of criminality came to be mentioned more frequently in reports of riot, in combination with 
brutal love of disorder; large numbers of men were, it was claimed, "suffered to live by thieving 
and disorderly conduct."®^ ® The Bread Riots of 1855 were in this way blamed on ".. the lowest
607 Geoffrey Pearson, Hooligan: a History of Respectable Fears, London, 1983.
608 G Stedman Jones, Outcast London, Harm ondsworth, 1984, Chapter 16, pp. 281-314.
609 John Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in England, 1700-1870, London & New Y ork, 1979, p. 300.
610 R  D Storch, "The Plague of the Blue Locusts: Police Reform and Popular Resistance in N orthern 
England. 1840-1857" in Fitzgerald et al (eds). Crime and Society, London and Henley, p. 87.
611 C. Emsley, Crime and Society in England, 1750 to 1900, London, 1987, chapter 3, pages 48-77.
612 Liverpool M ercury, 14 M ar 1848.
613 Liverpool Courier, 16 M ar 1836.
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and vilest.... those who are not in the habit of working honestly for a livelihood .. this
case, the constant harping on the criminal nature of the crowd is so laboured that it displays 
an insistent anxiety to deny that the rioters had any reason to steal bread. Thefts of roast meat 
were put forward as "proof" that these rioters were mere criminals whom it was right to punish 
savagely. The constant hammering at this point suggests that there was a need to answer an 
argument which nobody in fact put forward: that starving people might be justified in stealing 
bread. Between the lines, the theory of rational riot peeps through, only to be forcibly obscured 
by a concentrated insistence on the brutality and criminality of the rioters which justified heavy 
punishment.
The ghost of rational riot was also seen at a trial for assault on the police originatmg in police 
attempts to protect an open-air preacher. The Recorder argued that the police were wrong to 
arrest those disturbing so misplaced a sermon; despite the presence of a clergyman, the accused 
had "every right" to protest verbally.^^  ^ use of violence in trade disputes was also 
commonly seen as understandable although misguided, as the frequent explications of 
magistrates show. Yet such cases were relatively infrequent. In the main, although all three 
theories of motivation — brutal, criminal, and rational — were still recognisable, they were 
discemibly m e r^ g  into one idea of a "brutish and criminal" section of society which could 
take the blame for the majority of cases of disorder, even if evidence had to be ignored as in 
1855. This had the advantage that the measures of punishment seen as necessary to the 
maintenance of order could also be seen to be deserved.
There was still one great exception to this approach. Political protest still had the power to 
create panic among the magistrates. The events of 1848 were the most notable example; 
demands for troops, and even for a gunboat; constant communication with the Home Office; 
a petition for the suspension of Habeas Corpus; rumours of a conspiracy to destroy shipping; 
the draconian dismissals of hundreds of workmen who refused to enrol as special constables. 
The 'Plug Plot' problems of 1842 had provoked similar although more muted reaction. It
614 Liverpool Mercury, 20 Feb 1855.
616 Liverpool Courier, 19 May 1852.
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might be argued that the sentences for the 1848 conspirators should not be compared with 
those for other forms of riot, as they were after all pronounced by the courts which were 
dealing with the Chartist "rising" of that year, and thus under the influence of national rather 
than local events. The attempted Irish revolution also affected the issue. Too much should 
not be made of twelve sentences among so many, and this data would in any case be 
unnecessary as the attention paid to precautions speaks for itself. Nevertheless, the sentences 
were well outside the normal range.
Subversive riot, then, was still feared in 1848 as it had been earlier. Nor did the idea of its 
dangers die quickly. In 1853, the Mayor still argued for the maintenance of a military force in 
the town because troops "would if an emergency should arise have a powerful effect in 
overawing the disaffected and d e s i g n i n g . . " 6 ^ ®  Nevertheless, other types of riot were being taken 
more seriously than previously, and it is uncertain which type of riot, crixninal or subversive, 
was in the mind of the Inspector of Constabulary Forces in 1859 when he remarked that the 
military skills of the Liverpool Police Force were proof against "disturbers of the public peace, 
however numerous .... "6*’
616 H 045.5128 fo 540, M ayor to G eneral Viscount Hardinge, 21 Feb 1853.
617 I860 LVII.527 Reports o f Inspector o f Constabulary .... 1859, p. 61 (587). 
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Appendix 1: Statistics and Coding of Data
The choice of statistical test is dependent on the information available. The most accurate 
require data expressed as numbers whose value is directly related to the variable being 
measured; an example might be income expressed in pounds, where ten thousand is exactly 
twice as large as twenty thousand. In this study, this quality is not available. For example, the 
size of an incident (the number of people involved) is never accurately known. The numbers 
1 to 5 are used, in ascending order of size; each corresponds to a range of values. An incident 
of size 4 is larger than one of size 2, but it is not twice as large. This means that the tests used 
must be based on the principal of arranging items in order of size and using their rank rather 
than their numeric values. Such tests are referred to as 'non-parametric'.
Other variables cannot be measured in any numeric fashion; they can merely be labelled. The 
type of riot is such a variable. A type 2 riot, a "private battle", is neither larger nor smaller than 
a type 4 riot, "direct action"; it is merely different.
Where two codes can both be taken to show order of magnitude, a nonparametric correlation 
coefficient can be calculated. This shows the degree to which an increase in the first variable 
is associated with an increase or decrease in the second, expressed as a number between + 1 
and -1. The test used is the Spearman coefficient of correlation. Where one of the codes can 
only be regarded as a label, the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance has been used. 
This sorts items into order according to variable A (for example, length of sentence) and 
calculates the mean ranks of groups selected according to variable B (for example, type of riot), 
then answers the question "how likely is it that this difference is the result of chance?" For 
example, when sentences are grouped according to the type of riot to which they relate, it 
appears that some types were more severely punished than others, and are thus consistently 
ranked higher when sorted. This might result from a real difference, or it might be that random
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accidents have affected the chances of survival of data to produce a misleading sample. The 
test provides a numerical value of one or less which measures the probability that the difference 
found came about by chance, the true distribution of sentences being the same for riots of all 
types. The lower this value, the less probable it is that chance alone could have produced the 
apparent difference. A similar 'significance level' is calculated for the non-parametric 
correlation coefficient, similarly giving the probability that the result could be produced by 
chance.
These calculations were performed using SPSS-X (the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences, extended version) on Liverpool University's IBM 3081 computer. My thanks are 
due to the Director of the Computer Laboratory, Dr. J. L. Schonfelder, for allowing me to 
use these facilities, and for the use of the SCRIPT wordprocessing package and the 7171 laser 
printer. I must also thank the many members of the Laboratory's staff who gave me the benefit 
of their computing expertise.
The following pages gve a key to the interpretation of the codes and abbreviations used, 
followed by listings of the data and then by the results of calculations done using SPSS-X.
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Interpretation o f Data
First Line for Each Incident:
No: Incident number, arbitrarily allocated in
approximate date order, with gaps to allow 
for amendments.
1st Character 0 for 1815-1835
1 for 1836-1844
2 for 1844-1852
3 for 1852-1860 
Date: Date; 00 means exact date uncertain;
R = date of report, rather than incident. 
Description: Highly abbreviated account of events.
RUO = Riot of unknown origin
NV = no violence
Type: 1 = Unknown . • 5 = Election
2 = Private Battle 6 = Anti-Police
3 = Sectarian 7 = Trade Dispute
4 = Direct Action 8 = Political Protest
Size: 1 = 10-24 4 = 500-1999
2 = 25-99 5 = 2000 +
3 = 100-499 9 = No Information
Sevy: Severity:-
0 = No violence
1 = Jostling, verbal threats
2 = Minor injury, persons or property, or arms (inc stones)
carried
3 = Major injury, 5 or less persons, major damage, or use of
arms.
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Dum: Duration:-
4 = As 3, 6 -10 victims, or life in danger, 5 or less victims.
5 = Death, or otherwise greater than (4).
9 = No information
1 = 30 Min or less
2 = 30-90 Min
3 = 90 Min-3 Hrs.
4 = 3-12 Hrs.
5 = 12 Hrs or more 
9 = No information
Locn: Location:-
1 = Court or backstreet, poor district
2 = Street, poor district
3 = Workplace, field, etc.
4 = Street, well-to-do area (usually city centre)
5 = Widespread, more than one of above 
9 = No information
Free: Precautions:-
0 = None, or not applicable
1 = Collection of information
2 = Attempt to prevent meeting etc.
3 = Police in place prior to meeting
4 = 3 & 2
5 = Use of special constables
6 = Armed or mounted police
7 = Troops standing by 
9 = No information
Pol; Policing:-
0 = None, or not applicable
1 = Normal policing (inc ad-hoc reinforcements)
2 = Minor rearrangement, e.g. reinforcements sent from station
3 = Major rearrangement, e.g. whole force mobilised, specials
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4 = Armed or mounted police
5 = Troops
9 = No information 
Arrs: Number of arrests;
-1 = no information
FOLLOWING LINE(S)
Sentences in days:-
-2 = prisoner acquitted
-1 = sentence unknown
Both above values treated as "missing values" in statistical tests.
0 = no custodial sentence (e.g. prisoner cautioned)
9998 = life imprisonment, life transportation
Note that since non-parametric tests are used this 
need not be numerically equivalent to the severity 
of the sentence, so long as it is higher than any lesser 
sentence.
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Details of Incidents, data coded as described in Appendix 1
N o . D a te
0010 25-Jan-16  R
0020 02-M ay-16R
0030 O W un-16
0040 04-Jul-17 
0050 22-Jun-19 
0060 22-Jun-19
0060 540 540
0070 23-Jun-19
0080 12-Jul-19
0090 30-Aug-19 
0100 29-NOV-19R 
0110 O l-M ar-20 
0120 12-Jul-20
0130 2O-N0 V-2O 
0150 29-M ar-22R 
0160 21-M ar-23R
0165 07-Jun-22 R
0170 12.JU1-23
0180 17-Dec-23
0190 28-M ay-24 
0200 13-Dec-24 
0205 15-Dec-24
0210 08-Nov-25
0220 I 6-N 0V-25
0230 l^D ec -2 5  R
0250 23-Jan-26 R
0260 25-Jan-26 R
0270 17-M ar-26 
0280 17-Jun-26 
0290 19-Aug-26 
0300 23-Sep-26 R
0310 23-Sep-26 R
0320 13-NOV-26 
0330 19-Apr-27 R 
0340 19-Apr-27 R 
0350 21-M ay-27 
0360 05-J u n -2 7
0370 Ol-Oct-27
0380 15-Dec-27
0390 07-Jul-29
0400 Ol-Apr-30
0405 Ol-Aug-30
0410 lO-Aug-30 
0420 25-NOV-30 
0425 24-Dec-30 R
0430 05-Apr-31 R 
0440 21-Apr-31 R
0450 02-M ay-31 
0460 26-Jun-31 
0470 02-Oct-31
0480 18-Oct-31 
0490 21-Oct-31 
0500 Ol-Nov-31 
0520 29-M ay-32 
0530 O l-Jun-32
0540 02-Jun-32 
0550 02-Jun-32 
0560 02-Jun-32 
0570 03-Jun-32 
0580 09-Jun-32 
0590 lO -Jun-32 
0600 lO -Jun-32
0610 19-Sep-32
0620 Ol-Dec-32 
0630 Ol-Sep-33 
0640 23-N 0 V-33
0650 27-Dec-33
0660 02-M ar-34
D e s c r ip t io n
S E N T E N C E  O N LY  RUO 
90 0 0 0 0 0
S E N T E N C E  O N LY  RUO 
540
R IO T O U S E L E C T IO N  
180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
IL L E G A L  P O L IT  M E E T IN G , NV 
R E S C U E  O F T H IE F , D O CK LA N D  
R E S C U E  O F 2 W O M E N , D O CK LA N D  
540 540 540. 540 -2 540 540 540 540 
540
P O L IC E  S E E K IN G  R IO T ER S A TTA C K ED  
7
A T T A C K  ON  O R A N G E P R O C E SSIO N  
90 90 90 90 90 90 180 90 90
-1 90 90
IL L E G A L  P O L IT  M E E T IN G , NV 
C O R B E T T 'S  M E E T IN G  
R IO T O U S E L E C T IO N  
A T T A C K  ON O R A N G E  P R O C E SSIO N  
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Q U E E N ’S A C Q U IT T A L  PR O C N ., NV 
S H IP W R IG H T S  A T T A C K  B L A C K LEG S 
R O P E R S  A T T A C K  BL A C K LEG S 
30 30 30 60 60 60 60
T H E A T R E  R IO T 
-1 -1
A T T A C K  ON O R A N G E M E N  
180 180 180 180 180 
A T T A C K  ON B L A C K L E G  S H IP S A W Y E R  
0 360 -2 360
A T T A C K  ON W A T C H M E N  
T H E A T R E  R IO T 
R E P E T IT IO N  O F 0200 
-2 0 0 90 -2
R O P E R S ' C H A R IV A R I 
120 120 120 120 -2 180 -2 120 120
-2 120 120 -2 120 -1 180 180 180
R O SA N N A H  G A N G  R E SC U E  
360 360 360 -1 -1
A T T A C K  ON W A T C H M E N  
90 180 90 -1 90 90
R U O , LO V E LA N E 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
R E S C U E  & A T TA C K  ON T ID E W A IT E R  
720 720 720
ST . P A T R IC K 'S  DAY B A TTLE 
R IO T O U S E L E C T IO N  
C H IL D  R E S C U E D  FR O M  D R U N K  
B O Y S' BA TTL E 
-1 -1
F A C T IO N  F IG H T  & R E SC U E
0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 
B U IL D E R S  T H R E A T E N  BL A C K LE G S 
S H IP W R IG H T S  A T T A C K  A P P R E N T IC E S  
S H IP W R IG H T S  B U RN  E F F IG Y  
S P . C O N S. D IS P E R S E  S H IP W R IG H T S  
T R O O P S  GU A R D  B L A C K L EG  SH IP W R T S  
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
A T T A C K  ON  W A T C H M E N  & RUO 
-1 -1 -1 -1
A T T A C K  ON W A T C H M E N  & RUO 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
N A V V IE S  A T T A C K  H O U S E H O L D E R  
-1 -1
A T T A C K  ON W A T C H M E N  
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-1
R IO T A T  S E IZ U R E  O F STIL L  
-2 360 270 360 360
N A V V IE S  A T T A C K  PA SSER S-B Y  
E L E C T IO N  P R E C A U T IO N S 
P R IZ E F IG H T  RIO T, TO X TET H  P A R K  
-1 -1 -1
P O L IT IC A L  W IN D O W -B R EA K IN G  
S E N T E N C E  O N LY , RUO 
90 90
E L E C T IO N  C A N D ID A TE IN S U L T E D  
L O U N G E R S  A T T A C K  H O U S E H O L D E R  
R IO T A T  S E IZ U R E  O F ST IL L  
-1 120 240 120 210
P O L IT . E F F IG Y  BU R N T 
R IO T O U S E L E C T IO N  
R E F O R M  M E E T IN G S , NV 
C H O L E R A , T .P K .,D O C T O R S STO N ED  
C H O L E R A , V A U X H A LL RD.
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 .
C H O L E R A  H O S P IT A L  SU R R O U N D E D  
C H O L E R A : W O M A N  A T TA C K ED  
C H O L E R A : P A L A N Q U IN  A T TA C K ED  
C H O L E R A : DO CTO R A T TA C K ED  
C H O L E R A , C H IS E N H A L E  ST.
C H O L E R A : P O L IC E  T H R E A T E N E D  
C H O L E R A , GT. H O W ARD ST.
-1
S H O E M A K E R S  A T T A C K  B L A C K LE G  
-1 -1
RIO T O U S  E L E C T IO N  
B L A C K L E G  B R IC K L A Y E R S A TT A C K E D  
RU O 1 1 4 9 2 0 2 2  
-1 -1 -1 -1
M U R D E R  C H A R G E  A R IS IN G  FR O M  RUO 
-1 -1
C H E S H IR E  F A C T IO N  FIG H T  
270 30 270 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2
-2 -1 -1 -2 30 270 270 90 90
-2 -2 -2 -2 30
T y p e  S iz e  S e v y  D u r h  L o c n  F r e e  P o l  
1 9 9 9 9 9 9
1 9 9 9 9 9 9 7
5 4 9 3 5 5 3 0
8 4 0 3 4 9 0 -1
6 9 9 1 3 0 1 12
6 5 3 3 3 0 5 1
6 3 3 2 3 0 1 12
3 3 4 3 4 0 5 0
8 6 0 3 4 7 9 0
8 5 1 3 4 3 9 -1
5 5 9 5 5 5 3 8
3 3 9 9 4 2 9 0
8 5 0 4 5 2 9 0
7 9 3 9 3 0 9 7
7 2 2 9 3 9 9 2
4 2 2 2 4 9 9 5
3 1 3 1 2 0 1 4
7 1 3 1 9 0 9 0
6 1 3 1 2 0 1 0
4 2 2 1 4 0 2 5
4 2 2 1 4 3 . 2 18
7 3 3 3 5 0 2 5
6 3 3 2 4 0 2 6
6 9 3 9 2 9 9 9
6 9 9 9 2 9 9 3
6 9 9 9 3 9 9 -1
2 4 4 9 5 9 9 -1
5 9 2 9 4 9 9 0
4 1 1 1 2 0 1 2
2 3 2 5 2 0 1 9
2 9 2 2 2 0 2 -1
7 2 1 4 5 9 9 0
7 2 2 2 3 7 9 0
7 2 1 2 3 7 9 0
7 4 0 2 3 . 7 3 7
7 3 1 5 3 7 5 4
6 9 9 9 9 9 9 8
6 2 3 2 2 0 2 2
1 1 3 1 9 9 2 10
6 9 3 9 9 0 1 5
6 2 9 9 9 9 9 0
2 1 3 1 2 9 0 -1
5 9 9 9 5 5 9 3
6 4 4 2 9 0 2 -1
8 9 2 9 4 9 9 2
1 9 9 9 9 9 9 -1
5 4 1 5 5 5 3 0
1 1 2 2 1 0 1 5
6 2 2 2 1 3 2 0
5 4 1 4 5 9 9 -1
5 5 2 5 5 5 3 0
8 5 0 3 4 7 9 0
4 1 2 1 2 0 3 1
4 1 1 1 2 3 2 0
4 2 2 1 2 0 2 0
4 2 2 1 4 0 9 4
4 2 2 1 2 0 2 -1
4 2 1 9 4 0 1 0
4 2 1 1 2 3 2 0
4 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
4 2 2 1 2 0 1 2
7 1 2 1 4 3 2 -1
5 5 1 5 4 3 3 0
7 1 2 1 4 3 2 4
1 9 5 9 9 9 9 23
2 3 4 5 2 0 2 1
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N o . D a te D e s c r ip t io n T y p e  S ize S e v y D u r n L o c n P r e c P o l A r r s
0670 Ol-Nov-34 S C H O O LB O Y  B A T T L E S, H O P E  ST. 2 2 2 2 4 0 1 -1
0680 02-Jan-35 R IO T O U S E L E C T IO N 5 4 3 5 5 5 3 2
0685 26-Jan-35 A T T A C K  ON  B L A C K L E G  S H O E M A K E R 7 1 2 1 4 9 9 0
360 360
0690 Ol-Feb-35 S C H O O L B O Y  B A T T L E S , D U K E  ST . 2 2 2 9 4 0 2 15
0700 Ol-Feb-35 IR IS H  RO W , ST O C K D A L E  ST. 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 -1
0710 17-M ar-35 
0720 17-M ay-35
0730 12-JU1-35
1055 19-Jun-36 
1060 27-Jun-36
1070 O l-Jul-36 R
1130 04-Apr-37 
1135 ll-M ay -3 7 R  
1140 0 4 Ju n -3 7  
1150 23-Jul-37
1160 09-Aug-37R 
1170 07-M ay-38
1180 20-M ay-38
-2
1190 28-Jun-38
1200 25-Sep-38 
1210 29-Sep-38 R
1220 02-Oct-38 R
1230 06-Oct-38 R
1240 17-M ar-39
1250 20-Apr-39 
1255 20-Apr-39 
1260 20-M ay-39 
1270 25-May-39R
1280 30-May-39R
1290 l l- J u n -3 9  R 
1300 Ol-Jul-39
1310 12-Dec-39 R
1320 18-M ay-40 
1330 29-M ay-40 
1340 15-Jul-40 R
1350 08-NOV-40
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
ST . P A T R IC K 'S  DAY F IG H T S 
P R E S T O N  ST . VS N O R TH  ST.
0 0 0 0 0
O R A N G E  D A Y, A N D  A T TA C K  ON W A TC H
120 60 60 60 60 60 180 60 60
60 60 60 60 90 60 120 90 180
60 60 60 60 120 60 120 60 60
60 60 60 60 60 60 120 60 120
60 90 60 60 60 120 60 60 60
30 60 60 60 60 120 90
90 60 90 60 90 90 90 30 180
-1 -1 -1 -1 30
G A N G  E X P E L  T E N A N T  FR O M  H O U S E  
0 0 0 0
R E S C U E . M A N , F IG H T IN G  
21 7 -2 18 -2 21 -2 -2 -2
21 21 21 -2 21
R E S C U E  A N D  B A T T L E  W IT H  P O L IC E  
35 35 35 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 35
-2 -2 0 35 -1 -1 35
60 60 60 60 60 60
IR ISH  H A R V E S T E R S  A T T A C K  G E N T L E M A N  1 
60 60
P O L IC E  S T O P  F IG H T  & A R E  A T T A C K E D  6 
-2 60 -2 60 60 -2 -2 -2 60
-2 -2 -2 -2 -2 60
IN S P E C T O R  K IL L E D  S T O P P IN G  P R IZ E F IG H T  6 
9998 9998 9998 -2 -2 9998 9998 -2 9998
11 0 0 0 -2 -1 -1 -1 -2
-2 -2 -1 11 -2 -1 0
A T T A C K  ON PC  S T O P P IN G  F IG H T  
C A R T E R S ' ST R IK E , M IN O R  D ISO R D E R  
30 2 2 30 30 30 30 30 30
2 30
B E A R B A IT IN G ; A U D IE N C E  A T T A C K  P O L IC E
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
'R E N T A M O B ' S E IZ U R E  O F  S H IP  
C A R P E N T E R S ' DA Y, M IN O R  D ISO R D E R  
B R IC K M A K E R S  A T T A C K  B L A C K LEG S 
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 90 90 90
IR ISH  B A TT LE , N O R T H  V S S O U T H  
-1 90 90 -1 -1 -1 90 -1 120
-1 -2 -2 -2 90 -1
0740 07-A ug-35 R A T T A C K  ON O R A N G E M A N  
30
R O P E R S A T T A C K  E M P L O Y E R S
3 1 2 1 9 0 1 0
0750 02-Oct-35 R 7 1 2 1 3 0 9 2
0760 09-Oct-35 R A T T A C K  ON T E M P E R A N C E  M E E T IN G  
60 60
4 1 2 1 9 0 1 -1
0770 13-NOV-35R A T T A C K  ON B L A C K L E G  IR O N F O U N D E R 7 1 2 1 2 9 9 0
1010 29-Jan-36 R N V  O 'C O N N E L L  M E E T IN G , PO L IC E D 8 4 0 2 4 3 3 2
1020 lO-M ar-36 PU B  F IG H T  E N D S  IN  G E N E R A L  BA TTL E 1 1 4 2 2 0 1 0
1030 17-M ar-36 N V  ST. P A T 'S  P R O C E S S IO N 3 5 0 4 5 2 9 1
1040 25-M ar-36R R E S C U E  A T T E M P T , D R U N K E N  W O M A N  
10
R E S C U E , 2 M E N , A S S A U L T
6 2 9 1 2 9 9 14
1050 17-Apr-36 6 2 3 2 2 0 2 4
1080 05-JuI-36 A T T A C K  ON P O L IC E  IN  PU B 
14 18
6 1 3 1 2 0 1 0
1090 15-Jul-36 R A T T A C K S ON C O R PO R A T IO N  SC H O L A R S 3 1 2 5 5 9 9 0
1100 22-Sep-36 R S T O N E S T H R O W N  A T  C O R P. SC H O L A R S 3 1 2 5 2 9 9 1
1110 08-Dec-36 A T T A C K  ON T E M P E R A N C E  M E E T IN G 4 1 2 1 2 0 1 6
1120 l l-M ar-3 7 U S M A T E S  E N F O R C E  T H E IR  A U T H O R IT Y 4 2 3 1 2 0 2 1
C O O P E R S ' S T R IK E , T H R E A T S 7 1 1 5 5 0 1 1
C O O P E R S ' ST R IK E , A S S A U L T 7 2 2 2 4 3 2 6
30
P O L IC E  S T O P  'R O W ' A N D  A R E  A T T A C K E D 6 2 3 2 2 0 2 26
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
R IO T O U S E L E C T IO N 5 4 5 5 5 7 4 2
21 0 5 0 21 0 8 16 30
0 0 -2 30 0 -1 0 30 10
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RU O & A T T A C K  ON PO L IC E 6 3 9 9 9 0 1 0
30 30 30 30 360 360 30
D IS R U P T IO N  O F C H A R T IS T  M E E T IN G 8 4 1 1 4 9 9 2
S A IL O R S A T T A C K  P O L IC E 6 2 9 9 9 9 1 3
16 16
R E S C U E , A T T A C K E R  O F P O L IC E  INFO RM AN TB 2 2 1 2 0 1 2
30 30 60
P O L IC E  A T T A C K E D  BY B O A TM E N 6 1 2 1 3 0 2 2
60 60
S T A B B IN G  D U R IN G  ST . P A T 'S 1 9 3 9 5 9 9 0
-2 60
IR ISH  RO W 1 1 9 9 2 9 1 0
IR ISH  RO W 1 1 9 9 2 9 1 0
F R E E M E N  D IS R U P T  RA D ICA L M E E T IN G 8 5 2 2 4 3 3 5
IR ISH  RO W  R E. H O U S E  T E N A N C Y 4 1 2 9 9 0 1 16
60 -2 60 -2 60
C A R P E N T E R S ' DAY A T TA C K  O N  IR ISH 3 4 4 5 2 2 4 0
4 2 2 3 3 0 2 0
3 3 1 4 5 3 3 8
7 9 2 9 3 9 9 15
2 3 4 5 2 0 1 4
1360 28-Jan-41 W O M E N  A T T A C K  B L A C K L E G 'S  W IF E  
-2 - 2 - 2  0
7 1 2 1 2 9 1 0
1370 Q5-Feb-41 R P O L IC E  P R O T E C T  P R IN T E R  V S S T R IK E R S 7 1 1 5 3 3 2 0
1380 19-Feb-41 R O 'C O N N E L L ; M JW 'S  D E F E N C E 8 3 0 0 4 0 1 1
1390 17-M ar-41 S T . P A T 'S  P R O C E S S IO N , NV 1 9 1 4 9 9 9 1
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1400 19-Apr-41 W IN D O W  B R O K E N  ON  'L IF T IN G  M O N D A Y ' 4 1 2 1 9 0 1 0
1410 27-Apr-41 T O R IE S  A T  R E F O R M  M E E T IN G  A T TA C K ED 8 3 1 1 4 9 9 0
1420 31-M ay-41 C A R P E N T E R S ' DA Y. M IN O R  D ISO R D E R 3 3 0 0 5 3 3 0
1430 09-Jun-41 A T T A C K  ON  C O R N -LA W  M E E T IN G 8 3 2 2 4 3 3 0
1440 l l- J u n -4 1 R E V E N G E  F O R  IN C ID E N T  1430 8 4 3 3 5 9 4 2
1450 25-Jun-41 R S H IP W R IG H T S  D IS C IP L IN E  Y O U TH 4 1 2 1 3 0 1 59
1460 30-Jun-41 R IO T O U S E L E C T IO N 5 5 5 5 5 7 4 0
180
180
60
21
-2
-2
30
60
60
30
0
21
180
30
0
60
120
021
60
30
60 30 90 -2
0 30 30 60
0 30 180 21
30 30 60 30
30 180 -2 60
60 30 -2 60
1470 12-JuI-41 SE C T A R IA N  T E M P E R A N C E  P R O C E S SIO N 3 9 0 0 5 3 3 19
1480 27-Jan-42 R P R O T E S T  W IT H IN  W O R K H O U S E  
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
21 21 21 21 ,2 1  21 21 21 21 
21
P R E C A U T IO N S  F O R  ST. P A T 'S
4 1 3 9 3 0 1 0
1490 17-M ar-42 3 3 0 9 5 3 2 0
1500 18-M ar-42 R E S C U E  O F  BO Y S F R O M  S H IP 'S  CA PTA IN 4 1 2 1 . 3 0 1 4
1510 20-Jun-42 R R U O , SC O T L A N D  RD. 
0 0 0 0
1 9 2 9 2 0 1 0
1520 24-Jun-42 R F A L S E  R E P O R T  O F SE C T A R IA N  R IO T 3 9 0 0 9 0 3
1530 24-Jun-42 R R E S C U E  O F 'V A G A B O N D S ' FR O M  P O L IC E  
10 10 7
6 1 , 9 1 9 0 1 19
1540 12-Jul-42 O R A N G E  D A Y D IS O R D E R  
60 14 60 60 30 60 5 30 60 
30 30 0 60 60 30 60 60 30 
30
R U O , O R A N G E  ST.
10
P L U G  P L O T  F E A R S
3 5 2 5 5 7 4 1
1550 28-JuI-42 1 1 2 ■ 9 2 0 1 0
1560 16-Aug-42 8 0 0 0 9 5 6
1570 03-NOV-42 S H IP W R IG H T S  A T T A C K  'F O R E IG N E R S ' 
7 -2 0 0 0 0
7 9 9 9 3 9 4
1580 08-NOV-42 S H IP W R IG H T S  A T T A C K  B L A C K L E G  
14 14 180 14
7 1 9 1 3 0 4
1590 24-Dec-42 
1590 60 60
IR IS H  RO W , LA C E  ST. 
60 60
1 9 2 9 2 0 1 4
1600 07-Jan-43  R A F F R A Y  B E T W E E N  P O L IC E  & S O L D IE R S  
30 0 30 30
6 1 2 1 4 0 1 0
1610 17-M ar-43 ST. P A T 'S  P R O C E S S IO N  O U T S ID E  BO RO U G H 3 0 0 0 5 2 0
1620 07-Apr-43 R O R A N G E  F U N E R A L , NV  3 9 0 2 9 0 2 1
1630 21-Apr-43 R A F F R A Y  B E T W E E N  P O L IC E  & S O L D IE R S 
0
S E N T E N C E S  O N LY , RUO 
180 90 90
6 2 9 1 4 0 1 3
1640 22-Apr-43 R 1 9 9 9 9 9 0
1650 28-Apr-43 R D O C K  S T R IK E , N V 7 0 0 0 3 3 -1
1660 12-May-43R C O R N L A W  M E E T IN G  D IS T U R B E D 8 2 1 1 4 0 1 0
1670 09-Jun-43 R C H A R T IS T /R E P E A L  M E E T IN G  D ISTU R B E D 8 2 2 2 9 0 1
1680 12-JuI-43 P O L IC E  S T O N E D  W H IL E  A R R E S T IN G  T H IE F 6 9 2 1 2 0 1 0
1690 04-Aug-43 P O L IC E  S T O N E D , D IS P E R S IN G  Y O U T H S 6 2 3 1 4 0 1 1
1700 12-Sep-43 A T T A C K  O N  R E P E A L  M E E T IN G  
42
R E S C U E  BY  IR O N F O U N D E R S  
30
O 'C O N N E L L  M E E T IN G , NV
3 3 4 2 4 3 1
1710 19-Jan-44  R 6 2 2 1 3 0 1 0
1720 28-M ar-44 8 9 0 0 4 3 0
1730 08-Apr-44 P E A C E F U L  o r a n g e  P R O C E S S IO N 3 2 0 2 5 9 2
1740 17-Apr-44 R R U O , M A R Y B O N E  
60 60
1 9 9 9 2 0 0
2010 24-Apr-44 R R E S C U E  O F  D R U N K E N  S O L D IE R S 6 9 3 1 4 0 1 0
2020 08-Apr-44 L IF T IN G  M O N D A Y , R E S IS T A N C E  TO P O L IC E 6 9 2 1 4 0 1 2
2030 08-Apr-44 R E S C U E ; NO  D E T A IL S  
60 60
6 9 3 1 2 0 1 -1
2040 08-Apr-44 O R A N G E  D E M O N S T R A T IO N .T O X T E T H 3 3 1 1 5 0 4
2050 22-Jun-44  R R E S C U E  O F  D R U N K  
90 0 90 90
6 9 2 1 2 0 1
2060 30-Jun-44 F IG H T  B E T W E E N  2 IR IS H  C O U N T IE S  
150
2 3 3 9 2 0 1 -1
2070 12-JuI-44 S K IR M IS H E S  A T  LA R G E O R A N G E  PR O C N 3 5 3 4 5 3 -1
2080 24-Aug-44R B A T T L E , M A C D O N A L D S A N D  K E L LY S 2 9 9 9 1 0 0
2090 14-Sep-44 R R E S C U E , P R IS O N E R  M U C H  IN JU R E D 6 9 3 1 9 0 -1
2110 17-M ar-45 D IS T U R B A N C E  D U R IN G  S T  P A T 'S  PR O C N 3 3 2 2 5 4 10
2120 28-M ar-45R L IF T IN G  M O N D A Y , R E S IS T . TO P O L IC E  
-1 30 60 30 60 30 30 30 30
6 4 2 1 2 0 -1
2130 16-M ay-45R R E S C U E  O F D R U N K 6 1 2 1 2 0 1 4
2140 SO-M ay-45 V IO L E N T  P IC K E T IN G , D O C K -B U ILD E R S 
30 30 30 30
7 2 1 1 3 0 4
2150 27-M ay-45 R E S C U E
0 - 2 - 2  0
6 3 3 1 2 0 1 12
2160 06-JuI-45 O R A N G E  F U N E R A L  
120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
120 120 120
3 4 3 3 5 0 3 0
2165 07-JuI-45 A F T E R M A T H  O F  2160 3 3 1 2 2 3 3 14
2170 1 4 Ju I-4 5 M IN O R  S K IR M IS H E S  ON O R A N G E  DAY 
30 60 60 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 
-2 -2 120 210 -2
3 5 3 3 5 3 3 -1
2180 25-Jul-45 R A T T A C K  ON  P C  W H O  S T R U C K  A  W O M A N 6 4 2 1 2 0 1 1
2190 29-NOV-45 P O L IC E  IN T E R V E N E  IN RU O 
120
1 9 3 1 2 0 1 0
2200 31-Jan-46 R N O IS Y  N V  M T G  O F  W O R K IN G  C L A SSE S 8 4 0 2 4 9 0
2210 17-M ar-46 D R U N K E N  B U T  N V  S T  P A T 'S  PR O C N 3 4 0 3 5 4 -1
2215 28-M ar-46 B A T T L E  A M O N G S T  U R C H IN S , W IN D S O R 2 2 2 1 2 0 1 5
2220 08-May-46R P O L IC E  IN T E R V E N E  IN  RU O 
-1 -1 -1 - 1 - 1
1 9 3 9 2 0 1 -1
2225 13-JUI-46 S C U F F L E S  D U R IN G  O R A N G E  PR O C N 3 3 . 1 3 5 4 -1
2230 07-Aug-48 RO W , P O L IC E  V S  C O A L H E A V E R S 1 1 3 1 2 0 1 -1
2235 11-A ug-46 R D IS T U R B A N C E  A T  S A IL O R S ' H O M E 1 9 9 9 3 0 8
2240 14-A ug-46 R R E S C U E
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 9 9 9 9 0 1 3
2245 19-Aug-46 S H IP W R IG H T S  A S S A U L T  N O N -L 'P O O L  M E N  
240 -2 120
7 1 3 1 3 0 1 1
2250 22-Sep-46 R P O L IC E  V S C L U B M E M B E R S  O U T S ID E  PU B 6 1 1 1 2 0 1 1
2255 17-Oct-46 R R E S C U E
30
S M A L L  A N D  N V  S T  P A T 'S  P R O C N
6 9 9 1 2 0 1 0
2260 17-M ar-47 3 3 0 3 5 9 9 2
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2265 22-M ay-47 R E S C U E  O F  M A N  A R R E S T E D  ON W A R R A N T  6 
60 60
. 9 9 1 2 0 1 3
2270 30-M ar-47 A T T A C K  BY  R O P E R S  ON W O M E N  W O R K E R S 7 
240 180 180
1 . 9 1 3 0 1 6
2275 30-M ay-47 , P O L IC E  A T T A C K E D  P A R T IN G  2 F IG H T E R S  
-1 120 120 120 150 14 -1
6 1 2 1 2 0 1 4
2280 2 5 Ju n -4 7  R P O L IC E  A T T A C K E D  B R E A K IN G  U P  ROW  
60 42 42 30
6 9 . 9 9 9 0 1 0
2285 31-Jul-47 R E L E C T IO N , NV 8 9 0 9 5 3 8
2290 31-Jul-47 R E S C U E  
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 60
6 9 2 1 2 0 2
2295 23-Aug-47R A T TA C K (S) ON N O N -S T R IK IN G  R O P E R  
0 60
7 9 9 1 2 0 1 -1
2300 27-Oct-47 R B A T T L E , S T O N E S  B E T . 2 S C H O O L S 2 2 3 1 9 0 1 2
2305 23-Oct-47 R A S S A U L T S  ON S T R IK E -B R E A K IN G  R O PE R S  
6 0 - 1
7 1 2 1 3 0 1 0
2310 07-Jan-48 R RU M O U R S O F ROW  A M O N G S T  N A V V IE S ? 1 9 0 9 5 6 0 0
2315 07-M ar-48F D O C K E R S ' M E E T IN G S  V S N E W  S Y ST E M 7 3 0 5 4 7 3 0
2320 12-M ar-48 D O C K E R S ' M E E T IN G S  N O W  'P O L IT IC A L ' 8 3 0 3 4 7 3 0
2325 13-M ar-48 PO L IC E  U S E  S T A V E S  V S D O C K E R S &C . 8 5 1 3 4 7 4 0
2330 17-M ar-48 ST . P A T 'S ; F E A R S  O F  A R SO N 8 9 0 9 9 3 0
2335 31-M ar-48 C H A R T IS T  M E E T IN G , NV 8 9 9 4 4 7 3 0
2340 lO-Apr-48 M A JO R  C H A R T IS T  M T G , Q U E E N  SQ ., NV 8 5 1 3 4 7 3 2
2345 29-Apr-48 PC  A S S A U L T E D  A T R E Y N O L D S ' S H O P  
60 60
8 2 1 1 2 0 1 2
2350 29-Apr-48 S E R IO U S  A F F R A Y  V S PO L IC E  
0 240
6 9 3 1 2 0 1 2
2355 20-M ay-48 ' R E S C U E  O F A R R E S T E D  NA V V Y 6 1 2 1 2 0 1 4
2360 20-M ay-48 R E S C U E , W A R W IC K  ST . 
0 0 0 0
6 1 2 2 2 0 1 1
2365 lW u n -4 8  R A T T A C K  ON  O R A N G E  P U B 3 1 2 1 4 0 1 0
2370 1 4 Ju n -4 8  R Y O U T H S D IS T U R B IN G  R E P E A L  M TG 3 1 1 1 9 0 1 5
2375 16-Jul-48 R U O , M A N  STA B B ED  
540 540 540 180 180
1 9 3 1 2 0 1 10
2380 20-Jun-48 D IM IN IS H IN G  F E A R S  IR ISH  R E B E L S  
360 360 -2 720 90 90 180 720 720 
720
8 4 0 5 5 7 . 5
2385 06-Sep-48 A T T E M P T E D  R E S C U E  
360 120 360 -2 210
6 2 2 1 1 0 1 -1
2390 26-Oct-48 R RUO 1 9 2 9 2 0 1 -1
2395 23-D0C-48 R S O L D IE R S  A T T A C K  P U B L IC  T H E N  P O L IC E 6 1 2 1 4 0 1 3
2400 16-M ar-49R EN G L IS H  VS P O R T U G U E S E  SA IL O R S 
-1 -1 -1 
N O ISY  B U T N V  S T  P A T 'S  PR O C N
2 9 9 9 9 0 1 0
2405 17-M ar-49 3 3 0 2 5 0 4
2410 29-Apr-49 A T T A C K  ON  P O L IC E  BY  'D U F F E R S ' 
-2 -2 -2 -2
6 1 2 1 2 0 1 2
2415 13-M ay-49 R E S C U E ; P O L IC E  STO N E D  FR O M  R O O FS 
180 180
6 9 3 . 9 9 0 1 8
2420 25-May-49R FIG H T , M A Y O  A N D  SL IG O  F A C T IO N S 
60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
2 9 3 5 2 0 4
2425 lO -Jun-49 P O L IC E  D IS P E R S IN G  CROW D 
30 30 30 30
6 3 3 1 3 0 1 2
2430 ll- J u l-4 9  R R E S C U E 6 9 9 9 9 0 1 2
2435 09-Aug-49 R E S C U E  D U R IN G  'F A N C Y  F A IR ' 
60 21
6 1 2 1 4 0 1 3
2440 19-Oct-49 A T T A C K  ON  P O L IC E  S U P P R E S S IN G  F IG H T  
180 180 -2
6 9 2 1 4 0 1 5
2445 15-NOV-49 W O M E N  A T TA C K  W O R K H O U S E  O V E R S E E R  
21 21 21 21 21
4 2 1 1 3 0 1 1
2450 20-NOV-49R F IG H T  B E T W E E N  TW O F E M A L E  FA C T IO N S 2 9 9 9 2 0 1 2
2455 23-Jan-50 R A T TA C K  ON  R A C IS T  U S S H IP S ' O F F IC E R S  
-1 42
4 1 2 1 4 0 1 15
2460 30-Jan-50 R O F F IC E R S  A T T E M P T  R E V E N G E  FO R  2455 
60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
60 60 60 60 60 60
4 1 2 1 4 0 1 11
2465 06-Feb-50 R A T T E M P T E D  R E S C U E , C L A Y TO N  S Q U A R E  
-1 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
6 9 9 1 4 0 1 -1
2470 17-M ar-50 S M A L L  A N D  N V  S T  P A T 'S  PR O C N . 3 9 0 3 5 4 4
2475 30-M ar-50 R E S C U E  O F P IC K P O C K E T  IN  PU B 
180 0 42 240
6 2 3 1 4 0 1 13
2480 06-Apr-50 R G IRLS D E M A N D  E N T R Y  TO W O R K H O U S E  
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
21 21 21 21
4 1 1 1 3 0 1 0
2485 18-Apr-50 B A IL IF F S  A T  H O U S E  O F  B A N K R U P T 4 1 2 1 3 0 0 10
2490 21-May-50R B A T T L E  B E T W E E N  N A V V IE S 
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
30
O R A N G E D A Y  S IE G E  O F W R IG H T 'S  PU B
2 9 2 1 2 0 2 0
2495 12-Jul-50 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 1
2500 13-Jul-50 4 S H O T  A S CROW D A T T A C K S O R A N G E  PU B 3 3 5 2 2 3 2 -1
2505 17-Jul-50 R R E S C U E  A T T E M P T  BY SA ILO R S 6 1 2 1 2 0 1 4
2510 07-Sep-50 R R E T U R N IN G  O R A N G E M E N  A T T A C K  PO L IC E  
-2 -2 -2 14
6 1 2 1 4 0 1 3
2515 15-Sep-50 O R A N G E  F U N E R A L ; P O L IC E  R E S IS T E D  
-2 0 0
3 9 9 9 9 0 2
2520 26-Oct-50 R S A L T H E A V E R S  A T T A C K  C H E A P  W O R K E R  
30 30
7 1 9 9 3 0 1 7
2525 28-Dec-50 A T T E M P T E D  R E S C U E  
120 150 180 120 -2 120 -1
6 1 2 1 9 . 0 1 0
2530 lO -Jan-51 R R E P O R T  O F M O B A T T A C K  ON B L A C K  M A N 1 9 9 9 9 0 -1
2535 21-Jan-51 R BR A W L A T  T E E T O T A L  M E E T IN G 1 9 2 9 9 0 4
2540 25-Jan-51 R R E S C U E  A T T E M P T  
0 0 0 0
6 1 2 1 2 0 1 1
2545 22-Jan-51 R S A IL O R S A T T A C K  O N E  W IT H  A  'T IC K E T ' 
60
S O L D IE R S  IN S U L T  P U B L IC  T H E N  P O L IC E  
60 0 60 30
7 2 2 1 3 0 1 4
2550 05-Feb-51 R 6 1 2 1 2 0 1 10
2555 15-F eb-51 A F F R A Y  B E T W E E N  P O L IC E  A N D  N A V V IE S  
240 360 210 150 -2 -1 -2 270 -2 
360
6 3 3 1 2 0 1 9
2560 17-Mar-51 A F F R A Y S  D U R IN G  D R U N K E N  S T  P A T 'S  
240 270 240 240 42 28 270 360 180
6 2 2 3 5 3 3 2
2565 03-May-51R A T T A C K  ON  C O F E  P R E A C H E R 3 9 2 1 2 3 2 1
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2570 O l-Jun-51 RIO T , O V E R F L O W  CR O W D  A T  C H U R C H  
21
R E S C U E
3 2 2 1 4 0 2
2575 28-Jun-51 R 6 9 9 9 9 0 1 1
2580 28-JUU-51 R P O L IC E  S TO P A  P R IZ E F IG H T  
21
A T TA C K  O N  C O F E P R E A C H E R  
1 3  1 1
6 9 9 1 3 0 1 4
2585 28-Jun-51 R 3 2 2 1 2 0 1 27
2590 28-Jun-51 F A F FR A Y S  B E T W E E N  P O L IC E  A N D  S O L D IE R S  6 
-2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 
-2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -22 
-2 -2 0 60 60 0 60 -2 -2
2 2 5 4 0 1 0
2595 12-Jul-51 R CROW D VS M A N  LE A V IN G  W IF E ; NV 4 2 1 1 2 0 1 5
2600 14-Jul-51 T R O U B L E ON  O R A N G E  DA Y, IN C  SH O O T IN G  
60 42 7 90 7 21 90 60 30 
60 30 0 90 30 30 0 0 60 
0 0 0 90 -2 30 0 90 -2 
0 -2 0 -1 -1 0 0 60 30 
-1 -1 0 -1 30 0 0 -1 30 
-1 3 60 90 30 90 30
3 5 5 3 5 3 3 0
2605 21-Aug-51R RO W  A F T E R  TA L E  O F A T T A C K  ON  P R IE S T 4 1 2 1 2 0 1 1
2610 06-Sep-51 R 'IR IS H  RO W '
30
P O L IC E  C L E A R  R O U T E  TO  C H U R C H
1 1 9 9 2 0 1 -1
2615 14-Sep-51 6 3 2 1 4 0 1 3
2620 12-Oct-51 FA C T IO N  F IG H T  
30 30 30
2 3 3 2 2 0 1 2
2625 17-Dec-51 30 'D IS O R D E R L Y ' A F T E R  P U B L IC  M E E T IN G 1 1 1 1 4 0 1
2630 07-Feb-52 R U S SA ILO R S; A R R E S T  F O R  U S E  O F K N IF E  
60
A T T E M P T E D  R E SC U E  
120 60
1 9 3 1 4 0 1 2
2635 09-Feb-52 6 9 9 1 2 0 1 1
2640 13-Feb-52 R D IS P U T E  O V E R  O W N E R S H IP  O F LA N D 4 1 3 1 2 0 1 0
2645 28-Feb-52 R P O L IC E  A T TA C K  CA TH  C O N G R E G A T IO N 3 3 3 2 4 0 2 7
3005 25-Apr-52 R E V E N G E  A T T A C K  ON P C , T H E N  R E S C U E  
60 60 60 60 60 60 60
6 2 2 2 2 0 2 4
3010 06-M ay-52 O P E N A IR  P R E A C H IN G  L E A D S TO  R IO T 
21 14 14 28 '
3 3 2 2 2 0 2 1
3015 26-May-52R FA C T IO N  FIG H T , A D ISO N  S T R E E T  
14
IR ISH  VS B O IL E R M A K E R S
2 1 2 1 2 0 1 0
3020 08-Jun-52 2 2 3 1 2 0 1 2
3025 13-Jun-52 A T TA C K  ON O R A N G E F U N E R A L 3 3 2 2 2 0 2 1
3030 13-Jun-52 S H IP W R IG H T S  S T O N E  'F O R E IG N ' W O R K E R S 7 2 2 1 3 0 3 7
3035 07-Jul-52 E L E C T IO N  D ISO R D E R S, O R A N G E  T IN G E D  
0 0 0 30 0 0 -2 0
5 4 5 5 5 6 4 0
3039 07-Jul-52 TO R Y  V O T E R 'S  PU B L IC  H O U S E  IS D A M A G ED 5 - 1 3 1 2 0 1 0
3040 13-JuI-52 R TO RY  V O T E R 'S  PU B  A G A IN  D A M A G ED 5 1 2 1 2 0 1 15
3045 12-Aug-52 O R A N G E p r o c e s s i o n  IS S U P P R E S S E D  
0 0 0 0  0 -2 0 0  0 
0 0 0 0 0 0
3 4 2 2 5 6 4 0
3050 31-Aug-52R NV : O R A N G E PR O C .B A N N E D , A LSO  IN lO M 3 3 0 9 5 4 2 4
3055 05-Sep-52 FA C TIO N  F IG H T  
60 60 60 60
2 3 3 2 2 0 2 3
3060 17-NOV-52R IN T IM ID A T IO N  D U R IN G  D O C K  S T R IK E  
90 180 90 90
7 3 4 2 3 0 1 7
3065 23-NOV-52 R E SC U E , K IT C H E N  S T R E E T  
60 60 60 60 60 60 60
6 1 2 1 2 0 1 1
3070 26-Dec-52 2 M O B S FIG H T , T H E N  U N IT E  VS P O L IC E 2 3 2 2 2 0 2 2
3075 22-Jan-53 A N C H O R S M IT H S  A T T T A C K  W A G ES C L E R K  
0 - 2
A T T E M P T E D  R E S C U E , A S S A IL A N T  O F  PC
7 1 2 1 3 0 1 0
3077 17-Apr-53 6 1 2 1 9 0 1 0
3080 04-May-53R NV: P IC K E T IN G  BY C A B IN E T M A K E R S 7 1 0 9 9 1 0 3
3085 08-M ay-53 M O L L Y  M A G U IR E S  V S O T H E R  FA C T IO N S 
30 30 30
2 3 2 2 2 0 2 5
3090 21-M ay-53 R E S C U E , ISLA Y  S T R E E T  
7 7 -2 7 30
6 3 3 1 2 0 1 0
3095 O l-Jun-53 D O CK  ST R IK E 7 9 1 5 - 3 3 0 0
3100 12-Jul-53 T E E T O T A L  P R O C E S SIO N  S U P P R E S S E D 3 3 2 3 5 4 3 0
3105 07-Jul-53 NV: N O ISY  E L E C T IO N 5 5 0 5 5 3 0 1
3110 ll- J u l-5 3 P O S T -E L E C T IO N  ROW 5 3 2 1 2 0 1 7
3115 12-Jul-53 R IR ISH  V S O R A N G E M E N , A L B E R T  S T R E E T  
60 -2 -2 60 21 -2 0
3 3 3 2 2 0 2 1
3117 16-Jul-53 R E L E C T IO N ; R IO T  A V E R T E D  BY S H 0 P K E E P E R 5 3 1 1 4 3 3 5
3120 14-Jul-53 H O U S E S  D A M A G ED  BY S T O N E S  
90 90 90 90 90
3 9 3 9 4 0 1 1
3125 22-Jul-53 R E S C U E , S M IT H F IE L D  S T R E E T 6 1 1 1 2 0 1 0
3127 06-Aug-53R C R IC K E T E R  D IES C H A SIN G  RO U G H S 2 1 5 1 4 0 1 8
3130 14-Aug-53 F IG H T  B E T 2 G IRLS LE A D S TO M E L E E  
7 14 14 7 7 7 14 7
2 3 3 2 2 0 1 0
3135 05-Jan-54 SN O W B A LL  F IG H T  ON EX C H A N G E 2 3 2 3 4 0 2 2
3136 15-Jan-54 R E S C U E  O F F E M A L E  W IN D O W B R E A K E R  
14 14
6 1 2 1 1 0 1 0
3138 25-Feb-54 R NV  B U T  RO W DY M E E T IN G  R E  C A T H . EMANCS 3 0 2 4 0 1 10
3139 28-Feb-54 TW O G A N G S F IG H T  IN W R IG H T  S T R E E T  
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7  7
2 2 2 1 2 0 1 1
3140 25-M ar-54R IR ISH  ROW ; C O B B LER  ST A B B ED 2 9 2 1 2 0 1 0
3145 16-May-54R IN T IM ID A T IO N  D U R IN G  D O C K  S T R IK E 7 9 1 5 3 3 3 0
3150 14-M ay-54 CO LLISIO N  B E T W E E N  TW O IR ISH  FU N ER A L S2 3 3 9 4 0 1 4
3155 28-M ay-54 P R IZ E F IG H T  A U D IE N C E  A T T A C K S  P O L IC E  
60 30 30 60
6 2 2 2 2 0 1 1
3157 06-Jun-54 A T T A C K  ON W O M A N  W IT H  O R A N G E  RIBBON3 3 1 1 2 0 1 1
3165 14-Jun-54  R M OB A T T A C K S O R A N G E M A N 3 1 2 1 9 0 1 1
3170 20-Jun-54  R RIO T O U S A F F R A Y , CO N W A Y  S T R E E T  
30
R E S C U E , G T  HO W A R D  S T R E E T  
60
NV : O R A N G E  DAY
1 3 9 9 2 0 9 1
3175 Ol-Jul-54 6 1 3 1 2 0 1 0
3180 12-Jul-54 3 4 0 3 5 4 3 1
3185 31-Jul-54 S H IP W R IG H T S  A T T A C K  FO R E IG N E R S 7 9 9 9 3 0 9 1
3190 17-A ug-54  R
180
R E S C U E , B E D FO R D  S T R E E T  
60
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3195 05-Sep-54 R CR O W D  W A T C H IN G  F IG H T  A T T A C K S  P O L IC E S  
-2 0 0 0
3 9 9 2 0 2 0
3200 03-Dec-54 R RU O , C H A D W IC K  S T R E E T 1 9 3 9 2 0 . 1 0
3205 19-Jan-55 R D O C K E R S P R O T E S T  V S S T E A M -C R A N E 7 1 1 9 3 3 2 1
3210 31-Jan-55 S E C O N D  E X C H A N G E  S N O W B A L L  F IG H T 2 5 2 3 4 0 3 109
3215 19-Feb-55 R S E R IO U S  BR EA D  R IO T S 4 4 3 5 5 0 3 2
3216 03-M ar-55
3217 05-M ar-55
3220 09-M ar-55R
3221 lO-M ar-55
3223 23-Apr-55
3224 02-Jun-55 R
3225 05-Jun-55
3230 12-Jun-55 R
3235 l l- J u l-5 5  R 
3240 12-Jul-55
3245 l l-A u g -5 5 R
3250 14-A ug-55 R
180 -1 -1 -1 90 -1 -1 -1 90
120 -1 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 60 -1
90 -2 -1 -1 -1 0 90 90 -1
-1 240 300 450 90 -2 -2 7 7
-1 7 7 7 7 7 7 -1
-1 -1 -1 60 90 120 120 90
-1 -2 90 90 14 -1 -2 60
-1 -1 -1 30 90 90 -1 -1
-1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 90 90
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1 540 90 90 -1
-2 90 90 -1 -1 -1 90 -1
-2 180 90 -1 -1 180 -1 -1
60
RUO
120
7 -1 -1 -1 -1 
T H O M A S  S T R E E T  
120
30 -1
T H E A T R E : RO W  O V E R  H E C K L E R  0 0
IN T IM ID A T IO N  D U R IN G  D O C K  S T R IK E  
90
S N O W B A LL S &. A T T A C K  ON P R O T E S T O R  
0
R E S C U E , V A U X H A LL  ROAD 
14 14 90 14 90
BO YS S T O N E T H R O W IN G  N R C O L L E G E  
0
R E S C U E  O F BO Y A R R . F O R  V A N D A L IS M  
90
F IG H T  A T  L O D G IN G S O F  B L A C K  S E A M E N  
0 0
NV: O 'N E IL E  B A N N E D  F R O M  P R E A C H IN G
N V  O R A N G E  P R O C E S S IO N  
- 1 - 1
F IG H T  FO R  PR . M E N S C H IK O F F ’S C A R R IA G E  
-2 -2 -2 -2 60
IR ISH  ROW  A N D  A T T A C K  O N  PU B  
60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
60
1 9 3 9 2 0 2
4 1 1 1 4 0 1
7 1 1 9 3 0 1
4 1 1 1 2 0 5
6 9 3 1 2 0 1
2 9 9 9 9 0 1
6 1 2 9 2 0 2
1 1 9 9 9 0 0
3 9 0 9 4 4 2
3 4 0 3 9 4 4
4 2 1 1 3 0 10
2 9 9 9 2 0 3
3251 06-Oct-55 R E S C U E , M ID G H A L L  S T R E E T  6 
90 90 90
9 2 1 2 0 0
3255 lO-Oct-55 R NV: P R E C A U T IO N S , V IC T O R Y  IL L U M IN A T IO  4 9 0 3 5 3 1
3260 ll-N o v -5 5 RO U G H  M U SIC  V S A D U L T R E S S  4 
90
P O L IC E  A T T A C K E D  O U T S ID E  P U B  6
3 1 2 2 0 1
3265 09-Dec-55 3 3 1 2 0 2
3270 29-Dec-55 R M A N  R E F U S E S  TO  JO IN  H IB E R N IA N  A S S O C . 4 
60 60
1 2 1 2 0 2
3271 26-Jan-56 R CROW D M A K E S  A R M E D  M A N  GO H O M E  4 
30 30
9 2 1 1 0 1
3272 31-Jan-56 CROW D T R IE S  TO  P R E V E N T  D IS T R A IN T  4 1 2 1 4 0 1
3273 01-M ar-56R BOYS O F  3/4 SC H O O LS T H R O W IN G  S T O N E S  2 2 2 1 4 0 1
3274 15-M ar-56R M O B R E S IS T  C L E A R A N C E  O F B E E R H O U S E S  6 
14
P O L IC E  A T T A C K E D  W H IL E  Q U E L L IN G  RU O 6 
60 -2 60 7 60
9 9 9 2 0 5
3275 19-Apr-56 R 9 9 9 2 0 1
3280 19-Apr-56 R F IG H T  A U D IE N C E  A T T A C K S  P O L IC E  6 
90
A T T A C K  ON  F O R E IG N  S E A M A N , V A U X  RD 4 
-2 -2 -2 -2
2 2 1 2 0 4
3282 24-May-56R 9 9 9 2 0 4
3283 31-May-56R R E S C U E : PC  S E R IO U S L Y  W O U N D E D  6 
60 60 60 60
9 3 1 2 0 0
3285 30-May-56R N V : P E A C E  C E L E B R A T IO N S  4 5 0 3 5 3 0
3287 14-Jun-56 R P O L IC E  S T O N E D , R E S C U E , A T H O L  S T R E E T  6 4 2 1 2 0 0
3290 14-JUI-56 NV  O R A N G E P R O C E S S IO N  3 4 1 3 5 4 0
3295 04-A ug-56 R RA IL W A Y  S T R IK E  7 9 2 9 9 3 -1
3300 05-tJan-57 R RU O , N E W  BIRD S T R E E T  1 2 3 9 2 0 7
3305 22-Feb-57 P C  D R A G G ED  IN TO  C O U R T  A N D  A S S A U L T E D 6 
90 90 30 90 30 30 90
5 2 1 1 0 -1
3310 28-M ar-57R NV: N O ISY  E L E C T IO N  5 5 0 5 5 3 4
3315 13-Apr-57 P O L IC E  D IS P E R S IN G  Y O U T H S  A R E  S T O N E D  6 
90 90 90 30
2 2 1 2 0 2
3320 15-Apr-57 R NV : P R E V E N T IV E  A R R E S T  O F 2 P R E A C H E R S  3 9 0 1 4 2 5
3323 18-Apr-57 C A T H O L IC  V S O R A N G E , C H A D W IC K  S T R E E T  3 
60 60 60 60 60
9 2 4 2 0 2
3325 25-Apr-57 F A C T IO N  FIG H T , N O R T H  S T R E E T  2 2 4 2 1 0 2
3330 31-M ay-57 RU O , B R IC K  S T R E E T  1 9 2 9 2 0 -1
3335 03-Jul-57 R F A C T IO N  F IG H T , N O R T H  S T R E E T  2 9 9 9 2 0 1
3337 18-JuI-57 R F IG H T  A M O N G  S E A M E N  1 
0
R E S C U E , S T  JA M E S  S T R E E T  6 
90 60
1 1 1 9 0 2
3338 27-May-57R 2 2 1 2 0 11
3339 04-DCC-57 R P O L IC E  F E A R S  O F B E G G IN G  G A N G S 4 1 0 1 9 0 0
30 30 30 30 30 30
3340 13-Feb-58 R O R A N G E  P R O C E S S IO N  O U T S ID E  B O R O U G H  6 3 2 2 2 0 1 1
3345 14-Apr-58 R F E M A L E  R E V E N G E  A T T A C K  ON IN F O R M E R  4 2 2 4 2 0 1 2
3350 01-M ay-58 RU O , A D IS O N  S T R E E T  1 
90 60
9 2 1 2 0 1 1
3355 05-May-58R R E S C U E  BY  W O M E N  6 1 2 1 2 0 1 1
3357 09-M ay-58 S IE G E  O F RC H O M E  F O R  F A L L E N  W O M E N  3 3 2 3 2 0 3 1
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3360 22-M ay-58R F IG H T  B E T  G A N G S O F  C O T T O N P IC K E R S 4 3 2 2 3 0 1 3
3365 05-Jun-58  R N A V V IE S  B A R R ED  FR O M  ST A T IO N  P R O T E S T  4 120 120 120 1 3 1 3 0 1 3
3370 lO-Jul-58 ST A B B IN G S  D U R IN G  FA C T IO N  FIG H T  
-1 360 -2
2 2 4 2 1 0 1 2
3375 12-Jul-58 A T T A C K  ON  O R A N G E  T E A -P A R T Y  
60 60
3 3 3 1 2 1 2 1
3380 15-Jul-58 CR O W D  P R E V E N T S  D R U N K  P A W N IN G  BED 4 1 5 1 ■ 2 0 1 4
3385 25-A ug-58 R- R E N T A C R O W D  IN RE A L  E S T A T E  D IS P U T E  -1 - 1 - 1 - 1 4 1 4 1 2 0 1 2
3390 ll-S ep -5 8  R P R IE S T  H IT  BY F IS H , M O B A ID  A R R E S T  
60 60
4 1 1 1 2 0 1 4
3395 12-Sep-58 M IL IT IA  V S P O L IC E  
90 30 30 0
6 9 9 1 2 0 2 6
3400 29-Sep-58 R P O L IC E  V S S O L D IE R S 
90 90 90 90 90 90
6 3 2 1 3 0 2 3
3405 23-NOV-58R P O L IC E  S T O N E D  BY CROW D 
360 120 360
6 2 2 1 2 0 1 2
3410 29-Jan-59 R A T T A C K  ON  CA RD . W IS E M A N 'S  CA R R IA G E 
60 60
3 3 2 1 4 3 2 1
3415 09-Apr-59 R B R U S H M A K E R S  V S S P A N IS H  SA ILO R S 2 2 5 1 9 0 1 2
3420 24-Apr-59 R U O , W E S T M O R E L A N D  S T R E E T  0 0
B E E R  A N D  F IG H T IN G  F IE S T A  
0 0 90 90 90
1 2 2 , 2 2 0 1 5
3425 16-May-59R 2 3 9 9 3 0 2 3
3426 18-Jun-59 R S E C T A R IA N  D IS C U S S IO N  IS D IS P E R S E D  -2 60 60 6 3 1 1 4 0 1 1
3427 26-Jan-59 A T T A C K  O N  O P E N A IR  PR E A C H IN G  
60
NV ? O R A N G E  P R O C E S S IO N  -1
R U O , M IL T O N  S T R E E T  0 0 0
4 1 2 2 2 0 1 1
3428 12-JU1-59 3 5 2 3 5 4 3 3
3429 14-JU1-59 1 1 3 1 2 0 1 1
3430 02-Aug-59R IN T IM ID A T IO N  IN  C O A L H E A V E R S  S T R IK E 7 9 1 9 9 3 2 -1
3435 05-Aug-59R SO L D IE R S  V S P O L IC E 6 9 9 9 9 0 9 1
3445 16-Aug-59R C L E A R A N C E  O F P R E A C H IN G  G R O U N D 3 4 2 3 5 4 3 -1
3450 13-Sep-59 R F A M IL Y  Q U A R R E L  S P R E A D S 6 2 1 1 4 0 -1
3455 16-Sep-59 R M O B ; K N O C K IN G  G E N T S ' H A TS O F F 2 1 1 1 9 0 1 -1
3457 30-Jan-60 R E S C U E , C H R IS T IA N  S T R E E T  0
SN O W B A L L S  ON EX C H A N G E  FLA G S A G A IN  0 0 0 0 0
4 3 1 2 9 0 1 1
3458 12-Feb-60 6 3 1 1 2 0 5
3459 Ol-M ay-60 IR IS H  RO W , P O R T E R  S T R E E T 2 3 3 2 4 0 1 4
3460 03-M ay-60 A T T A C K  O N  P O L IC E  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 9 9 9 2 0 1 1
3465 05-M ay-60R M IN O R  T R O U B L E  A T  P R E A C H IN G  G R O U N D  0
R U O , G R O S V E N O R  S T R E E T  
60 60 60
3 3 1 1 4 0 1 3
3466 01-M ay-60 1 1 2 1 2 0 1 3
3470 12-Jun-60 R R U O , S A W N E Y  P O P E  S T R E E T  0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 1
3475 05-JU1-60 W O M E N  R E S C U E  T H E IR  'B U L L Y ' 6 1 2 1 2 O' 1 0
3480 lO -Jul-60 R NV  R A D IC A L M E E T IN G 8 4 0 2 4 3 2 10
3485 12-JuI-60 O R A N G E  P R O C E S S IO N  O U T S ID E  BO RO U G H  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 3 2 2 5 4 2 4
3490 16-JuI-60 R S H IP S A W Y E R S  A T T A C K  C H E A P  W O R K ER S 
60 -2 -2 60 90
7 1 2 9 3 0 9 1
3495 08-Sep-60 R S T A B B IN G  IN F E M A L E  RUO 
90
P O P E 'S  S U P P O R T E R S  V S G A R IB A L D I’S 
60 -1 60
1 9 3 9 2 0 1 3
3500 Ol-Oct-60 3 3 4 2 1 0 1 4
3505 15-Oct-60 P O L IC E  A T T A C K E D  D IS P E R S IN G  Y O U T H S 6 1 2 1 2 0 1 0
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Appendix 3: Tables
Summaries and Results o f Statistical Tests 
Table 1: 1815-1835, Precautions by Type of Incident
Level of Precautions; see App 1 for meaning
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Type of Incident
Private Battles 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sectarian 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Direct Action 9 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
Election 0 0 0 1 0 6 0 0
Anti-Police 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Political 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
Number of Missing Observations: 24
Table 2: 1815-1835, Policing by Type of Incident
Level of Policing; see Appendix 1 for meaning 
0 1 2 3 4 5
Type of Incident 
Private Battles 
Sectarian 
Direct Action 
Election 
Anti-Police 
Political
Number of Missing Observations: 34
Table 3; 1815-1835, Numbers of Arrests by Type of Incident.
Type of Incident Number of Number of Mean no of 
Incidents Arrests Arrests/Incid
Private Battle 10 55 5.5
Sectarian 5 68 13.6
Direct Action 14 15 1.0
Election Riot 9 7 0.8
Anti-Police 14 71 5.1
Trade Dispute 14 40 2.8
Political Protest 6 10 1.7
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Table 4: 1815-1835, Sentence by Size and Severity of Incident.
SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
Sentence Sentence
Size of Incident .0326 Severity of Incident .0476
N( 161) N( 163)
SIG .341 SIG .273
Table 5: 1815-1835, Type of Trial by Type of Incident
Percentage
Summary Quart Sess Assizes Total Number
Type of Incident 
RUO
Private Battle 
Sectarian 
Direct Action 
Election 
Anti-Police 
Trade Dispute 
Political
Table 6: 1815-1835, Sentence by Type of Incident
Kruskal-WaUis 1-Way Anova
0 84.6 15.4 13
69.4 30.6 0 49
1.4 98.6 0 69
16.7 83.3 0 12
0 0 100 7
0 86.8 13.2 68
0 25.0 75.0 32
0 0 0 0
Mean Rank Cases
40.98 32 TYPE = 2, Private Battle
85.67 69 TYPE = 3, Sectarian
43.14 7 TYPE = 4, Direct Action
135.76 33 TYPE = 6, Anti-Police
90.05 30 TYPE = 7, Trade
171 Total
Corrected for ties
Cases Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance
171 65.2402 .0000 67.1682 .0000
Table 7: Comparison of Size and Severity, 1815-1835 with 
1836-1860.
i. Comparison o f Size o f Incidents  ^before 1836 and after,
Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova
Mean Rank Cases
163.16 63 INCNO = 1; Before 1836
145.84 235 INCNO = 2; 1836 and after
298 Total
Corrected for ties
Cases Chi-Square Significance Chi-Square Significance
298 2.0073 .1565 2.1542 .1422
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ii Comparison o f Severity o f Incidents  ^ before 1835 and after.
Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova
Mean Rank Cases
Cases
336
180.80
165.49
66
270
336 Total
Chi-Square Significance 
1.3159 .2513
INCNO = 1, Before 1836 
INCNO = 2, 1836 and after
Corrected for ties 
Chi-Square Significance 
1.4592 .2270
Table 8: 1836-1860, Precautions by Type of Incident
Level of Precautions; see App 1 for meaning
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Type of Incident
Private Battles 32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sectarian 22 1 4 13 13 0 1 1
Direct Action 35 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
Election 3 0 0 4 0 0 1 2
Anti-Police 91 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Political 4 0 0 5 0 1 0 6
Number of Missing Observations: 51
Table 9: 1836-1860, Policing by Type of Incident
Level of Policing; see App 1 for meaning
0 1 2 3 4 5
Type of Incident
Private Battles 0 21 9 1 0 0
Sectarian 3 12 15 20 • 3 0
Direct Action 1 31 2 2 1 0
Election 1 3 0 3 3 -0
Anti-Police 0 82 9 1 0 0
Political 0 - 3 2 10 2 0
Number of Missing Observations: 55
Table 10: 1815-1835 and 1836-1860, Arrests by Type of Incident
1815-1835 1836-1860
Type No Arr Mean No Arr Mean
Private 10 55 5.5 32 98 3.1
Sectarian 5 68 13.6 59 144 2.4
Direct Action 14 15 1.0 37 214 5.5
Election 9 7 0.8 10 94 9.4
Anti-Police 14 71 5.1 94 389 4.0
Trade 14 40 2.8 29 59 2.0
Political 6 10 1.7 20 12 0.6
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Table 11: 1836-1860, Type of Trial by Type of Incident.
% % % Total
Type Summary Quart Sess Assizes Number
RUO 62.1 24.2 13.6 66
Private Battle 88.1 10.7 1.2 84
Sectarian 66.8 21.2 12.0 184
Direct Action 70.6 20.1 9.3 194
Election / 66.7 29.3 4.0 99
Anti-Police 79.8 16.1 4.1 342
Trade Dispute 80.0 18.6 1.4 70
Political 16.7 0 83.3 12
Table 12: 1836-1860, Sentence by Type of Incident
Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova
Cases 
916 .
Mean Rank Cases
460.42
393.96
484.27
413.63
478.94
463.23
773.33
85
167
166
98
326
62
12
TYPE = 2, Private Battle 
TYPE = 3, Sectarian 
TYPE = 4, Direct Action 
TYPE = 5, Election 
TYPE = 6, Trade 
TYPE = 7, PoHtical 
TYPE = 8, Unknown
916 Total
Chi-Square Significance 
33.2944 .0000
Corrected for ties 
Chi-Square Significance 
34.7072 .0000
Table 13: 1836-1860, Sentence by Size and Severity of Incident.
i Correlation o f Sentence with Size of Incident
SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEEFICIENTS
Sentence
Size of 
Incident
.0140
N( 787) 
SIG .348
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ii Correlation o f Sentence with Severity o f Incident
Severity of 
Incident
Sentence .0039
N( 828)
SIG .456
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